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THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANISM

By LOUIS J. A. MERCIER

STUDIES ON HUMANISM AND CONFERENCE

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L'HUMANISME AUX ÉTATS-UNIS.
La Revue Mondiale, Paris, 1928.

LE MOUVEMENT HUMANISTE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS. (Hachette, Paris, 1928) (*Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie Française*)

W. C. BROWNELL AND OUR NEO-BARBARISM.
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THE HALF-WAY HOUSE OF HUMANISM.
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LITERATURE AND THE SPIRIT: THE WORK OF H. A. JULES-BOIS.
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The Challenge of Humanism

An Essay in Comparative Criticism

By

Louis J. A. Mercier

> "Men do not make laws. They do but discover them. Laws must be justified by something more than the will of the majority. They must rest on the eternal foundation of righteousness."
>
> Calvin Coolidge.

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To
My Wife
Zoé Lassagne Mercier

FOREWORD

WE have gone wrong on first principles," Irving Babbitt warned us, as far back as 1919, in his *Rousseau and Romanticism.* " When studied with any degree of thoroughness," he further wrote, in 1924, in his *Democracy and Leadership,* " the economic problem will be found to run into the political problem, the political problem in turn into the philosophical problem, and the philosophical problem itself to be almost indissolubly bound up at last with the religious problem." The wholesale breakdown of the economic system and the threatened collapse of the political systems of the nineteenth century which followed the unprecedented tragedy of the World War may well lead us to inquire whether the quality of our philosophical thought and its relation to religion, do not, indeed, need to be re-examined. The same concern has long been felt elsewhere, notably in France, where the naturalism toward which we have been moving and which had, in that country, an earlier development, has already been largely repudiated. Hence the trend toward an international humanistic movement which challenges our attention.

The aim of this essay is to bring together, by comparative analyses, several strands of this searching for the mental readjustments necessary to save the Occident, and the Orient as well, from further disintegration. I have failed of my purpose if I have been anywhere other than objective.

My thanks are gratefully acknowledged to Professor Irving Babbitt, Dr. Paul Elmer More, and Baron Ernest Seillière, for the opportunity to discuss with them many points of their doctrines and the assurance that I have not misinterpreted their thought; to Mr. Seward Collins for his permission to reproduce from the Bookman the study of Baron Seillière's work; to Rev. James F. Mellyn, S. J. of Boston College, and to Rev. Joseph P. Conroy, S. J. of Loyola University, Chicago, for their critical examination of my treatment of the neo-scholastic and theological points involved; finally, to Professors Samuel M. Waxman, and Austin Warren, of Boston University, for their kind reading of the proofs.

Louis J. A. Mercier

Cambridge, Mass.
1933

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I

THE RENAISSANCE OF HUMANISM

THE sudden capture of the national attention by humanism in the year 1930 might at first seem strange. When in 1929 I published *Le Mouvement humaniste aux Etats-Unis* to help acquaint the French public with the work of William C. Brownell, Irving Babbitt, and Paul Elmer More, I was told by several sympathetic American reviewers that the word "movement" applied to humanism was premature. One year later, on the occasion of the publication of a collection of essays by disciples of Babbitt and More, under the title: *Humanism and America,* even adverse critics admitted that the movement had numerous adherents, particularly among the younger men. One critic ventured to say that, if humanism could be explained in simple terms, most people would accept it. Even columnists began to play with the word, and New York papers, sensing the importance of the humanists' challenge, analyzed its significance in their editorial columns, recalling that, exactly one hundred years before, the romantic movement had burst into prominence in France in a like manner.

The parallel seems to the point. Movements of thought have a way of becoming suddenly dominant, not only because they have had a long period of incubation but because the world into which they suddenly emerge has long been preparing to receive them. Somehow, they answer a general if often unconscious demand not only local but international, and it becomes apparent that their leaders are merely heralding the convergent tendencies of their time. Such, it would seem, is the case with the renaissance of humanism. It has long been preparing not

For references and notes, see p. 273.

only in the United States but in Europe. Nor is it strange that, like the romantic movement in the nineteenth century, it should burst out some fifteen years after the cataclysm which ended the preceding epoch.

The period which culminated logically in the World War is already far enough removed to be safely labelled. It now appears clearly to have been marked, politically, by the flood-tide of nationalism, and, philosophically, by the height of naturalism. Periods, however, are never sharply defined. The principles that dominate one epoch grow up as a protest against the gradual exaggeration of the principles of the preceding age. For, curiously, man hitherto has seemed to be unable to avoid falling from one excess into the opposite.

The Middle Ages were supremely dynamic and progressive. Between 1100 and 1500, more social, political, intellectual, and artistic development was achieved in western Europe than in the four hundred years since, a fact insufficiently appreciated because it is not generally realized to what a low state, as a result of the Northmen invasions, civilization had fallen in the two hundred years after Charlemagne. Yet there is little doubt that the Middle Ages had neglected unduly the study of nature in their devotion to the supernatural. Man's capacity of attention seems to be so limited that when he concentrates on one order he can with difficulty pay sufficient attention to the other. There are always some men, however, who are bound to turn from the dominant principle of the day to its opposite. Naturalistic elements may be found in *Le Roman de la Rose* in the very time of St. Louis; the principles of the French Revolution were already familiar to the French bourgeoisie of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, while nationalism, in its first form of national kingdoms, began to develop in the twelfth century. The so-called Renaissance which culminated in the sixteenth century had thus had in its many aspects a long preparation. At first a violent assertion of individualism and neo-paganism, it found its equilibrium and issued into what may be called the era of humanistic civilization which lasted into the eighteenth century. As the *légistes,* or students of Roman law, found in this law arguments for the legitimacy of the power of national kings, in opposition to that of both the feudal lords and of the Papacy, so the "humanists," or students of Latin, and later of Greek, literature, found in their classical authors so much material on the dignity of man as man that they felt urged to challenge *literæ divinæ* in favor of *literæ humaniores.*

It then became evident that the civilization of a given age depends largely upon the prevalent conception as to the nature of man.

The *literæ divinæ* of the Middle Ages had not only a very clear conception of human nature, partly distinct from animal nature, as minutely studied in the philosophy known as scholasticism, but they also explained how God had superimposed upon this distinctive human nature, characterized by intellect and will, a superhuman nature, through the influx of supernatural grace, which made the end of man no longer merely the discursive knowledge and free service of God, but, ultimately, the intuitive vision and in consequence the assured love of God. It is this theological ideal, the call to live this life primarily as a preparation for the life to come, retained even by Protestantism, that *literæ humaniores* tended to displace. As opposed to the attitude of humility with reference to God, a shift was made towards pride in man's estate as man. The humanists sought the ornamentation of this life through the cult of thought, as opposed to faith, and of the beautiful unconsecrated to God's service. Thus the *Century Dictionary* defines humanism: "A system or mode of thought in which human interests predominate, or any purely human element is made prominent." It was soon apparent, however, that in the Renaissance itself what the humanists came to emphasize was the principle of mediation between extremes, of proportion and measure which they found both in the *Ethics* and the *Poetics* of Aristotle, based on his psychology, and exemplified in their beloved Cicero. The avoidance of extremes is achieved through a selection which presupposes in man the power to choose judiciously and therefore the capacity of reason and will, of a will to do or to refrain from doing. This power differentiates him from the rest of nature. It constitutes him a man, a being essentially distinct from all other beings. " Human nature or character," the character of man as such, is the first definition the Century gives of humanism. The whole question raised by humanism is precisely: what is the character of man as such, what is the nature of man?

On the basis of the recognition of intellect and will, still presumably, as in Aristotle, distinct from matter, there are four representative positions with reference to practical life. A semi-optimistic answer is that man may quite easily discover the laws of nature which concern the achievement of a well-ordered human life, and that, when the intellect has discovered these laws, the will easily follows them. Knowledge insures virtue. This is essentially the Stoic position stemming ultimately from the Socratic " Know thyself." As opposed to this, we have a semi-pessimistic answer that man's intellect has much difficulty in learning the laws of nature which concern him, and that, even when he does know them, his will does not necessarily follow them. The third position is one of utmost optimism: namely, that man's instincts are so naturally good that without effort he can be virtuous, that he has only to let himself go, so that his analytical intellect is rather a hindrance than a help. This is essentially the Rousseauistic view. The fourth position is that of the denial of intellect and will as distinct from the All-One of the universe which is conceived as wholly spiritual or wholly material.

The first two positions may be called humanistic, in so far as they clearly visualize man distinct from nature, and thus assign him a character of man as such. The respective quality of these two types of humanism remains however to be worked out. The third position is essentially naturalistic and the fourth clearly monistic; both are evidently opposed to humanism.

It is not surprising that there should be much confusion as to the respective limits of these positions and especially as to which is held by a given philosopher or a given school. The semi-pessimism of the second position needs to be clearly distinguished from the semi-optimism of the Stoic; while the outlook of the philosophy of the All-One, in its practical aspects, may be, at times, undistinguishable from the Rousseauistic trust in nature. Moreover, to the second position may be added the conception of something that may be found in man superior to both intellect and will, which may come to enlighten and strengthen them, insure a well-ordered life, and thus enable man to pass from semi-pessimism to a judicious optimism. These are precisely the questions which discussions of humanism must help to clear up.

Evidently the need of this discussion goes back to the Renaissance. The Middle Ages held to the second position. They believed in the reality but weakness of man's intellect and will, with the added explanation that the original natural tendency of man's intellect, will, and sensual appetites to virtuous functioning had been disorganized, that they now tended to excess, and that to achieve order they needed the help of the grace of God. According to the *literæ divinæ,* man needed God to lead even a well-ordered human life in this world, and, of course, needed it still more to live in such a way as to experience a sense of communion with God in this life and to deserve the beatific vision of God in the next.

Now just what did the most representative humanists of the Renaissance have to say on this point? There is no doubt that they sought to take the emphasis from the thought of the after-life. The purpose of *literæ divinæ* was to produce the saint. The aim of *literæ humaniores* came to be to produce the *honnête homme,* the cultured gentleman. The Renaissance however by no means indulged in extreme optimism as to the power of man to develop a well-ordered life. It is true that the humanists could find in Stoicism considerable faith in the rectitude of the intellect and will of man, and in Epicureanism much encouragement to enjoy the goods of this life. But the Stoics held that the passions were diseases of the soul and that man had often to rise superior to circumstance, so that one of their cardinal maxims was: " Abstain and bear," while for the Epicureans, happiness is to be found in a poise to be achieved by conquering feelings, such as ambition, irritation, sadness, undue sympathy, fear, especially the fear of death; and such detachment, as opposed to the excesses to which man naturally tends, had to be cultivated. Thus, if, as compared with Christianity, Stoicism and Epicureanism are over-optimistic in that they believe that man can, with comparative ease, achieve happiness and a well-ordered life on the purely natural level, they remain semi-pessimistic compared with the utter optimism of the third position listed above. It is this optimism which differentiates the era of naturalism beginning in the eighteenth century from the era of humanism beginning with the Renaissance.

The confusion as to the meaning of the Renaissance on this point comes from the fact that the Stoics often used the mottos: " Live conformably to nature " and " Follow nature." That this was often to be taken to mean " Follow all the instincts of nature " was inevitable. It is still often claimed, even today, that the humanists preached this doctrine. The " *Fais ce que voudras,*" the " Do as you please " which Rabelais wrote over the portal of his *Abbaye de Thélème,* is thus interpreted, while Montaigne has phrases which offer an excuse for taking him for a sheer naturalist. For instance: " As for me, I love life and cultivate it, such as it has pleased God to grant it to us . . . I accept heartily and gratefully what nature has done for me; and am pleased with it, and feel praiseful for it; one should not wrong the great and all-powerful Giver by refusing, annulling, or disfiguring His gift. He made everything good." It is significant that Montaigne quotes here directly from the *De Finibus* of Cicero: "*Omnia quæ secundum naturam sunt aestimatione digna sunt.*"

But the Rabelaisian "*Fais ce que voudras*" was addressed only to people " well born, well instructed, conversing in honest company "; and the basis of Rabelais's optimism as to their consequent virtuous lives was that such people "have by nature an instinct and a goad which ever urge them to virtuous deeds and keep them from vice, which instinct they call honor." Far from praise of natural goodness we have here praise of acquired goodness, a confidence in the effects of aristocratic culture. As for Montaigne, he reads delightedly the *literæ humaniores,* but only to discover that man is " changing and diverse " and that the "*tintamare de tant de cervelles philosophiques,*" "the din of philosophies," can but lead to scepticism through the realization of the limitations of the human mind. To the " Know thyself " of Socrates, Montaigne answers, " What do I know? " "*Que sais-je?*" Neither of the two greatest French representatives of Renaissance humanism can be credited with a wholly optimistic trust in the capacities of the natural man.

Then too, it is a pure distortion of the facts to make either Rabelais or Montaigne irreligious, even in the Christian sense, except in so far as they necessarily fall into contradictions in their effort to retain the old and welcome the new. Montaigne finds man weak and helpless when he considers him "shorn of grace and divine knowledge which is his sole honour, his strength, and the foundation of his being"; while Rabelais concludes Gargantua's counsels to Pantagruel with one of the noblest tributes to the need of religion: " But because, according to the wise Solomon, wisdom does not enter an evil-loving soul, and science without conscience is but ruin of the soul, it behooves you to serve and love and fear God and to place in Him all your thoughts and all your hopes; and through faith based on charity, you must remain united to Him, so that you may never be abandoned by

Him because of sin. Hold in suspicion the excesses of the world. Set not your heart upon vain things; for this life is transitory, but the word of God abideth forever."

It is quite true that from Rabelais and Montaigne, or better still, from the humanism of the Renaissance as a whole, a full-fledged naturalism could issue. There was in Rabelais such a love of life and knowledge and activity that he may be held to have exalted the *libido sciendi* and the *libido dominandi,* the lust of knowledge and power, into virtues. There is in Montaigne such a sensuous love of the *literæ humaniores,* such a seeking of tranquillity through fear of suffering, such an acceptance of scepticism that the Epicureans of the seventeenth century could look upon him as a model; and, on the other hand, such a revolt from all dogmatism that the rationalists of the eighteenth could hail him also as a precursor of their destructive criticism and, though inconsistently, of their counter-dogmatism. But all these possibilities are but proofs that the humanist movement was from the first pregnant with all the contradictions which issued from the confrontation of Christian and pagan thought and which have remained to this day unreconciled.

But, in the light of our present controversies, it should be clear that our renaissance of humanism is truly one with the humanism of the Renaissance. If Rabelais and Montaigne may be taken as the most representative humanists, Renaissance humanism was certainly not naturalistic, purely rationalistic, materialistic, or, in any way, monistic. It did not believe in the natural goodness of man; it did not even put complete faith in the capacity of reason to insure virtue. Nor did it reject the supernatural or attack the possibility of a Revelation. On the contrary, it welcomed the support of religion. It merely called for more emphasis on the secular study of human life. It certainly labored to give their due place to *literæ humaniores*; but it did not pretend to do away with *literæ divinæ*. It but sought to mediate between their ideals in so far as they were opposed. It was by this mediation that the whole humanistic age which followed sought to live, though not without the variations which were to be expected. Corneille, Racine, Bossuet, Boileau, Fénelon, La Bruyère were, in various degrees, Christian humanists; while Molière and La Fontaine were Epicureans not far remote in some aspects from the submerged school of the *libertins* which, throughout the seventeenth century, already tended to pure naturalism. Descartes's utter trust in reason was perhaps but a culmination of the proud confidence of Stoicism, whereas Pascal, taking his point of departure from the scepticism of Montaigne, based on the limitations of man's natural powers, reached a complete pessimism and in so far departed from the spirit of humanism: " It is in vain, oh men, that you seek in yourselves a remedy to your misery. Your own lights can but help you to know that you cannot find truth or righteousness in yourselves. The philosophers have made you but vain promises. They do not know what is your true good or your true state." To the " What do I know? " of Montaigne, Pascal answered: " Be humble, oh powerless reason; be silent, imbecile nature; learn that to know man is far beyond man, and hear from your master your true condition of which you are ignorant. Listen to God."

But Pascal's plea became associated with the controversies as to the nature of that grace through which God spoke to man, and the upshot was to be Voltaire and the rejection of revealed religion. Moreover, if the humanistic age was to produce a high type of culture and great works of art, it could hardly be expected to avoid exaggerations of its own. Neo-classicism degenerated into pseudo-classicism, and the *literæ humaniores* came to be challenged as they had challenged the *literæ divinæ*. They had oriented man away from the kingdom of God towards the kingdom of man, but they had kept this kingdom clearly distinct from the kingdom of nature. They had emphasized the study of man, but they had had little to say about the study of things. Had not the time come to change once more the emphasis? Thus the era of humanism was to wane as the era of naturalism set in.

Naturalism, like humanism, is unfortunately on the surface an ambiguous term. But, as in the case of humanism, it is not difficult to get at its central meaning. In fact standard definitions go to the root of its differentiation from humanism. Littré defines it as: " The system of those who attribute everything to nature as a first principle," and he further defines " naturism " as " a system in which nature is considered as author of itself." At once we see that, unlike humanism, naturalism is antithetical to supernatural religions and therefore incompatible with and consequently hostile to Christianity in its historical meaning of revealed religion. In fact, the *Century Dictionary* defines it only in theological terms: a) the doctrine that natural religion is sufficient for salvation, b) the doctrine that all religious truth is derived from a study of nature without any supernatural revelation and that all religious life is a natural development unaided by supernatural influences." " Moslems," asks Diderot, in his *Suffisance de la Religion naturelle,* " which cult would you embrace if you abjured Mahomet? Naturalism. . . ." Thus the essence of naturalism or naturism is seen to be a denial of the supernatural. From the establishment of Christianity until the eighteenth century, it was practically a minor trend in European thought; but by the middle of that century it was displacing humanism and vigorously attacking revealed religion and eventually the conception of the dualism of man's nature.

With this current of naturalism began the great rejections, not only of the Christian tradition, but more and more of the Greek and Latin traditions, philosophical and literary. Under the above definitions of naturalism, as opposed to the humanism of the Renaissance, may be summed up all the doctrines which the eighteenth century bequeathed to the nineteenth and twentieth and which they were to develop in various ways. All united in establishing a complete cleavage between the natural and the supernatural, while the more successful of them tended to merge man completely in material nature.

First, deism. This goes back ultimately to the quarrel raised by the Reformation over the method of transmission and interpretation of revealed religion. Deism boldly rejected Revelation. It may have retained the idea of God as creator, but it denied him all interference with nature or man posterior to creation. It therefore took a stand against the possibility of Providence, Revelation, and miracles. It still asserted, however, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, " a law for man " in nature distinct from " the law for thing." The laws of nature, both laws of spirit and laws of matter, account for all events, and are unchangeable. Ultimately the laws of morality may be regarded as the will of God. Human reason is capable of discovering them, and man may thus be moral. Revealed Christianity is thus replaced by a natural religion. It is this deism, developed especially in England from the middle of the seventeenth century to the middle of the eighteenth, that Voltaire exploited on his return from England in 1729 and that explains both his spirited attacks upon the Church and his no less emphatic assertion of a personal God and an after-life.

Could this body of doctrine rightly be called humanism? It certainly does not coincide with the beliefs of the humanists of the Renaissance; yet it might legitimately claim this title in that it still distinguishes human nature from the rest of nature by reason of the existence in man of a spiritual principle which has its own laws. In any case, it certainly deserves to be called rationalism.

But deism was evidently an unstable form of naturalism as was shown by the tendencies to divergence among members of the group. They were by no means agreed even on the immortality of the soul or at least on its demonstrability. Shaftesbury clung to theism and yet thought the idea of future rewards and punishments less needed than did Voltaire. From the idea of a God, merely the author of nature and its laws, it was easy to pass to the idea of a

God immanent in nature. This pantheism which asserted that, somehow, one necessary, eternal, and infinite being existed in and explained the multiplicity of the changes in the universe went back also to antiquity, not only Greek but oriental. The deist, John Toland, reintroduced the word pantheist at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Pantheistic naturalism was however to have its full development much later. The doctrines of Spinoza (d. 1677), who systematized it, were not fully exploited until, a century after his death, they passed into the writings of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. There, pantheism assumes the form of an Absolute which embraces all individuals, and comprises in itself all differences in such wise that history is but the revelation of a God slowly developing to some consummation of being. We thus get a philosophy of becoming versus a philosophy of antecedent reality. The doctrine of evolution was to reinforce this conception of everlasting change. This trend sweeps away individual existence. Reality is but the unfolding of the All-One. God becomes impersonal and human personality a mere illusion. All human actions are inevitably determined. A moral order has no foundation in reality. There is of course no supernatural, since God and the world are one. There is no immortality save reabsorption into the All-One, and hence no differences in the after-lives of men. We thus have a monistic philosophy which may profess to be spiritualistic but which easily lends itself to a materialistic interpretation. At least, we have here a doctrine which, with its complete merging of God, man, and nature, stands in sharp opposition to humanism, in so far as the humanists of the Renaissance believed in the autonomy of man, in a human nature distinct through its spiritual element from the rest of nature, and in a personal God above both man and nature.

Materialistic naturalism, however, had an independent development. It, too, of course, has antecedents in antiquity. But its full revival follows from the work of Bacon (d. 1626) and of Descartes (d. 1650). Bacon did little more than call attention to the possibilities in the study of natural forces. Descartes too remained a spiritualist, but he pushed so far apart the dualism of thought and matter that it became easy to doubt the possibility of their interaction and to deny one or the other term; hence his philosophy opened the way to a pure idealism on the one hand and to a pure materialism on the other. Through Hobbes (d. 1673), Locke (d. 1704), Hume (d. 1776), Condillac (d. 1780), Diderot (d. 1784), La Mettrie (d. 1751), d'Holbach (d. 1789), man's conception of himself is gradually reduced to that of a machine. We thus get a new series of notions. Nothing exists but matter endowed with movement. Man's acts follow mechanical laws. There is no teleology. The cosmic process is developing blindly without purpose. There is no spiritual mind, nothing but a physics and chemistry of the brain. Man is a conscious automaton. Freedom, responsibility, personal immortality disappear with personal reality. Here again we have a complete denial of humanism. Not only is there no "law for man" distinct from "the law for thing" but actually man is not. There is nothing abiding in him. He represents nothing but a passing arrangement of material particles, his consciousness is but a property of matter. Materialistic, like pantheistic naturalism, implies the complete denial of man as man, as a distinct if mysterious entity possessing identity and personality, a being *sui generis* in the midst of nature.

It is against this whole naturalistic trend that the movement now widely known as "humanism" rises to protest. By definition, there is really nothing new about it, nothing in fact which the man in the street does not take for granted as immediate data of consciousness. It merely asserts that there is such a thing as "man as such." Whatever side we may take in the debate — and the development of naturalism to the present day has added little to the bequest of the eighteenth century — our common care should be to keep the issue clear-cut if we are to retain any possibility of intelligent discussion. This issue should remain sharply defined as it comes to us historically: humanism versus naturalism; and humanity conceived as made up of individual, personal, autonomous beings, distinct from the rest of nature, versus the identification of man with either a spiritual or material All-One; spiritual-material dualism versus a spiritual or a material monism. We shall have occasion to note that in France, at least, where naturalism first reached its most complete materialistic formulation, there was, in the last years of the nineteenth century and down to our day, a revolt against the doctrines which completely merged man in the rest of nature, deprived his life of all purpose and consequently left him without any moral responsibility. We are here primarily concerned however with the same trend in American thought; and, as is now well known, the challenge to naturalism and all its works in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries came from the joint work of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, who began to write about 1900.[1]

Now, as is equally well known, the approach to the problems of philosophy of these two men, whose intellectual association dates back to their student days at Harvard, was through the study of literature. At first proceeding on parallel lines, they so diverged, at least in their studies, some fifteen years ago, that it is already apparent that the name of Irving Babbitt will remain associated with the reformulation of humanism proper, while that of Paul Elmer More will live primarily for his independent studies of the transition from humanism to religion. There are already indications that the precise restatement of humanism which Irving Babbitt gave us is likely to become distorted in the discussion to which it must continue to lead. Our first care then should be to isolate and set it off as sharply as possible from the naturalism against which it protests, from the prideful type of humanism of the Stoic school which we shall see it repudiates, and from its possible relation to *literæ divinæ* which Paul Elmer More was led to study once more after his labors in what the Renaissance marked off as the special field of *literæ humaniores*. Before we take up the discussion of these distinctions, however, it will repay us to see first how Irving Babbitt was led, through his studies of the literary and historical record of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to question the soundness of naturalism.

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[1] It may be noted here, though the question will be discussed later (see pp. 250–253) that the "humanism, a new religion," of Dr. C. F. Potter and other former Unitarians (developed about 1925) is the very antithesis of humanism as Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More understand it, since Dr. Potter's doctrine is an extreme development of naturalism.

II

THE CHALLENGE OF IRVING BABBITT TO NATURALISM

"WHAT is Humanism?" Such was the title of the first essay in the book to which may be traced the beginning of the movement in American thought which may now be hailed as a renaissance of humanism. This book appeared in 1908 under the title: *Literature and the American College.* Its author was Irving Babbitt, a graduate of Harvard who, after some years of study in France, had in 1894 returned to his Alma Mater as instructor. The book is thus seen to have been the fruit of over fifteen years of study and meditation. During those very years graduate study in language and literature had been fast developing in the United States, but it had done so mostly at the school of German philology. However valuable the lessons of accuracy which might be learnt from that school, it was already apparent that philological "research" was not the best means of getting at the spirit or even the letter of literature or of qualifying for its interpretation. At least so it appeared to Irving Babbitt. Fortunately for him the study of "comparative literature" had also been inaugurated. It was now realized that the literature of a given European people could not be studied independently. Not only were all the European literatures linked together in their development, but they all went back to those of Greece and Rome. The sense of a unity in the development of occidental civilization was being recovered. Irving Babbitt was eminently fitted to enter this field. He had early read extensively in the ancient and modern languages, and he had even, under the guidance of Sylvain Lévi at the *École des Hautes Etudes* in Paris, studied the ancient languages of India. An object of somewhat scandalized worry for his philological colleagues, he could find a refuge in this new field. Four years after the appearance of his first book, he was duly elected to a chair of French literature at Harvard, which he made in reality a chair of comparative literature, and from which for some twenty years he has exercised an influence whose ultimate effects are only now beginning to be foreseen.

He might have approached the study of "comparative literature" merely as a minute study of sources, influences, and relationships. But he quickly saw in it the opportunity to study the deep underlying movements of thought reflected in the several national literatures, and to try to discover in them the abiding elements and permanent values.

However, at this point, he was confronted with the necessity of widening the field of his inquiry. If the critic is to deal in values how can he do so without standards? As he expressed it in the preface to *The Masters of Modern French Criticism* (1912): "Whether the critic can judge, and if so by what standards, is only a form of the more general inquiry whether the philosopher can discover any unifying principle to oppose to mere flux and relativity." But this means that there can be no criticism worthy of the name without a philosophy, and philosophy is but a delusion unless it can reach some abiding elements in the midst of the manifoldness of change. For if there are no permanent elements in man and outside of man, nothing which transcends time and place, there is no reality. If nothing in us today is what was in us yesterday and will be in us tomorrow, it is as though we had never been or rather *we* have never been. Individual human life is but an illusion. Hence the problem of philosophy remains where Plato placed it: Find the abiding, discover the one in the many, the permanent elements in the midst of change, in the relative, or there is for you no reality. Reality is the abiding, and the abiding is reality.

Irving Babbitt thus came to consider himself obliged to take up the philosophical problem before he could have anything worth saying as a critic of literature.

But precisely, as we have seen, the naturalism which developed during the eighteenth century tended to deny abiding reality, and the nineteenth century had continued to exploit this denial. At once Irving Babbitt began a long inquiry into the literary record which these centuries had left. One early consequence of the loss of the sense, which characterized the humanistic age, of the necessity for man to search for the abiding laws which concerned him particularly as man, distinct from the rest of nature, and to school his will to follow them, was the complete confusion between the higher self and the lower self in man, the self which needs and is able to exercise control and the self which tends to mere expansiveness and uncritical indulgence of its every impulse, sensual, volitional, and intellectual.

Babbitt finds a major statement of the growing call to man to follow confidently his temperamental or lower self as early as 1759 in Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition.* "In the fairy land of fancy," Young wrote, "genius may wander wild; there, it has creative power and may reign arbitrarily over its own empire of chimeras." Stronger words could hardly be uttered. This was a call to indulge in the utmost freedom on the wings of uncontrolled imagination, a call to each individual to utter his own uniqueness, to express all that separates him from his fellow men, whereas the classicism of the seventeenth century, like the classicism of Greece and Rome, had sought to express all that was common to men. It was a challenge to turn from the universal to the particular, to all that has since been known as romanticism. Already Diderot conceived poetry as "calling for something enormous, barbaric and savage."

Irving Babbitt has explained, at length and often, how this plea for originality was a natural enough protest against the mechanical imitation and artificial decorum of decadent neo-classicism, just as the assertion of man's natural goodness was a rebound from the doctrine of total depravity ushered in by Protestantism. The English deists proclaimed that nature was God's nature filled with His "harmonies." How natural then for man to discover harmonies in himself, virtue in instinct, and to transform with Shaftesbury even conscience into an expansive emotion. Away then with humility and restraint. Man is naturally good, nature is beneficent and beautiful. In fact God, man, and nature become so merged that presently God will disappear and, as we saw, the deist becomes the pantheist. To be expansive, to let oneself go according to one's temperament will be considered to be natural and vital, in fact to be at one with whatever God there is, with the laws of nature conceived as good. So that to resist temperamental expansiveness will be denounced as an acceptance of "the chains" of the conventional or artificial. Thus Mme. de Staël will be praised for showing "primitive, incorruptible, naïve, passionate nature in conflict with the barriers and shackles of conventional life." She was of course merely following the lead of her master, Rousseau, who positively gloated over his own uniqueness, and thus set the tone for the whole epoch which Chateaubriand helped to usher in.

Hugo but continues this cult of the wonderful. With Wordsworth, he praises the child as a seer, because of his spontaneity. All the romantics pride themselves on their departure from the norm. They go in quest of the picturesque and exotic in nature, cultivate concrete words, set up violent contrasts of character, cherish eccentricity, even monstrosity, in short oppose native "genius" to culture, and in every way exalt the individual as opposed to the type.

But to be unique in the midst of a real world is difficult. The real, after all, merely repeats the type. The romantic could not long satisfy his yearning to be thus ever novel within his environment, even if widened through travel and the search of the glamorous in America, Italy, or Spain, or anywhere in the wilds of nature, now for the first time sought as the free domain of unrestraint, of pantheistic revery, and as a mirror of individual moods. But man can escape his environment. He has imagination. In him, images may combine spontaneously. Let imagination then become unrestrained and carry with it the emancipated emotions. Did not Rousseau deem the land of chimeras alone worthy of habitation? His example was to lead men to prefer something that never existed to civilization! A vagabond of genius, he was to entice generations into the ever vanishing lands of infinite, indeterminate desire, into the imaginative primitiveness of Arcadia. After him, we have romantic Hellenists like Schiller and Shelley who make of Greece a wonderland of pure beauty. We have dreams of transforming the real world into a golden age. The imagination strains from the prosaic present into the past or the future after the idyllic dream of the unknown. The mediaeval age, romantically conceived, becomes another land of heart's desire, especially for the Germans who find it a means of idealizing their national genius, of combining the romanticist's love of the primitive with patriotic pride. Hence the enthusiasm of Mme. de Staël for *L'Allemagne*. She was but following the Schlegels; and by 1820, in England, Byron will also take them into account.

In these idyllic settings, the romantic moves, unawed, impressed only by his own wonderfulness. The *honnête homme* of classical days, the product of social disciplines, disappears before the *belle âme,* the *âme sensible,* set against the Philistine multitude. Away too with the thought of sin. " Julie," writes Rousseau, " can have no surer guide than her heart; she may give herself up to it without scruple, and to do right has but to follow it." Passion becomes virtue, and virtue a passion — and how superior to cold reason! True drama with its background of ethical values gives way to melodrama or to melodramatic novels or plays about sublime convicts and virtuous courtesans. Freed from inner conflicts, the beautiful soul has only to improve the less beautiful. Is not the spirit of brotherhood part of its own beauty? We are on our way to a humanity of comrades, the more surely that science is now contributing to human progress. Prometheus, at once rebel, lover of man, and promoter of man's material welfare, becomes the favorite hero of the humanitarian utopist. To be a social outcast is almost the surest badge of a beautiful soul, and beautiful souls love all outcasts. "*Un pourceau secouru vaut un monde égorgé,*" writes Hugo, and Wordsworth and Coleridge join him in exalting the ass. Away then with all the old scales of values. Sympathy and enthusiasm replace them; the more delirious they are, the better. Reason and reality are the enemies to get rid of, even by drink or opium. Love itself is to be in turn but an emotional intoxication. Here Pygmalion becomes the symbol, the sculptor, enamoured of his own creation, who by the sheer intensity of his desire brings it to life. The romantic thus loves merely a projection of himself. Novalis, Shelley, Byron, Chateaubriand, Musset flit from love to love, in love really only with their own emotions. As Musset puts it: "To love is the great point; what matters the mistress? What matters the flagon provided one has the intoxication?" In fact, for many, the beloved is often an elusive nymph haunting the imagination to the point of hallucination. Rousseau always spoke of sylphids; Chateaubriand of sylphids and "phantoms of love," and the latter exactly describes their genesis: "As a result of the ardor of my imagination, my timidity, and solitude, I did not turn to the outer world, but was thrown back upon myself. In the absence of a real object, I evoked by the power of my vague desires a phantom that was never to leave me." His sylphid accompanies him in the forests of the New World. Shelley likewise invites his soul's sister to sail with him to Arcady. A third symbol reappears with Don Juan, no longer a type of libertinism or defiance of God, but on the contrary, as in Musset, of the man who tries to slake his thirst of the infinite through amorous adventure. Musset, in particular, speaks of his loves as though they were in the service of God, and claims a spiritual reward for a sensual indulgence. The remembrance of indulgences will remain for the romantics what Hazlitt calls " the heavenly tints of fancy reflected in the bubbles that float upon the spring tide of human life." The beautiful soul loves to linger on its past most beautiful moments. Rousseau's *Confessions* are re-echoed in that trilogy of ecstatic remembrance: *Le Lac, Souvenir,* and *La Tristesse d'Olympio.*

But intense stimulation inevitably leads to depression. The spectre of melancholy dogs the footsteps of the romantic. His most beautiful songs are the most desperate. Impassioned recollection, the attempt to prolong the thrill of indulgence, cannot long retain whatever glamour may have lingered in the dream. The real cannot be held at bay permanently. Gradually we hear notes of irony and sardonic laughter, of proud disdain or defiance, till we see the romantic fall from the towers of his castles in Spain to the miry moat below. Flaubert, in particular, typifies this change of mood. It made him the prince of realists and yet left him the most temperamental of romantics. The most revealing of all romantic confessions is his pathetic cry: " *Mme. Bovary, c'était moi.*" The pity and irony of Anatole France, spiced with eroticism, prolong into our century the final disenchantment of a Renan who began with an enthusiastic paean to science, changed Christ into an Arcadian apparition, and ended by encouraging a decadent epicureanism for the élite, and drunkenness for the masses. It thus seems that, since man turned from facing the mysterious reality of the dualism of his nature, he has but flitted from illusion to illusion and condemned himself to a restless unhappiness from which relief can be found only in some type of intoxication. And as Darwinism proclaimed that nature was not tender and pitiful, as Wordsworth had visioned it, but " red in tooth and claw," the Nietzchean superman appeared to reinforce the lust of sensation with the lust of power, and two centuries of sentimentality about the goodness of human nature and the spontaneousness of human brotherhood ended in the butchery of a world war.

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For there is involved in this whole question much more than mere art. Art, as the expression of the individual and of the age, is but the flower of a civilization, the proof of the health of the plant. The Greek Nemesis is in accord with the God of Christianity that the sterile tree will be destroyed because such is the demand of justice. In *Democracy and Leadership* (1924) Irving Babbitt proceeded to trace how, in the political domain, there has also been a regression, this time from the promises of the Christian ages, and that, in spite of appearances, our political evolution has become an inevitable tendency to ever harsher forms of despotism, to what he would call an imperialistic decadence. This of course will appear to many an even greater paradox than his arraignment of the romantic movement, but that is largely because the social and political evolution of the Middle Ages is still so little understood.

It is true that the Middle Ages have a chequered actuality. But their political and social progress was nevertheless continuous. The Roman empire bequeathed to them political absolutism and a social order based on slavery. The invasions held back the progress of Christian principles till the tenth century, but, from the eleventh to the fourteenth, this progress was so continuous and so rapid that politically the Middle Ages developed the ideal of a Christian commonwealth with the distinction, unknown in classical Antiquity, between the things of God and the things of Cæsar, on which, as Babbitt brings out, ultimately rests the only possibility of individual liberty. Socially, they evolved out of serfdom a middle class, so proud that the Gothic cathedrals and town-halls are its fit expression, and that, in France at least, as early as the fourteenth century, it asked the king to be represented on his council and to control his acts. As kings, the Middle

Ages produced a Saint Louis and a Charles V of France, the first a saintly knight, the second a saintly scholar. And if the reign of Louis XI marks fittingly their end, it is because we can see in him, even before the letter, the appearance of the Machiavellian ruler.

" If one wishes," writes Babbitt, " to study in its purest form the new nationalistic spirit that was destined finally to destroy the religious unity of mediæval Europe, one needs to turn to Machiavelli." He would have the statesman sternly realistic but recognizes as " real " only the law of cunning and the law of force. In his " virtu," nothing is left of religious virtue and little of the humanistic. Patriotic pride is to replace humility. The material aggrandizement of the state dictates right conduct. The universal morality of the Christian ages is left behind. Hobbes, in England, continues this new naturalistic trend towards ethical blindness. He erects the law of cunning and the law of force into a metaphysical system. The mediaeval sovereign, whether Pope or Emperor, if not responsible to the people, was at least responsible to God, and thus, theoretically at least, could not transgress the universal moral law, whether natural or supernatural. But with Hobbes it is the state which becomes the absolute and unlimited sovereign as a result of a supposed social contract which man made in the state of nature, a state which is purely mythical.

Here, let us note carefully, we may study the turning point of modern history, the beginning of the road on which we are still travelling. Here we add to the lists of the illusions we have already studied the political myths, and thus we retrogress at once not only back of sixteen hundred years of Christianity but back of Aristotle; for according to Aristotle, man is naturally a social and political being. For Hobbes, on the contrary, man is naturally non-political. Before forming a political group, he lived " solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish," at war with all his fellow men. A poor estate, indeed, Hobbes recognizes; but on the other hand, in this " natural state," man has unlimited liberty and unlimited sovereignty over his own person. These are his " natural rights ", and therefore he can transfer to the state the natural right of sovereignty by the social contract which men somewhere, somehow, are mythically supposed to have made. Thus the state again comes to be considered as having absolute power and therefore all rights over the individual. Thus a principle of ultimate state despotism is reintroduced into the Occident, through a new confusion of the things of God and the things of Cæsar, compromising, as Babbitt puts it, " the chief advance in political thinking that had been made since Aristotle."

Hobbes's conception of the state of nature was so pessimistic that his doctrines might have had no future, but there was at work since the Renaissance, thanks largely to neo-stoicism, a more optimistic outlook. Cicero speaks of a " common utility " and of a " society of mankind." Marcus Aurelius conceived it to be as natural for a man to serve other men as for the eye to see. Thus arose an ethical trend favorable to the growth of confidence in the natural goodness of man which characterized the English deistic movement. By the end of the eighteenth century, humanitarianism in its two main aspects — the utilitarian and the sentimental — was already taking definite shape. Sociology was beginning to displace Christianity.

Not that this new faith in man's natural social morality could be accepted at once; and the fact partly explains the *chaos d'idées claires* of Voltaire, and the scepticism of a Mandeville as to the power of reason to control the selfish passions. But the doctrine of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, as to the existence in man of a moral sense which makes him naturally virtuous, prevailed more and more, encouraging an optimistic interpretation of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people.

In the meantime, the transition from the mediaeval Christian commonwealth based on the idea of the sovereignty of God was going on. Protestantism, Babbitt sees clearly, was " largely an incident in the rise of nationalism." "Practically," he writes, "both the Lutheran and the Calvinistic state tend to run together the things of God and the things of Cæsar, and to leave the individual without any *civitas Dei* in which he may take refuge from the secular power." Even in Catholic France, a Bossuet, while still limiting the power of the king by the Christian idea of his responsibility to God, went very far towards accepting a nationalistic Gallicanism.

The sovereignty of the king, pushed to this extreme, led to a reaction in favor of the sovereignty of the people. For the sovereign national king there was substituted the sovereign nation. The English Revolution of 1688 gave Locke the occasion to write his second *Treatise on Government* which was extremely influential upon both American and French revolutionists. Hobbes saw salvation from the brutish state of nature in a social contract by which the individual renounced his unlimited individual sovereignty in favor of a despot who would insure order. Locke, following the more optimistic conception, looked on the state of nature as "a state of peace, good-will, mutual assistance and preservation." But, in the name of the common good and the protection of private property, the product of manual labor, he argues for the necessity of an organized state in which the will of the people, conceived as the will of the majority, is to dominate both the executive and the judiciary through the legislative organ. Hence the famous motto: "Taxation without representation is tyranny."

Though Locke thus guards against the absolutism of a king, there is nothing in his theory to prevent the sovereignty of a majority of the people from developing into a new absolutism and from becoming tyrannical with respect to the minority. The consequences of his inadequacy at this point were, however, to become evident only gradually.

Fortunately, Montesquieu came to correct Locke. Like him, he stands for parliamentary control of the executive, especially in matters of taxation, but he tends to separate more sharply than Locke the legislative, the judiciary, and the executive, and to make the last two more independent of the first, with the resulting system of balances which had a decided influence on the framers of the American Constitution. Furthermore, these framers had a practical sagacity which, while insuring a popular form of government, helped to save the American system of government until our own day from the tyranny of the majority.

The proponents of a constitutional reform in France who initiated the French Revolution also looked to Montesquieu for their principles, but they were to be later pushed aside by the disciples of Rousseau. Irving Babbitt has often been accused of Rousseauphobia. But it is not his fault if Rousseau stands at one of those culminating points of history where an accumulation of principles is ready to be summed up by one man and made the battle cry of a new age. The works of such a man are apt to be filled with contradictory elements and it is always easy to defend him against being exclusively the apostle of one set of ideas by quoting from another set. It remains true that he becomes significant only in terms of the principles which won him disciples. Babbitt has never used stronger words about Rousseau than has, for instance, M. Lanson, a great admirer of the eighteenth century. " Rousseau," the latter writes, " is a poor dreamy creature who approaches action only with alarm and with every manner of precaution and who understands the applications of his boldest doctrines in a way to reassure conservatives and satisfy opportunists. But the work for its part detaches itself from its author, lives its independent life, and, heavily charged with revolutionary explosives which neutralize the moderate and conciliatory elements Rousseau has put into it for his own satisfaction, it exasperates and inspires revolt and fires enthusiasm and irritates hatreds; it is the mother of violence, the source of all that is uncompromising; it launches the simple souls who give themselves up to its strange virtue upon the desperate quest of the absolute, an absolute to be realized now by anarchy and now by social despotism."

Until Rousseau, the change in outlook was largely rationalistic. The so-called "age of enlightenment" is rightly called "the age of reason." It is but the culmination of the neo-stoical movement which begins with the Renaissance and tends to imbue man again with the ancient Stoic's proud confidence of being able to achieve virtue through knowledge. But reason after all is a cold goddess. What makes Rousseau significant is not the originality of his ideas but his imaginative and passionate genius. Reason will never make men enthusiastic, but an imaginative appeal to emotions does. It was Rousseau who put fire into the rationalistic conception of the rights of man deduced from a hypothetical state of nature. He did it by flattering human pride, proclaiming as natural to man no longer, liberty, equality, and war, as Hobbes had done, nor like Locke, liberty, equality, and reason; but liberty, equality, and fraternity. For him the man who reasons is no longer in the state of nature. He is a "depraved animal." His natural instinct is not to struggle against his fellow men but on the contrary to pity them; hence, generosity, clemency, benevolence, friendliness are conceived as gushing spontaneously from the heart of man. Thus man is naturally good and virtuous in spite of his self-love, and the more he follows his instincts, the more virtuous he will be. What then leads him to be selfish and grasping? Rousseau replies: "Social institutions." But these are represented by individuals. Hence the denunciation of all hierarchies, kings, priests, capitalists. Upon this myth of the natural goodness of man, perverted by institutions, is to be built the whole mythology of democracy dear to the romantics from Shelley to the aging Hugo. To the fall from a state of grace to a state of corrupted nature, will be opposed the fall from the state of nature to the social state, organized on the basis of property, the source of all inequalities. Christianity tried to teach humility to the rich and powerful. The Rousseauistic gospel taught pride and envy to the poor, whom it pitied as victims of a conspiracy. Rousseau admitted in his " Second Discourse " that he put facts aside; and elsewhere that, dissatisfied with reality, he had imagined a " golden age of fancy "; and, again, that he feared that his theories were full of extravagances. He even expressed disapproval of the father who sought to bring up his child according to *Emile*. But it is not Rousseau, critic of Rousseau who prevailed, but the Rousseau who flattered man and inspired enthusiasm in the masses by the pictured happiness which was to follow the destruction of the social order. His powerful imagination conjured up from the myth of the natural goodness of man the mirage of an Arcadia ever susceptible of arising upon the ruins of the existing social order. Hence, in the Rousseauistic movement, the perpetual appeal to revolution. In spite of contradictions, and even, sometimes, of a certain relativism which recalls Montesquieu, Rousseau's thought tends essentially to the absolute. From the integral individualism of the " Second Discourse," he passes to the integral collectivism of the " Social Contract." The natural goodness of the individual becomes the natural goodness of the citizen. He uses the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people to denounce as illegitimate all existing governments. " Man is born free and is everywhere in chains." Utilizing the myth of the social contract, he transfers to the general will the virtues which, according to the other myth of man's natural goodness, belong to man, not as a result of ethical effort, but as a free gift of nature. From these two myths there follows the enormous consequence that the sovereignty of the state is one and indivisible. " The sovereign people by the very fact that it exists, is always everything it ought to be." " To limit its sovereignty is to destroy it." The king, according to Bossuet, was responsible to God. The sovereign people, according to Rousseau, is responsible to no one. It is god. It has every power and no obligation. The divine will of the Middle Ages has been replaced by the absolutely unrestricted popular will of the naturalistic age. One consequence is that the naturalistic age is condemned indefinitely to revolution. Another is that it is to see ever reappearing the tyranny of Cæsar against which the Middle Ages had given to man the refuge of the "City of God." In practice, the popular will is the majority at a given moment. What guarantee remains to the individual or to the minority against its despotism? None. Rousseau, it is true, pauses a moment before the boundless credulity required to believe that the supposed spontaneous goodness of the individual in the state of nature is transferred to the general will by the social contract. He admits that, if the people always want the right, they do not always know what this right is. But his remedy is even worse than the disease. He conceives the idea of a superman who is to legislate and elaborate an ideal code to guide the general will. This new and illogical fancy could but encourage the appearance, in the course of revolutions, of Robespierres ready to pose as Lycurguses and to persecute or guillotine men who would not accept their idea of virtue. Nothing was left, to make all the possibilities of tyranny complete, but to substitute a religion of the state for that of the Church. Rousseau did not fail to do so. He accused the Church of having put man in contradiction with himself by imputing to him a certain degree of perversity, whereas, as Babbitt puts it, the Church had only borne witness to a primordial fact of human nature. He proposed a religion of the heart, purely individualistic, without rites or ceremonies. But even such a religion, from which all spirit of humility has disappeared, would still put man as an individual in contradiction with himself as a citizen. Whereupon, Rousseau hastens to abolish this contradiction by annexing religion to the domain of Cæsar. Humility, which implies the submission of the individual to something superior, may then be replaced by patriotic pride, as in the days of ancient Rome and Sparta. Thus all things are definitely subordinated to political unity. Religion becomes a mere matter of social utility. There is to be a civil religion and a civil constitution of the clergy. The possible curve of revolutions is completely traced for all time. History will have but to repeat itself. Revolutions begun in the name of democracy will inevitably end in some form of decadent imperialism.

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What has happened then, according to Irving Babbitt, is that, in the course of the transition from the Christian Middle Ages and the Christian-humanistic era to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, man has lost the true conception of himself. He no longer knows "what man is as such." He is no longer a humanist. He has come to believe that every individual is naturally so good that whatever he does is in conformity with the best to be attained; that the more spontaneously he acts, the better he will be; and that, for the same reason, the spontaneousness of the social group is to be given free play. The individual and the social self are naturally virtuous and remain so unless interfered with. You will get good social conditions, good art, good literature, good education, indeed good religion, in proportion as the individual succeeds in expressing all that is in him. Back of this point of view is the philosophy both of the idealistic and the materialistic naturalism which we have analyzed, and of the conceptions we shall see further developing in nineteenth-century German thought. The individual is naturally good because he is part of nature; and nature is necessarily good, it will be further asserted, because it is all the good there is, all the God there is, God in the process of development. Individual human consciousness is but a curious and inconsequential accompaniment of this development. That aspect of consciousness which leads man to analyze what is going on and to believe that the individual can interfere with this evolution is but a delusion. In so far as it is indulged in, it but prevents the individual from getting the benefit of the evolution. If it could be successful it would interfere with this evolution. Such possible interference through thought and will is indeed the only possible sin, an opposition to the will of the All-One whose only purpose is to evolve freely. The fruit of thought and will leads to static dogmas, reflections on some moments of change, adherence to which can but withdraw the individual from the benign current of the evolution of the All-One. To let oneself go, to float along with and in the current of manifold change is not only not bad; it is the only way to be good. In any case all else is futile. The attempt of the individual to separate himself, through reflection and selection, from the stream of the All-One may for a while make an eddy in its flow, but the stream is resistless, and the puny individual who, with his would-be static dogmatizing, would thus sin against the All-One, will be carried on willy-nilly in the sweep of the universal flux, whether spiritual or material. Such are the dogmas of the philosophy of change which has displaced the dualistic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, of the Middle Ages, and of the humanistic age.

It is against this whole fundamental conception that Irving Babbitt would react, because for him this whole monistic philosophy is hopelessly contrary to the facts which a critical study of human nature, through self-observation and through the historical and literary record of man, can establish. To accept this philosophy is but to fall " into the terrible naturalistic trap." It is from this trap that Irving Babbitt would help to rescue us. Man has lost the sense of the reality and the value of the autonomy of the individual. It is this sense which Babbitt would help restore.

The Christian ages had this sense and that more clearly than any preceding age. Aristotle had developed the idea of a Prime Mover, and of individual autonomous man; but his God remained a cold, distant, silent abstraction. Hebraic tradition, on the other hand, spoke of the actual revelation to man of this God, and this revelation was wholly in terms of personality — a personal God revealing

Himself as the end of each individual man, all equally precious in His sight. This message was in accord with the immediate data of man's consciousness, of his natural feeling of individuality and responsibility. But this personal God was a spirit. It is true the mind of man can conceive a spirit since it had done so with the Greeks, but though it can abstract, its abstractions remain unsatisfactory. Though man by the very possession of this abstracting power may make clear that there is a spiritual element in him, his spirit is so evidently united with the body, so dependent upon it, that the abstractions of the spirit remain cold and uninspiring. Man's knowledge comes to him through the senses. When he abstracts, it is but from sense impressions; and, unless he can clothe these abstractions in images, built out of those which the senses furnish, he can only with difficulty, if at all, keep a hold upon them. He is incapable of pure intuition. If the abstract God was to reveal Himself to man, he had to do so in such a way as to appeal to his senses. The Incarnation of God in man is an ultimate psychological necessity. Irving Babbitt has purposely remained short of this aspect of the question, but such was evidently the Christian message. God had manifested Himself to man, to the people who among all peoples had drawn the nearest to the conception of a personal God and so had become the most worthy to receive His Revelation. Furthermore, God had appeared among men in human flesh. He had perfected the Revelation. He had entrusted it to those He had gathered about Him. He had promised that His spirit was to remain with them to the end of time. He had left them the Eucharist that He might always be present among them under visible form, that they might unite with Him in their physical as well as in their spiritual self; tremendous unfathomable mysteries, but no more inexplicable than the union of spirit and matter in man which the Greeks had deduced from the operations of the human mind. Christianity gave a name to their unknown God, and found Greek terms ready to express the universality of this final religion, and to displace Hebraic particularism in formulating it. Thus it swept around the Mediterranean, permeating the Roman world with the sense of the responsibility of the individual, of the ever ready help of a personal God, of the consequent dignity of every man, woman, and child, of the weak and the lowly as well as of the strong and mighty; because all were equally sacred in origin and destiny, sons of God, brethren of God, destined to return to God, each responsible for his ultimate success in ordering all the impulses of his being in accord with the divine laws; each, too, directly helped in this ordering by the grace of God ever present to those who prayed. And when the barbarians of the North seeped into the Empire, they were in turn given these tidings of great joy to assimilate and eventually to carry back to their own peoples. Thus developed the occidental Christian Commonwealth, with many a vicissitude, with much falling short of its ideal, but holding fast throughout to its faith in the autonomy of the individual, capable, with the help of God, of rising superior to the flux of circumstance, to the excesses to which nature is ever prone, and thus of reaching his end through conformity to the abiding eternal law in the midst of and above change.

It was inevitable that when Christendom began to quarrel as to the reality, content, and mode of interpretation and transmission of the Christian Revelation, a new age should begin with the gradual dislocation of Christian thought. But, while the evolution of Protestant doctrine prepared the way for the revival of naturalism, the study of *literæ humaniores* maintained the idea of literary disciplines and the Aristotelian idea of the golden mean. However, the return to the stark intellectualism of the Greeks was already accompanied by an overconfidence in human reason, and was soon followed by an even less legitimate confidence in the rightness of all human feelings and appetites, till finally this natural goodness was explained through the complete merging of God and man in nature.

Thus were lost both conceptions which Christianity had given to man: the idea of his autonomous self which pointed to a law for man distinct from the law for thing, and of a necessary humility because man could follow this law only by submitting not merely his feelings but his reason and will to God's law, the ultimate source of the law for man. The Christian had recognized the evident need of this humility and translated it into the need of divine grace. Naturalism did not recognize this need, nor the possibility for man of submitting to any principle which might act as a check on the promptings of his natural intellect, will, and feelings which, experience teaches, always tend to excess. Hence it was only to be expected that we should find the naturalistic age strewn, as we actually have, with the wrecks of individual character and ending logically in social catastrophes.

Eagerly, Irving Babbitt scanned the works of his predecessors, the great critics of the nineteenth century, to find how far they had helped to carry on the development of naturalism or recognized its errors and endeavoured to stem its tide. Thus he came to write his *Masters of Modern French Criticism* (1912), which enables us to follow more in detail the phases of this drama of civilization. In his tracing of given ideas through numerous authors, Babbitt has often appeared unfair, because, as he himself explained, he has not given rounded estimates. In this book, at least, he shows his power to do so. His studies of Sainte-Beuve, Taine, Renan, and Brunetière in particular are full-length portraits, only the more revealing that they bring out in strong light the essential traits.

Mme. de Staël enables him to show the transition from Rousseau to the nineteenth century. He finds her imbued from the first with the sense of the flux: "Nothing in life should be stationary and art is petrified when it no longer changes," which is true only if it is realized that unless there is beneath the change an abiding element there can be in the work of art no permanent value. This abiding element can be realized only through a special type of concentration. What Mme. de Staël cultivates, on the contrary, is expansion. For her, as for Rousseau, " virtue is a mere process of emotional expansion, related to the region of impulse below the reason rather than to the region of insight above it." This, applied in all domains, means a predominance of feeling over discrimination, an uncritical enthusiasm, an optimistic shooting of the rapids of change. She but carries on the whole naturalistic trend of trust in or complete surrender to nature. As Joubert expresses it, " She took the fevers of the soul for its endowments, intoxication for a power, and our aberrations for a progress. The passions became in her eyes a species of dignity and glory "; although, as Babbitt adds, " her rationalism and her emotionalism were tempered by the traditional views of morality and religion of the Swiss Protestant." But her feelings for the flux led her to emphasize the eighteenth century's faith in the doctrine of indefinite progress, in the rectilinear mechanical advance of the human race which the naturalist ever tends to maintain against the whole testimony of history. She saw in the Germans a nation of noble enthusiasts like herself. She set this enthusiasm of feeling against the cold analysis of the French, thus marking the triumph of Rousseau over Voltaire. She thinks she thus exalts individualism as opposed to social conventions, as so many still think they are doing when they plead for spontaneity. It is true the social and even literary conventions of the pseudo-classicism into which the humanistic age had degenerated were often artificial. The Renaissance, after all, far from being an emancipation, had proved, in one of its important aspects, to be the taking on of the classical disciplines. The ornamentation of life it had encouraged became artificial. But neo-classicism at its best produced great works because their beauty came from within, from their truth in relation to the centrally human and from the adequacy of their form to the expression of that truth. In calling for the rejection of artificial conventions that had developed in the course of this search for order, the danger was that all sense of the need of that order would be lost. The distinction between genuine good taste, truth, suitableness, proportion, and mere social *bienséances* is always, it is true, difficult to make. In the reaction against the aristocratic excesses of the later classicists, it was perhaps inevitable, but it was none the less fatal, that genius came to be conceived as purely effusive, and criticism as a mere sympathetic admiration of whatever might be thus produced. This could but mean an inevitable trend to pure impressionism. Taste was to be conceived as wholly fluid. Differences, individual, national, temporal, became more interesting than human, universal, and timeless identities. Each social group in the past and present should have been or should be spontaneous, original, self-assertive, yet open and hospitable to the originalities of other social groups. Are they not all moments of the everlasting flux? Let everyone be himself according to his own time and place. That there is some value in this point of view cannot be denied. It made for interest in the study of history, and for exploration in every age and country in search of the particular. The consequent cosmopolitanism would according to Mme. de Staël correct each national narrowness by the knowledge of other patterns of behavior. Yet this greater breadth was bound to remain but centrifugal incoherence, unless it could help to discover what was abidingly true in these diverse circumstances. This view of an enlarged norm Mme. de Staël failed to glimpse in her stress on differences. Impressionism seeks differences for differences' sake, for the thrill of the inexperienced. Moreover, the love of the flux is not only horizontal but vertical. If immersion in the flux is the ideal, the deeper the immersion the better. Thus we get the cult of the primitive. The sources of poetic inspiration are to be sought not through culture but through nature. The farther back they go or the more they appeal to the less educated, the better. Thus Tolstoy pushed Rousseau's principle so far as to reject Sophocles and Shakspeare because they have no meaning for a Russian peasant. Mme.

de Staël already encouraged each nation to return to its own infancy. This meant to the Middle Ages, but only on false pretences. For, with its roots in Judea and even in Greece and Rome, the thought of the Middle Ages was no more primitive than that of the Renaissance. At their best, they sought to become one in Christ, which is precisely the opposite of being one with oneself or with a moment in the flux of change. Mme. de Staël was still close enough to the humanistic age to escape complete allegiance to determinism. She still recoiled from the thought that "circumstances make us what we are." She still felt that a fatality "which binds us to the earth only degrades us." Yet we can already see in her work "the elimination of the selective element from the standard of taste." She lost sight of the fact that to sink from the intellectual to the instinctive level is but a fallacious widening of human sympathies. It is not by such sinking but on the contrary by disciplining oneself to some form of perfection set above the ordinary self that men can meet to advantage. If we are no longer able to become one in Christ, we should at least be aware that we cannot become one at all unless we discover some other type of spiritual concentration superior to the intellect, will, and feelings of our ordinary self.

How far do the other critics of the nineteenth century help us to achieve this necessary organization of thought and action? Sainte-Beuve perhaps, who fills the middle of the century and in whom we may study the last stand of the Christian-humanistic tradition, and the last struggle against complete surrender to naturalism? For a time he remains religious but, like Chateaubriand, primarily through sentiment. Although Chateaubriand posed as a champion of the throne and altar, he accelerated by his own example the trend to relativism and to the substitution of feeling for thought. His apologetics merely replace the aesthetic deism of Rousseau's Savoyard vicar by an aesthetic Catholicism. But feeling is ever changing and capable of every confusion unless thought and higher intuition come to guide it. Sainte-Beuve mourns the coming "great absence of God." He never is wholly satisfied with naturalism. After 1848, he repudiates its sentimental side, retaining the scientific, but shows that he is fully aware of its endless possibilities of excess. He diagnoses the lack of proportion in the realism of Balzac as well as in the romanticism of Hugo. He cautions Taine against his complete acceptance of naturalistic determinism. But he himself fails to recover an abiding center from which to judge the manifoldness of change. His knowledge and sympathy allow him to leave a gallery of portraits, unsurpassed in penetration but with little intimation of ultimate values, so that many give the impression of the futility of life. After all he did not outgrow the sense of bewilderment already recorded in his *Port-Royal:* "What contrasts and contradictions! On the shore of this sea of human opinions, I stand in wonder at its ebb and flow. But who shall reveal to us the law of it all?" He was "too clear-sighted really to warm up to the new religions that men offered as substitutes for the disciplines of the past." He seems to have realized that "the underlying method in all these nineteenth century attempts at religion — whether it be the religion of passion, the religion of beauty, the religion of science, or the religion of humanity — is always the same: to take some element of human life that is immensely important, indeed, but still secondary, and then to try to exalt it to the supreme and central place." But his all-embracing comprehension made for dispersion against any type of unity. Anatole France called him the universal doctor, the St. Thomas Aquinas of the nineteenth century. But the phrase has meaning only if it is taken in the sense of his being the most representative man of his age. Otherwise he stands at the opposite pole from St. Thomas: he is the great doctor of relativity. "And if so shrewd an observer as Sainte-Beuve could find no firm anchorage for the spirit in the movements peculiar to the nineteenth century," we may well suspect, concludes Babbitt, "that something was omitted in the whole nineteenth century view of life and that this something is the key-stone of the arch."

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Sainte-Beuve lived long enough to salute Renan and Taine. With them we reach the full development of the naturalistic age as expressed in French literature. For in the work of these two masters of French thought down to the beginning of the humanistic reaction, the philosophy of pantheistic and materialistic naturalism was openly avowed. We must now turn our attention to Germany, for it is there that we shall find the full development of this most important current in the evolution of naturalism. Irving Babbitt does not go into details at this point, but his former colleague, the late Kuno Francke, does so most illuminatingly.

Back of Goethe and Schiller were Herder and Kant; but, though the French romanticists of 1830–48 went back directly to Rousseau, at least through Chateaubriand and Mme. de Staël, they did not assimilate the momentous development that had been going on in German philosophy. Renan, on the contrary, had not only pondered *De l'Allemagne,* but his sister Henriette made him share her enthusiasm for Herder and Kant. Now Herder (d. 1803) also began as a disciple of Rousseau, but he soon passed from Rousseau's personal to a social or more precisely a national individualism. The individual soul became merged with the soul of the people, while in turn the national soul merged with the soul of humanity so that the artist but expresses, as Francke puts it, " the result of accumulated impressions exercised upon masses of human beings living under similar conditions and similarly organised." "Poetry becomes the common gift of mankind." Ballad singers expressed their time and nation as much as Homer and Shakspeare. Primitive poetry is but the beginning of an evolution. The whole conception leads to a philosophy of history conceived as " a succession of national organisms; each revolving around its own axis; each living out its own spirit; each creating individual forms of language, religion, society, literature, art; and each, by this very individualisation of national types, helping to enrich and develop the human type as a whole." We thus get not only the formulation of a humanitarian ideal but the growing implied notion that it is the environment which molds the individual. This ceaseless flux of phenomena, evolving, it is trustfully believed, a nobler humanity, entails a loss of the sense of the individual's capacity to master his environment and is a recession not only from humanistic but even from Rousseauistic individualism.

As for Kant (d. 1804), it is not difficult to see how his philosophy reinforced the humanitarian naturalism of his contemporary. Starting from Locke's principle that the mind receives its content from sense impressions, he concludes that empirical experience sets the limit to demonstrable truth, and denies to the intellect the power to solve such questions as those of the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and personal immortality. Moreover, he looks upon the terms of space, time, and cause, in which we discuss what the senses perceive, as wholly subjective functions of the intellect. The intellect shapes the world out of the impressions of the senses. It is therefore *its* world. Thus we get a pure subjectivism which will lead to agnosticism. But after pushing to their limits the ideas of Locke, and giving us what might be an extreme type of individualism, Kant was, as Francke expresses it, to bring " to a climax the ethical ideas of Leibnitz and Spinoza . . ." and " formulate the religion of modern mankind." What he denies to pure reason, Kant assigns to practical reason; the powers he refuses to the intellect, he grants to the will. Francke eloquently sums up this point of view: The moral law that we find in the dictates of our conscience " is the most complete expression of man's highest dignity. It resides within each individual, it is felt by him instinctively as his innermost essence; but at the same time it lifts him above his own self and connects him with all mankind. . . . Everything else in this world of appearances is subject to doubt and misrepresentation; the dictates of duty alone are a direct and unmistakable revelation of the divine." Kant thus restores the notion of a God, of freedom of the will, and of the immortality of the soul, as postulates of the practical reason, for the categorical imperative of the moral feeling demands a lawgiver and rewarder, a means of acting according to the law, because it is the law, and because virtue is worthy of happiness and this life does not give it. What Kant has destroyed by his first Critique he seeks to re-establish by his second, but he none the less helps the monistic trend to a philosophy of pure becoming. In fact we have here one of the shifts in the historical use of the terms God, the divine, and religion. As Francke words it: " While Kant demolished, on the one hand, whatever was left of a religious system which saw in God an extra-mundane and extrahuman sovereign, he firmly established, on the other, a belief which reconstructs the divine from the inner consciousness of man. We feel ourselves moral beings. This is the fundamental fact of all ethics and of all religion." Francke seems satisfied with this, but what is the upshot of it all, in spite of Kant's earlier rationalistic approach, if not that the idea of a personal God, morality, and religion become man-made? Thus Kant reinforces the naturalism of Herder. We get the celebrated maxim: " Act in such a manner that the motive of thy will at any time might be made the principle of a universal legislation." As Francke interprets it: " the moral feeling teaches us that the aim of life is not individual happiness, but work in the service of humanity." But this only means that Kant's naturalism gives us another approach to humanitarianism. Ethics start in man and end in man. All we can know or need to know of God is in terms of behaviour, and man's conscience is so safe and sound that it is sufficient to guide man to righteousness. Wilhelm von Humboldt is credited by Francke as having expressed in so characteristic a manner the idea of personality at the bottom of German thought at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, that his words may stand as a motto for the whole epoch: " The idea of moral and intellectual perfection is large and full and inspiring enough not to need any longer the help of religious symbols." And speaking of the individual who has this idea, Humboldt continues: " The prospective annihilation of his earthly existence does not frighten him; his unavoidable dependence on external circumstances does not oppress him . . . full of the noblest human pride he may exclaim:

Hast du nicht Alles selbst vollendet,
Heilig glühend Herz? —

How is it possible that he should feel the loneliness and helplessness which are usually associated with the lack of a belief in a personal, extra-mundane cause of the chain of finite beings? Nor does this consciousness of self make him harsh and insusceptible towards other beings, or shut out love and benevolence from his heart. . . . Perhaps his relation to his fellow-beings is all the more hearty, the more deeply he is convinced that their fate, as well as his, depends altogether on individual effort." Francke calls this the new humanism. It should of course be called the new humanitarianism, for we have here the passing of the faith of the Christian age and of the clear-cut individualism of the humanistic age. We have not only what Francke himself calls " an absolute freedom from traditional authority " but " humanity in the largest sense " as " the chosen study of the age." It is true humanity is to be served on the basis of " the unerring tribunal of his [man's] own moral consciousness ", and this would seem to be an individualistic basis, but man is felt to be but part of an evolution. " Here, so it seemed," writes Francke, " were the true foundations for a new religious belief, a belief which maintains that it is absolutely impossible to serve God otherwise than by fulfilling one's duties to men," and " which considers the divine rather as the final goal than as the preëxisting cause of life." Thus we have, in this whole body of doctrine the assertion of the uselessness of religious symbols, the rejection of traditional authority, the loss of belief in a personal, extra-mundane cause of the chain of finite being, the divine conceived as the elaboration of a human consciousness which may have the utmost pride and confidence in its moral capacity to legislate for the best interests of humanity. That this whole tendency is humanitarian rather than humanistic is shown by the fact that, according to the standard definitions, as we have seen, humanism concerns itself with defining " man as such " while the word " humanitarianism " is reserved for the doctrines that " benevolence or philanthropy forms the sum of man's duties ", that " mankind may become perfect without divine aid ", and that " Christ possessed a human nature only." Fichte (d. 1814), immediately after Kant, speaks of the absolute and universal Ego. From the primacy of the practical reason, he conceives an ego which is not an individual but the universal self-consciousness and is essentially an infinite tendency to act; whereas Schelling (d. 1854), the disciple of Fichte, conceived nature as unconscious spirit in absolute evolution, thus further promoting the revival of Spinoza's pantheism. For him the work of art is the absolute Ego producing itself most perfectly, a doctrine which could but add to the romantic's feeling of superiority. Finally he reached absolute idealism understood as the identity of the real and the ideal. Schleiermacher (d. 1834), after studying Spinoza, Plato, Kant, as well as Fichte, sought to mediate between all his predecessors and stressed the feeling in man of being penetrated by the absolute, finite man returning to the infinite through mysticism and religion. Francke speaks of Fichte and Schleiermacher as well as of Hegel only after showing how the romantic movement carried the noble individualism of Goethe and Schiller to the extreme of selfishness and thus perverted the ideal of humanity into its caricature, — which means that, in spite of his enthusiasm for his subject, he has to note, no less than Irving Babbitt, the disorganization of character into which self-expression leads so long as the problem of the integration of the self has not been worked out.

We may now see how, within the lifetime of Renan and of Taine, fully developed naturalism proved equally delusive. In Renan, the idealistic and the scientific currents of naturalism meet, for, if, as M. Strowski puts it, " he borrowed his ethics from Kant and his metaphysics from Herder, his young friend Berthelot acquainted him with the rationalistic faith in science." In 1849, four years after leaving the seminary, he writes an enthusiastic paean to *The Future of Science.* Science will replace metaphysics. The history of the religious instinct of humanity may be explored scientifically. In 1860, he goes on a mission to the Holy Land. He knew the *Leben Jesu* of Strauss, published in 1835. Strauss had reached Berlin the year of Hegel's death, but he was able to study under Schleiermacher and to know the disciples of Hegel. Renan was following in his footsteps. " No one," writes Babbitt, " was ever more penetrated by the teaching of the Hegelian logic that a truth, to become true, must be completed by its contrary." " God, Providence, soul," says Renan, " good old words, a little clumsy, but expressive and respectable, which science will interpret in a sense ever more refined, but will never replace to advantage." He thus already points to the whole modernist tendency to juggle with words. " Men are immortal," he tells us; but he means " in their works," " in the memory of those who have loved them," " in the memory of God." Then we find that God means " the category of the ideal " and further that the ideal does not mean a spiritual order superior to the phenomenal world, but implies " the negation of the supernatural, the experimental search for truth." Then again, " there is no science of the individual soul." " The only science of a being in a constant state of development is its history." He holds that the great modern achievement is to have substituted the category of becoming for the category of being, the conception of the relative for the conception of the absolute, movement for immobility. So, scientific history will mean the delving of the curious investigator into the moments of the flux; and Jesus, for Renan as for Strauss, is a moment in this history: the appearance of the man who made humanity take the longest step towards the divine. Whereupon, in opposition to rationalistic deism as fixed in its assertion as the dogmas it attacked, we have a new temper. Why quarrel with a passing, nay with a passed moment? Let us bid it rather an unctuous farewell mingled with sentimental regrets. Let us retain religiosity as we part with religion. Why not admire and even love what we no longer believe in — the mediaeval churches if not mediaeval thought? The result was a most unscientific *Life of Jesus*. Resting, as it does, on a philosophy of becoming which denies the supernatural and the possibility of miracles, it proved but a huge begging of the question. Renan sought to explain the Christ by a convergent effect of influences, but he merely gave us a romantic picture made to a large extent after his own image. " Renan," writes Babbitt, " is nowhere so dogmatic as in the confidence with which he decides what is ' natural ' and what is ' supernatural ' and rejects forthwith everything that cannot be properly tested in the laboratory of M. Berthelot. As though with our infinitesimal fragment of experiences, we really knew whether the ordinary ' law ' may not be at times superseded and held in abeyance by a higher ' law.' " " Renan ", writes Strowski, " set out in his *History of the Origins of Christianity* to study the spontaneous urge of human consciousness towards the divine and to sort out the illusions which accompanied it, but he did not succeed in giving the impression of this urge in the exceptional souls he tried to picture. He has given us but a hesitant and fanciful interpretation of what he wished to explain rationally. He proved even a mediocre scholar. Nothing remains of his *Origins* but a novel, at times pleasant in its fancies, a startling historical panorama, the amusing portrait of an aesthetic tyrant [Nero], the no less amusing sketch of a Stoic emperor [Marcus Aurelius], and a few profound paradoxes." He himself comes to realize the inanity of his efforts. To the end he believes in the philosophy of becoming, but he loses the confidence of German pantheism that this becoming makes for a moral end. He thus tends to lose all faith in values, and wonders whether virtue, like religion and love, is not but a decoy of nature. He came to believe, to quote Babbitt's analysis of his disillusionment, that "some deception is being practiced upon us by 'God' and nature. Indeed the world may be only a huge farce, the work of a 'jovial demiurge.' Nevertheless, let us remain steadfast in virtue, but let us show at the same time by our gayety and ironical detachment that we do not take nature any more seriously than she takes us. In this way, even if life should turn out to have no meaning, we shall not have been entirely mistaken." What then becomes of science? To what purpose research and study? They are reduced to being but satisfactions of our curiosity. "Even though all the rest were vain, it seems that curiosity would not be so; and even if it too were vanity, it would in any case have been the most delightful way of passing one's existence." Here are, Babbitt adds, the germs of dilettantism, delight in curiosity for its own sake, irrespective of all values. Thus the *libido sciendi* has merged into the *libido sentiendi.* All is reduced to feeling, to the seeking of excitement or delicate enjoyment. "The intelligence, released from all restraint, rejoices in its own ubiquity and passes rapidly from negative to affirmative, proving that all points of view are plausible and that none is certain." This intellectual voluptuousness is evidently for the intelligentsia. As for the common people, why should they not seek sense satisfaction at their own level? "Renan is opposed to temperance societies that would deny the poorer classes such legitimate satisfactions as drunkenness. He only asks that this drunkenness be gentle, amiable, accompanied by moral sentiments [!]." He even comes to feel that, after all, since the flux of phenomena may have no moral end, since it is meaningless, even the scientific sage might seek at times epicurean consolations. Thus he has passed from the most exalted optimistic idealism to the negation of all values and to the consolation of mere intellectual and sensual enjoyment. Anatole France is wholly explained by this last mood of his master. "What is perfectly plain," he writes, "is that our confidence in science, which used to be so strong, is more than half lost. . . . Even M. Ernest Renan, our master, who believed and hoped in science more than any one else, confesses that there was some illusion in thinking that modern society could be entirely founded on rationalism and experiment." Maurice Barrès, who later reacts from this mood, begins by making the *culte du moi,* through the seeking of a maximum of refined sensation, the sole ideal. Thus Renanism continued to exercise an influence as a logical outcome of naturalism, and Renanism, concludes Babbitt, "is synonymous with some of the most subtle forms of intellectual corruption the world has yet known."

When we turn to Taine, we meet a man made of sterner stuff. Renan was from the start essentially feminine in the pejorative meaning of the term. Taine is intellectual virility personified. As in Renan we have a combined influence of Herder and Berthelot, so in Taine we find, added to the pantheistic influence of Spinoza and Hegel, a scientific bent which came to him through the lately developed positivism of Comte and Stuart Mill. We here encounter again, in a man of exceptional genius, the two currents of naturalism. Taine's *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* suffers from his overconfident acceptance of the pantheistic deterministic philosophy of change and also from his scientific assurance that he can make an accurate record of that change through an accumulation of observations based on a study of documents. All the past moments of history are held to be "the movements of the spiritual automaton which is our being" and which are "as regulated as those of the material world." The motive power behind this automaton, Taine finds in the master faculty, itself the product of the race, the environment and the time which but stand for a particular phase in the current of becoming, in the universal flux of the All-One. Brilliant, stimulating, valuable by its calling of our attention to the element of change and relativity in human life, Taine's system is nevertheless, as a whole, a stupendous failure, as must be all systems that presume to give a complete explanation of the mystery of life and particularly of personality. Taine, like Renan, was to end in disillusionment. First of all, nature once conceived as a collection of inexorable laws can no longer be visualized as the kind mother it was for the romantics. Furthermore, a truly realistic observation must inevitably reveal that man is far from being naturally good, or merely perverted by society, but that on the contrary there are in him inordinate appetites which, under the pressure of circumstance, easily make of him a beast of prey. The *English Literature,* which appeared in 1864, had been begun ten years earlier, five years before the appearance of Darwin's *Origin of Species,* which could but reinforce this point of view. But Taine's own conception of man as wholly immersed in the flux was sufficient to lead to pessimism, once this flux was found to be amoral. The reaction in a man of Taine's fibre took the form of a braver and sterner facing of the facts. It is in this mood that, after 1870, he turned to the study of the *Origins of Contemporary France.* He came to denounce the myth of the *Contrat Social* as vigorously as Babbitt has done. He made a merciless analysis of the psychology of the Jacobin, which he erroneously traced to the logic of the classic spirit, forgetting that the classic spirit was primarily one of intuitive good sense. Finally he came to doubt, like Renan, the value of all these studies of the inexorable flux. "I feel more and more," he writes towards the end of his life, "that from the practical point of view they will be useless; an enormous and swift current is carrying us away; of what avail is it to write a memoir on its depth and swiftness?" Indeed, of what avail is it for man to struggle if there is nothing abiding in him, no permanent self which may react against the current of change? Thus did the virile Taine, no less than the sentimental Renan, bear witness to the bankruptcy of the pantheistic and pseudo-scientific aspects of naturalism.

It should be added that the shock of the war of 1870 had a great effect on both Taine and Renan. Both had trusted German thought and allowed it to shape their own. With Herder, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and Hegel, Germany promised saviours to humanity. Instead, she brought forth a Bismarck. The war of 1870 was but the prelude to the utter catastrophe of 1914 which proved the logical climax of the naturalistic age. The utter faith in a monistic order, implying that man has but to float on the flux of becoming, to trust his feelings because he is the Good in the making, blinds him to the much more complex exigencies of the dualism of good and evil in himself and the universe, of a human order to be achieved by humility and self-discipline. The Occident was thus led throughout the nineteenth century to think that it was progressing towards an Arcadia when it was hastening towards an Armageddon. And yet it could have been easily foreseen that a doctrine which spoke of universal progress through national self-assertion, and which, with Fichte, told the German people that they were, in the words of Francke, " the only people which believes in the spirit, in the infinite, in the divineness of man, the only people worthy of the name: *the* people, the Urvolk," was bound to lead eventually to a blinding nationalistic arrogance. Francke praises the patriotic Fichte and scores Hegel for having spoken of Napoleon as the " world-soul." The fact is that there was in both the same naturalistic pride. As Francke recognizes: " The human mind is the highest form of the divine spirit accessible to our understanding; man's consciousness of God is God's self consciousness; these are the premises which led Hegel to a theory of public life which cannot but be called a deification of the state and of human history. The state is not, as Rousseau thought, the result of a contract between individuals; it exists before and above individuals. It is the divine will itself embodied in human will; it is reason made manifest, the infinite personified. It is its own aim. . . . The highest freedom is service to the state. . . . There is only one true hero of the world's history and that is the idea of humanity itself. Individual men, nay, even individual nations, are nothing but organs of the universal idea and the only measure of their greatness is to be found in their fitness to embody this idea."

It is worth while to sum up even thus briefly these enthusiastic but fallaciously based calls to human brotherhood. German thought, in its great romantic idealists, must be credited with the most ardent and sweeping of all expressions of humanitarian naturalism. It is no wonder that it intoxicated the young Renan and the young Taine. But the deeper the spell it cast upon them, the more bitter was the awakening. The promise of a cosmic brotherhood turned out to be the brutal exaltation of the German nation. "The Hegelian system," continues Francke, "makes the world an evolution of the divine; it sees in human society an organism whose principal function is the bringing out of the universal idea; it finds the goal of human progress in the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth; it is Christianity secularized." The fact is that the secularization of Christianity is precisely its denial, through the denial of the Kingdom of God, of the City of God, distinct from and above the kingdoms of the earth. To say that the world is an evolution of the divine is to deny that the divine is above the world, the ultimate criterion by which the righteousness of the world is to be judged, and thus inevitably leads the strongest nation in the world to proclaim itself the highest evolution to date of the divine. Thus might is held to create right. This substitution of Germanic monism for the dualistic Greek and Christian thought not only left no tribunal of appeal above the flux of change but finally made the human individual disappear along with a personal God. It is a complete negation of humanism as well as of

Christianity. Francke, apparently unwittingly, admits it: "It is clear that, by freedom, Hegel understands not individual independence, but rather universal responsibility; that the climax of human development is to him not highest individual culture, but rather the most fully organized and the widest reaching collective consciousness. The individuals are sacrificed, the idea of the whole lives on; and only by living in and for the idea may the individual be admitted to a share in its immortality."

With the individual thus sunk in the flux of becoming and the individual nation nothing but an organ of the universal idea, all might be well if the individual and the nation were, in truth, but manifestations of the divine goodness. Unfortunately, as a matter of positive observation, the individual and the nation are revealed to be not automatically good, but naturally tending to excess, in particular to the lust of power, and consequently in need of disciplining themselves to something higher than their natural self. So long as the facts are such, the lofty idealism of Hegel is bound to issue in the tendency of each nation to consider itself the highest embodiment of the divine in the making. Francke himself is obliged to deplore the fact that Hegel became a tool of despotism and that, after having spoken of Napoleon as the "world-soul," "he should have ended in a fanatic admiration of Prussian bureaucracy as the most perfect embodiment of organized public intelligence." The Bismarck who so shocked Renan and Taine and the swashbuckling Germany of 1870–1914 were but the legitimate progeny of Hegelianism. "War will continue as one of the indispensable means of political progress," writes Weber, summing up Hegel's doctrine, "it is the boast of our time that we see it in its true light, and no longer regard it as the passing satisfaction of the caprice of a sovereign, but as an inevitable crisis in the development of the idea. . . . Antiquity and the Middle Ages were not yet conscious of the moral essence of war. . . . The victorious state is truer, nearer to the ideal state, better in a word than the vanquished state. The very fact that it has triumphed proves this: its triumph is the condemnation of the principle represented by the vanquished; it is a judgment of God. . . . There is in every epoch a people in whom mind is more completely incarnated than in the rest, and who march in the front rank of universal civilization. That is, the god of History has successively 'chosen' the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Greeks, the Romans, and the French. The national minds are grouped around the infinite Mind, of which History is the temple, and one after another become its privileged organ." What more fiendish logic could be devised for the development of nationalistic megalomania! What greater excuse for thinking that, at last, the turn of the Germans had come! We split hairs as to who did, or did not do, all they could to avoid the consequences of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia in the fateful days of 1914. We should be nearer understanding how the World War was the logical outcome of the age of naturalism if we followed the development of Hegelian thought in the Pan-Germanism of the nineteenth century.

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When Irving Babbitt began to write, William James, disgusted with the vagaries of German idealism, was endeavoring to piece together a working philosophy for young America, boastful, in turn, of being weaned from dogmatic religion by "modernism," itself a legacy of German thought. Could James satisfy the quest of his young colleague? Had he found a way of recovering the assurance in an abiding element above the flux of change by which to judge and select values? On the contrary, James had literally turned away from the problem of the abiding and bidden us to confine our attention to the flux of related phenomena. Kant had denied that we have any knowledge of the mind as a thing in itself. The "associationists," successors of Hume, denied that the mind is anything more than a succession of conscious states. James saw that the associationists' conception of separate states somehow " gumming themselves together " was inadequate. Instead, he spoke of " the stream of consciousness ", but he denied, no less than the associationists, the need of an abiding mind as the thinking subject. " The passing thought," he writes, " is itself the thinker." Each thought fades into another, but not so fast that the second does not know and include the first. " Each thought is born an owner and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realized as its self to its later proprietor."

This evidently remains quite opposed to the conception of the human person as an autonomous permanent entity. Nor did James, with his pluralism, set the individual in any way apart from and in possible effective control of the flux. He merely left him swimming amid the ice cakes of a river while pantheism locked him up in a growing glacier. It is true that, with his theory of the will, James left man free to push some of the ice cakes aside or to choose the most comfortable to sit on for a space, and to experience, when doing so, the thrill of a personal effort. Man was nevertheless being swept on to impersonal oblivion in the depths of the stream. In the meantime truth became but the verification of relative and temporal value. An ice cake had value if it could hold up the swimmer or offer him a fairly comfortable seat. But why should the swimmer care to be held up anyway, since he is bound to sink presently? James, in spite of his love of life, gave us no answer to the problem of life's abiding and ultimate value except in terms of struggle for the sake of struggling. With his pragmatism, truth becomes a mere term, laden still with the emotional power with which philosophies of the abiding have endowed it, but wholly relative to the changing scene and consequently impermanent. If truth is coequal with human judgments and human needs, then true human judgments and true human needs mean simply human judgments and human needs, and the human judgments and human needs of a given time and place. Pragmatism perpetually answers: " That is what I think. That is what I need," whereas philosophy to be worthy of the name should enable us to say: " That is what I must think. That is what I have a right or no right to have." James found naturalistic philosophy bankrupt and left it so, and was himself apparently conscious that he had.

After William James, John Dewey became the most influential spokesman of American philosophy, for the materialistic determinism of Santayana was already felt to be but a belated and dying, if melodious, echo. Was Dewey succeeding where William James had failed? Was he restoring the notion of the abiding? Irving Babbitt saw quickly that, far from doing so, he was endeavoring to complete its annihilation, and that, Rousseau-like, and pseudo-positivistically, he was leading us to think that we may reach individual happiness and a social millenium through the mere trust in a supposed essential tendency to order in human beings. Dr. Dewey too had been bred in the idealism of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. In 1884, he still declared, as Professor George M. Mead lately recalled, " God, as the perfect personality or Will, is the only Reality, and the source of all activity of the individual personality. The Perfect Will is the motive, source, and realization of the life of the individual. He has renounced his own particular life as an unreality, he has asserted that the sole reality is the universal Will, and in that reality all his actions take place." But, as Mead expresses it, by 1891, in his *Outline of Ethics,* " We find the will, the idea, and the consequences all placed inside of the act, and the act itself placed only within the larger activity of the individual in society. All reference of knowledge to a precedent reality has disappeared." Thus, after having accepted the merging of the one and the many in the All-One, Dewey had come to deal only with the many and was to deny the existence of an antecedently existing law above it. He had passed from one of the naturalistic excesses to the other. William James had continued to yearn for the supernatural and the metaphysical. But Dewey completely and serenely abandoned them. James still respected all types of religious experience, but to be a disciple of Dr. Dewey, you must give up " faith in the divine author and authority in which Western civilization confided," and also " inherited ideas of the soul and its destiny, of fixed revelation. . . ." For these, he tells us, " have been made impossible for the cultivated mind of the Western world." It is no doubt the imperturbable gravity of Dr. Dewey's style which saves him from the accusation of arrogance so often levelled at his caustic opponent Irving Babbitt; for to dismiss thus summarily as uncultivated all the eminent men who are believers in God, the spirituality of the soul, and the Revelation of Christianity, both in this country and in Europe, is truly remarkable, as is the striking nonchalance, for instance, of the following sentence: " The Victorian age recognized that the new science demanded a certain purification of traditional beliefs — such, for example, as the elimination of the supernatural." Sainte-Beuve had spoken wistfully of the coming " great absence of God." Renan, noting that, after the loss of faith in Christianity, men were living " on the shadow of a shadow," had asked tremulously: " What are people going to live on after us? " With Dewey, however, we are not only in " the naturalistic trap," we are so much at home in it that we are supposed to have long ceased to look over its edge and to have lost all consciousness of any but stark naturalistic modes of thought. To believe in any abiding element is now unworthy of a cultivated mind. " Until the seventeenth century," Dr. Dewey writes, " the natural sciences shared in the belief in the superiority of the immutable to the moving, and took for their ideal the discovery of the permanent and changeless. Ruling philosophies, whether materialistic or spiritual, accepted the same notion." Christianity, which " proffered a fixed revelation of absolute unchanging Being and Truth, elaborated into ' morals ' conceived as a code of laws, the same everywhere and at all times ", " our present economic régime conceived as something fixed except for experiments in detail ", " the institution of marriage and family that developed in mediæval Europe considered as the last and unchanging word," all these are but examples " of the extent to which ideas of fixity persist in a moving world." Dr. Dewey is ready to see all these ideas on which our civilization is based swept away in the name of what he calls a philosophy of experience. We must have " the faith in the possibility of producing the kind of experience in which science and the arts are brought unitedly to bear upon industry, politics, religion, domestic life, and human relations in general." For " the outstanding fact in all branches of natural science is that to exist is to be in process of change," and " social and moral existences are like physical existences, in a state of continuous if obscure change." Therefore there remains only, " as opposed to the futile effort to achieve security and anchorage in something fixed," to make the effort to " determine the character of changes that are going on and to give them in the affairs that concern us most, some measure of intelligent direction." Dewey would not have us search for *the* meaning of life and *the* purpose of the universe, for " there are many meanings and many purposes in the situations with which we are confronted, one, so to say, for each situation. Each offers its own challenge to thought and endeavor and presents its own potential value." We must not be afraid of the fact that experience is always in flux. We must disown the phrase of Dante: " God's will is our peace." Happiness is not to be found in " the antecedently real." It is not to be reached through the harmonizing of our life with its ultimate meaning, but " such happiness as life is capable of comes from the full participation of all our powers in the endeavor to wrest from each changing situation of experience its own full and unique meaning." Nowhere is there a hint of the conflicts which philosophers have found in human nature, no thought of its contrary tendencies which must be reconciled to its one purpose; or rather, with the denial that life has one purpose, all its contrary tendencies are equally a field for experimentation. Since there is no one end to which other ends must be subordinated that human life may be made harmonious, all the human urges have independent values. There should be no thought of sifting them into a permanent hierarchy. Indeed, in what name could such a permanent hierarchy be established? We are living in a pluralistic world, in a multiverse, not in a cosmos. Freedom of the will is recognized, but only as something following upon knowledge derived from the ever new experience. Knowledge will give us the right response, and knowledge is made up of ideas understood to be merely experiments in adjustment, in adjustment to the here and now, to the ever new specific situation which no human being before us has known and for which consequently he can give us no counsel. With John Dewey, naturalism reaches its most genial, confident, and impressive formulation. It becomes a faith, a faith not only in man but in the new ever emerging man, "in the possibilities of human experience and human relationships that will create a vital sense of the solidarity of human interests and inspire action to make that sense a reality." And, since back of these human interests there is no supernatural, no antecedently real, it follows that, if organized or already largely disorganized religions are to have a place in the future, they will do so only provided they can succeed in tagging usefully behind. As Dewey puts it: "If our nominally religious institutions learn how to use their symbols and rites to express and enhance such a faith [the faith in the philosophy of experience], they may become useful allies of a conception of life that is in harmony with knowledge and social needs." Dr. John Dewey, for all his rejections of other beliefs, is thus seen to be the high priest of a new faith, or rather the American representative of what, as we shall see when we study the work of Baron Ernest Seillière, has long been known in Europe as "naturalistic mysticism," which stems from Rousseau and is for the Occident the ever-breeding source of revolution.

Whereupon, John Dewey and Irving Babbitt meet in startling opposition. Babbitt would reject, as Dewey did, the absolute of German philosophy conceived as a monistic explanation of all reality. Moreover, he would meet the experimentalist on his own ground. He too would judge the value of behaviour by its fruits. Finally, he is as keenly aware as any pragmatist that life is in perpetual flux. And yet those who put exclusive emphasis on the element of change in things — and among these he would put James, Bergson, Dewey, and Croce — he considers as having fallen away from the positive and critical attitude into " a metaphysic of the many." What then is the substance of his challenge to this " naturalistic mysticism " or to the whole naturalistic age?

In the course of his searching, through the pages of the masters of French criticism, for a possible realization of the aberrations of naturalism, especially in his study of Joubert, we can already find many hints of the point of view he is to develop more fully later. But his rejection of the solution of his problem proposed by Ferdinand Brunetière is most enlightening. Brunetière wrote between 1874 and 1906. As early as 1883, nine years before the death of Renan, ten years before that of Taine, the *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine* of Paul Bourget had heralded the beginning of the French reaction against the naturalism which Renan and Taine represented. By this time, Anatole France had developed to the ultimate stage the relativity of his masters Sainte-Beuve and Renan, and Zola had, for a generation, oriented the French novel towards the crassest deterministic materialism. Brunetière protested vigorously against both these consequences of naturalism. He pointed out that Zola was distorting human reality because he ignored " the psychology of the forces of intellect and will which carry on the good fight against the shock of sensation and resist the assaults of desire." And after taking issue, like Babbitt, " with the complete self-absorption of the romantics and their unwillingness to occupy themselves with anything except their own emotions," he maintained, in a long polemic with Anatole France and Jules Lemaître, " that, in addition to our apparent self of sensations and impressions, there exists in each man a real self that he possesses in common with other men." Brunetière himself recognized the element of change in life. He even tried to apply the doctrine of evolution to literary genres, but he held that, by subordinating our sensations and emotions to reason, we may discover standards " raised above the realm of flux and change, with reference to which a work of art may be ranked as good or bad." He thus reached a humanism, a conception of man distinct from the rest of nature, on the basis of " the unity of the human spirit as it has manifested itself in history. To the personal preferences and impressions of any particular man he opposes the testimony and experience of all men as embodied in tradition." He applied the same test Boileau proposed as a solution in the *Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns*. For him, " that writer is most truly human and consequently most worthy of praise who has appealed through successive generations to the largest number of men."

Now we may ask: Is not this precisely what Irving Babbitt has sought to do — to find abiding standards by which to judge? Was not this the reason why, before becoming a student of literature worthy of the name, he found it absolutely necessary to take up the philosophical problem? We have here the occasion therefore to make an important note on the humanism of Babbitt. There is no doubt that his aim is the same as that of Brunetière. He attacks the same multiform manifestations of naturalistic relativity. He agrees with him that " there is needed a principle of restraint in human nature (*un principe refrénant*) ", that something must be opposed to " the mobility of our impressions, the unruliness of our individual sense, and the vagrancy of our thought." Brunetière, however, finally came to seek this principle of restraint in revealed religion. Babbitt does not deny that it may be found there, but the conversion of Brunetière is for him an occasion for insisting that the immediate data of consciousness reveal such a principle of restraint at work within the individual, whether or not he believes in revealed religion. Thus Babbitt finds a way to ground his humanism purely on individualism. He is dismayed at the consequences which have followed upon the assertion that the individual is to be the tribunal of last resort in every domain, a principle which is inherent in the rise of Protestantism. At first the assertion of this principle merely meant that every believer could interpret the Bible and would interpret it essentially along traditional lines, or even better according to the older tradition, and would drop the supposed accretions developed by the Church. The principle quickly led, however, to a rejection of the whole of Christianity through deism, pantheism, and the later developments of naturalism which we have reviewed, and left us bogged in a bottomless morass of impressionism. Babbitt would condemn this whole development. But he would not condemn individualism itself. He has dared to write: " Under certain conditions that are already partly in sight, the Catholic Church may perhaps be the only institution left in the Occident that can be counted on to uphold civilized standards," yet he condemns Brunetière for seeking exclusively in the Catholic Church " the discipline and the definite standards that could protect society against the individual." The whole purport of his critique of the naturalistic age is not that it was wrong in being individualistic but in the type of individualism which it developed. After paying the above tribute to Catholicism as a guardian of civilization, he adds: " It may also be possible, however, to be a thoroughgoing modern and at the same time civilized," and by a modern he means one who does not look to outer authority for the principle which will enable him to work out standards which may be opposed to the flux of the many, and which will further enable him to discipline himself to those standards.

What then are the characteristics of that humanistic individualism which Babbitt would oppose to the naturalistic? What is the ultimate principle of his challenge to the naturalistic age? Why should he call Dr. Dewey a "false liberal"? Because, for Irving Babbitt, true liberalism depends upon a proper conception of the individual and of his relation to the antecedently real, to the abiding law within and without him; secondly, upon the understanding of the way the individual may get in touch with that law as it governs each situation in which he may find himself and of the need and possibility he has to discipline himself accordingly; and, finally, upon the further realization of the difficulties he will experience in doing so, because of the tendencies to excess or disorder inherent in his nature.

Such a conception of the individual deserves to be called humanistic because it recognizes clearly that man is distinct though not apart from the rest of nature. It is in so far as the naturalistic age has lost this conception that it has failed. We can be saved from further disaster only by such a reassertion of humanism. Because this humanism is in the tradition of the Occident, because, in particular, it is dualistic and is therefore not counter to Christianity, it is for the Occident evolutionary instead of revolutionary. It spells true progress instead of the imperialistic decadence inherent in naturalism. Such seems to be the essence of the challenge of Irving Babbitt to naturalism. To understand this challenge more fully, we must proceed to make a systematic examination of his psychology.

III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IRVING BABBITT

THE failure of criticism to attain to any centre of judgment set above the shifting impressions of the individual and the flux of phenomenal nature is a defeat for civilization itself, if it be true, as I have tried to show, that civilization must ultimately depend on the maintenance of standards." Thus did Babbitt himself sum up the result of his study of the masters of French criticism which we have just reviewed. Philosophical thought, from the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, had oscillated from a merging of God, nature, and man into the All-One, to a repudiation of God in favour of a mere evolution of nature, with man, the most developed of its many organisms. The peculiar significance of John Dewey is precisely that in his own thought he has recapitulated the entire movement. In either view, man's humanity (*humanitas*), " the nature of man as such " is completely lost. Let us now examine on what basis Irving Babbitt makes bold to reassert it against this two-century-old tendency to obliterate it. As he has unfolded his psychology only gradually in the course of some twenty years, and as, in spite of several interpretations, it is still leading to so many misunderstandings, there may be some advantage in trying to sum it up in the briefest possible compass.

The most fundamental of these misunderstandings is the failure to note that Babbitt is just as profoundly impressed as any naturalist with the fact of " the many," of the stream of change in which man is living. In his re-examination of the problem of the nature of man, he would meet his opponents on their own ground. He would be wholly positivistic and critical. What do the immediate data of consciousness first tell us if not that we are conscious of a constant flux of impressions, our primary contact with whatever reality there may be? The all-important question then reduces to this: If these impressions are always changing, if the world about us is changing, and if we are changing with it, as is evidently the case, is there any abiding element anywhere — in short, is there any reality whatsoever at all worthy of the name; is there not merely, on the contrary, only ceaseless " becoming " ? This, as we already saw, was but to take up again the problem of Plato: find the abiding, discover the one in the many, some permanent element in the midst of change, or there can be for you no reality.

Babbitt, then, is keenly conscious that we are truly living in a flux of change. He tells us that " such reality as we can know positively is inextricably mixed up with illusion," that " illusion is an integral part of reality," that " an enormous element of illusion enters into the idea of personality itself ", so that " man is cut off from immediate contact with anything abiding and therefore worthy to be called real, and condemned to live in an element of fiction or illusion." This he asserts against the too confident rationalists who trusted unduly in reason to reach the real. He is ready to grant that, " strictly considered, life is but a web of illusion, and a dream within a dream." At least, he does not pretend to be able to establish completely that it is more than that. However, if it may be only a dream or if we cannot prove absolutely that it is more, there is no doubt that we have found experimentally that it can become a nightmare. The experience of the last two centuries would suffice to prove that if it is not to become one " it has to be managed with the utmost discretion." " However much life may mock the metaphysician, the problem of conduct remains." Whatever life is, it must be rightly organized. Here then is where Irving Babbitt would begin his inquiry. However much he may leave to the metaphysician, he feels that he must solve the problem of values. The more life is inevitably wrapped in a veil of illusion, the more we must exert ourselves to get in touch with whatever reality there may be within this illusion, with whatever abiding element there may be within the flux of impressions assailing us, with whatever unity there may be in the multiplicity in which we live. In short, we must learn to make the right use of illusion. We must diligently work to discover standards with reference to which we may practically guide our actions, for, again, experience teaches us that if we do not do so, all-illusive though life may be, the consequences will smite us so forcibly that the sensation will be one of genuine pain. The first question then narrows down to this: Are we able to discern any unity in the multiplicity in which we live? Yes, answers Babbitt, undoubtedly. Is it not "a matter of positive perception that there is an element of oneness in all the particular objects that belong to the same class even though, in life, the oneness and the change are inseparable?" Babbitt, therefore, begins by reasserting that, as a matter of positive observation, it cannot be denied that within the particular there is the universal. Objects may be of every size, shape, or color, yet who would dare to say that there is nothing permanently common to objects of the same kind? Thus even mere perception enables us to glimpse a first form of the abiding within the flux of change, a first conviction of the oneness in manifoldness.

To exaggerate the oneness of life and merge it into the All-One, until we lose the sense of individuality, is one extreme; to exaggerate the multiplicity of life, until we lose the sense of standards to which classes of objects should conform, the sense of a universal of which particulars are but variations, is the other. These are the two exaggerations between which naturalism has oscillated.

As opposed to this, we have the mediating formula which eventually points to humanism, as opposed to naturalism: Life gives both elements of change and elements of oneness. Let us note well the double aspect of this point of view, since the critics of humanism constantly accuse Babbitt of being blind to the elements of change, to the material of the contemporary scene. Elements of change, by all means, but elements of oneness, no less so. If you lose the sense of the elements of change, you will tend to inflexible standards. But if you lose the sense of the elements of oneness, you will lose all possibility of an ordered life. You will have nothing by which to judge and select, you will be totally at the mercy of the multiplicity of change, you will be unable to establish any standards whatsoever. What you must do is something much more subtle than to fall into either of these extremes, and the whole work of Irving Babbitt aims at making us understand this something much more subtle in all domains. Hence the many misunderstandings to which it has given rise. The something much more subtle that you must do is to reach "flexible standards." Why? Because life does not give merely elements of oneness, or merely elements of change; it gives both, and it gives both indissolubly blended. As Babbitt expresses it: "Life does not give here an element of oneness and there an element of change, but a oneness that is always changing." And moreover: " Man does not observe the oneness that is always changing from the outside; he is part of the process, he is himself a oneness that is always changing." Such is the complexity of the nature and of the problem of human life.

The great question then is: By what process can we glimpse in every domain the abiding within the flux of change, the universal in the particular, the one in the many?

The answer of the Greeks was that reason was sufficient to save us from illusion, to guide us to standards, to insure right conduct. Christianity, going much farther, proclaimed authoritatively such standards, at least in the moral domain, and sought to help the reason and the will to attain them through the grace of God. As a positivist, Babbitt dismisses the first solution as overconfident, and though he recognizes fully that the Church reached its object, he refrains from utilizing its message so long as he addresses himself to those who refuse to consider the Christian dispensation. What solution then will he offer in turn? Babbitt's answer is: We can glimpse in every domain the abiding within the flux of change, the universal in the particular, the one in the many, by understanding the possible combined working of the imagination and the reason, and their capacity to discover the laws of the higher will.

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This may seem simple enough, but it calls for many distinctions and considerable explanations, which must begin by a careful definition of terms. First of all, Babbitt does not give the first place to reason as the Greeks did. He refuses to do so on the basis of observation, but he finds corroboration for this refusal in Asiatic psychology, in which " intellect belongs to the natural self." " Though it cannot be maintained," he writes, " that the mind of the Buddhist coincides exactly with the Platonic mind, it is nevertheless significant that ' mind ' is for the Buddhist an organ of the flux, whereas Plato exalts ' mind ' to the first place."

The reason why Babbitt thus refuses to grant to " mind " in the sense of analytical reason the power of getting in touch with reality, with the abiding, is because he wants to recognize fully, as we saw, that " such reality as we can know is inextricably mixed up with illusion," because " life does not give here an element of oneness and there an element of change, but a oneness that is always changing," because, moreover: " man does not observe the oneness that is always changing from the outside " but is, on the contrary, " part of the process," because " he is himself a oneness that is always changing." What reason is there then to suppose " that one can transcend the element of impermanence, whether in oneself or the outer world, merely through reason in any sense of the word. . . ." "The person who confides unduly in 'reason' will be prone to set up some static 'absolute,' while those who seek to get rid of the absolute in favor of flux and relativity tend at the same time to get rid of standards." Therefore Babbitt concludes, referring to both Hegelians and pragmatists: "Both absolutists and relativists are guilty of an intellectual sophistication of the facts, inasmuch as in life, as it is actually experienced, unity and multiplicity are indissolubly blended."

It is here that we come upon one of his most original distinctions: his conception of the role of what he calls the "higher imagination."

To the reason as an analytical power, he opposes the imagination which he defines as the power that "conceives", "that gathers things together, that sees likenesses and analogies and in so far unifies what were else mere heterogeneity." It is this power which, in spite of the fact that absolute unity and reality must ever elude us, can enable us "to determine on experimental grounds to what degree any particular view of life is sanctioned or repudiated by the nature of things and rate it accordingly as more or less real." For Aristotle it was the intellect which thus links likenesses and analogies. But, as Babbitt limits the term intellect or reason to a purely analytical function, reason thus conceived cannot get at reality, since reality is not dissociated elements but a living whole. It is not the tree cut up by the woodsman, but the growing, changing tree standing in the wood. It is within the everlasting flux and it is perceived by a self that is also constantly changing. In so far as it analyzes, therefore, the intellect immobilizes life, and hence cannot reach living truth. If we take the truth that it reaches at its face value, we shall mistake a fixed moment of truth for the flowing truth. We shall have a fixed standard, whereas, to keep up with living truth, we should have a living, a flexible standard. Life is dynamic, both in us and outside of us. The one, the element of unity, the abiding truth is flowing within and with the many. What we need to do is therefore not to analyze but to "conceive." As opposed to reason which deals in static because isolated elements, we need a power which will give us an intuition of the abiding element in the midst of change. We have this power, Babbitt claims, and to it he gives the name of "higher imagination."

The analytical intellect — reason — perceiving any given set of facts, and immobilizing them as at the given time and place, will tend to erect them into a dogma or at least into a convention. This is to set up fixed standards and to stop all progress. But if, instead of concentrating on these facts merely analytically, we do so imaginatively, we can conceive an abiding element of unity in their possibly changing multiplicity, and thus reach a flexible standard. An example may help to make this clear. Experimentally, it may be proved that a play, under certain circumstances, should have unity of action, time, and place. But that is no reason for imposing forever upon plays the rule of the three unities. Reason analyzing Greek plays may find unities. To erect them into literary dogmas is to forget that Greek plays may have observed these unities rightly, because of the circumstances under which plays were then given, but as these circumstances have changed, it is quite possible to have variations of time and place, though it will be forever wrong to have no essential unity in a work of art. This is precisely Babbitt's quarrel with pseudo-classicism as a phase of neo-classicism. Because the pseudo-classical critics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries used reason and failed to use the higher imagination, they developed literary conventions instead of flexible standards and thus helped to bring about the imaginative revolt of the romantics against reason. The point is, however, that this revolt was not sufficiently critical about the quality of imagination which it proposed to substitute for reason.

Here we reach another of the fundamental items of Irving Babbitt's psychology: the all-important distinction to be made between what he calls the "higher imagination" and the "lower imagination." The lower imagination reaches only perceptions of the many, of the flux of change. When emancipated from the control of reason, it can so combine its images as to lose all contact with the real. This is the type of imagination the romantic so frequently indulges in, a type which leads him to fall into foolish conceits instead of getting in touch with reality. This type of vain imagining may lead the inventor to devise a two-legged chair, the legislator to frame a law in violation of the facts of human nature, the philosopher to evolve grandiose but chimerical explanations of the universe, and the scientist to believe that he has discovered its ultimate secrets. It has played the leading role in the naturalistic age.

It is only the "higher imagination," Babbitt holds, which can reach an intuition of the oneness in the midst of the changeableness of things, and of the multiplicity presented by a given situation; and because it is thus selective, because it seeks the abiding in the midst of change, it is always felt in its relation to man's lower nature as a principle of discrimination and control. It serves as a check on the lower imagination, or what French folk-psychology so well calls *la folle du logis,* as Joubert reminds us. It is the higher imagination alone which can give us humanistic insight. It should be evident therefore why Irving Babbitt so often associates the higher imagination with the higher insight or intuition.

Further analysis, however, is required before we understand the relation of the higher imagination to the reason. For instance, we find in Babbitt's works the terms "imaginative reason," "reason grounded on insight," "superior intellectual imagination," "imaginative insight," "intellect dependent on intuition for its knowledge of what is above itself," and we even hear that "reason gets its intuition of the one *with the aid* of the imagination." But this is but a reflection of the fundamental indivisibility of processes of knowledge. The distinction which explains all these terms is the following: If the universal, the abiding element, is the domain of the higher imagination; the particular, the suitable in the changing circumstance, is the domain of the reason, or analytical intellect.

Hence the role of the reason in relation to that of the higher imagination: The higher imagination has alone the power to get an intuition of the abiding essence in the midst of the accidents of circumstance, but the application of its findings needs to be tested by the reason in the light of new practical circumstances. It belongs to the reason to apply the universal timeless, spaceless truth to the particular time and place. The role of the reason is to formulate the particular application of the flexible universal standard which it is the role of the higher imagination to discover. It is the reason which tells the artist how to secure unity in a particular work, though, without the higher imagination, he would have lost track of the permanent necessity of this element of universal order. It is the reason which, in a given ethical situation, will point out to the individual just how he must behave to live up to the eternal ethical principle which he has been able to perceive through the concentration of the higher imagination on facts of the same order.

What Babbitt pleads for, then, is a coöperation of the higher imagination and the analytical intellect or reason, the first giving an intuition of the abiding element in the midst of the everlasting flux of change, the second testing and applying this intuition in the new situation.

But, furthermore, it should be noted that this leaves to reason a domain more particularly its own, for as Babbitt tells us: " Reason may mean the abstract and geometrical reason of Descartes, or it may be simply good sense, which may itself exist in very many grades, ranging from an intuitive mastery of some particular field to the intuitive mastery of the ethos of a whole age."

Reason, as the abstract or geometrical reason of Descartes, is used in science, though no doubt no great discoveries, even in this field, can be made without some use of the imagination.

Reason, as simply good sense and practical judgment, is what Pascal calls the *esprit de finesse* as opposed to the *esprit de géométrie* of Descartes. " So far as a man possesses the *' esprit de finesse ' "*, explains Babbitt, " he is enabled to judge correctly of the ordinary facts of life and of the relationship between man and man. These judgments rest upon such a multitude of delicate perceptions that he is frequently unable to account for them logically." " Good sense," Babbitt further explains, " may be defined as a correct perception of the ordinary facts of life and of their relation to one another." Intuition, here, or " intuitive mastery ", is posterior to much concentration of the intellect on this type of situation. It becomes a species of habit of thought or action. Hence its rapidity, ease, and intuitive character. Social tact, the skill in diagnosis of a specialist in a particular field, the quick responses of the superior athlete, are all due to this type of intuition. In short, reason remains well-nigh sufficient in its own domain, the domain of the particular, of the many.

One might ask here whether, with this use of intuitive good sense, we have become " humanists " in the sense Babbitt understands the term. Certainly not yet strictly so, as is shown by the fact that he refers to this *esprit de finesse* as " unimaginative good sense." But still he admits that " the field in which one displays one's good sense or practical judgment may fall primarily under the human law or the natural law." And he grants further that even in the ordinary affairs of life, " in determining what conforms to the golden mean or law of measure there must always be a mediation between the particular instance and the general principle and here intuition is indispensable." Evidently imaginative intuition is here meant, for, even in these ordinary affairs, right behaviour, the avoidance of extremes, the choice of the golden mean " is nothing mechanical, but may vary not only from individual to individual but in the same individual according to his age, etc." This applies to the choosing of a hat or of the temperature of a bath, as well as, for instance, in creative art where the question may be to distinguish what may happen only in isolated cases and thus be eccentric, and what happens according to probability or necessity and thus constitutes representative human experience. In both cases there is need of imaginative insight to reach fluidly the general principle, and of analytical reason to apply it in the particular instance.

So we pass almost imperceptibly from minor questions of conduct in everyday life to more vital issues, from the domain where reason might suffice to the domain where the higher imagination is indispensable. In the first case, the general principle — what Babbitt calls the centre — " with reference to which one has good sense may be only the ethos of one's time and country "; but as the imagination concentrates on data of a higher order, it will reach something more abiding. The transition may be seen, for instance, in passing from the works of a Pope to those of a Sophocles. Dr. Johnson credits Pope with good sense as " a prompt and intuitive perception of consonance and propriety." This may still be only the wisdom of an age, the wisdom of mere reason. Ismene, the sister of Antigone, had such wisdom. She thought in terms of the proprieties of her time and country. She was ethical according to the ethos of her age. But Sophocles goes beyond this. His heroine is Antigone. Her reason has the guidance of the higher imagination, and so she is thereby " enabled to go beyond the convention of her particular time and country and lay hold upon one of ' the unwritten laws of heaven,' that is, on a principle of universal abiding morality. She is ethical in terms of the ethos of the ages. She shows an insight into a moral order that is set not only above her ordinary self but above the convention of her time and place." She has used her higher imagination and it has brought her within the " City of God," the domain of the eternally abiding moral law.

Evidently, then, the conventions of time and place may have in them something of the abiding, and yet the abiding lies above them. As Babbitt puts it: " The good sense and decorum of one time and country do not coincide exactly with those of another time and country." This does not mean, however, that good sense and decorum have in them no universal element, and are entirely implicated in the shifting circumstances of time and place. For, as he adds, " something of the permanent order " behind them " is sure to shine through even the most imperfect convention." Hence the respectful interest of the humanist in conventions. " Though no convention is final, though man and all he establishes are subject to the law of change, it is an infinitely delicate and perilous task to break with convention." If the eighteenth century, and in its wake the nineteenth, have often so significantly failed, it is because they repudiated conventions without concerning themselves enough with what should replace them. What was needed was at least the insight of the higher imagination. As Babbitt expresses it: " The only thing that may safely be opposed to common sense is a commoner sense," that is, " a common sense that is more and more imaginative," and, if possible, that is wholly in terms of the higher imagination, wholly in touch with the universal, timeless, spaceless truth, for thus only can we escape the lapse into another too rigid convention, thus only can we reach a genuine mediation between the abiding one and the ever changing many.

To achieve a humanistic reconstruction, we must therefore add to the limited experimentation possible to one age the wisdom of the ages, a wisdom that one may achieve by an imaginative concentration not only on our own experience and that of our time but on the experience of the race, to be found in history and especially in the records of the thoughts of its greater witnesses.

For, on the reaches of the higher imagination, the greater spirits meet through their intuitions of the universal and come to agree on essentials, because within the infinitely diverse accidents of time and space they thus vision reality *sub specie aeternitatis*. " The sage is delivered from time," says Buddha. "Happy is the soul in which time no longer courses," answers Michael Angelo across the centuries. Students of sources should remember this. The same thoughts will occur to those who have achieved the same insight, not necessarily because they borrow from one another, but because they dwell on the same heights. We find in them "maxims that are sure to be reaffirmed wherever and whenever men attain to the level of humanistic insight." And Babbitt adds: "We are dealing here with indubitable facts and should plant ourselves upon them as against those who would exaggerate either the constant or the variable elements in human nature."

Babbitt would thus solve the problem of our reaching the abiding one in the ever changing many, and hold out to us the hope of getting in touch with reality. If he cannot give us a complete metaphysics, at least he would restore to us the sense of the abiding values in the lives of our abiding selves; he would have us certain that, no matter how much we may feel lost in the multiplicity of the universe, no matter how we may be haunted by the realization of the flux of change without and within us, we are not mere flotsam on the stream of time, but, however mysteriously, we have within us wherewith to lay hold upon the no less mysteriously abiding Truth outside of us. Thus would he free us from the subjectivism of Kant, from the agnosticism to which it led, from a pragmatism which would seek truth only in the particular, and from an experimentalism which so despairs of discovering abiding truth that it denies its existence.

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Irving Babbitt might have stopped here, but positivistic observation led him to go one step farther in reassuring us as to our relation with the antecedently real, with a truth superior to us. He has established that we can glimpse in every domain the abiding within the flux of change, the universal in the particular, the one in the many, by understanding the possible combined working of the imagination and the reason. But he would add: This means that we have the capacity to discover the laws of the higher will.

The higher will! Here we come to the ultimate aspect of Irving Babbitt's doctrine, the most subtle, no doubt the most objectionable to his naturalistic critics, and the one which, on the other hand, arouses the suspicion of his Christian well-wishers. There is of course no possibility of making it acceptable to the invincibly convinced naturalist, but there should be no difficulty for all others to appreciate the importance of its reassertion. The higher will — what else can it be than the ultimate source of the abiding, the sum of the universals, the whole universal, timeless, spaceless truth, the antecedently real, the permanent order, " the unwritten laws of the heavens " which even the Greeks conceived, which the Christian called the " City of God," reality *sub specie aeternitatis*. It is this reality which, for Irving Babbitt, as we saw, it is the role of the higher imagination to attain, the reality which reflected in man's records constitutes the wisdom of the ages. The higher will is eternal Wisdom, eternal Law, the multiple aspects of which man must discover and obey to fit himself into the cosmos and know happiness, else ignorance and transgression will inevitably bring him misery. All the records of history, in all times and places, testify that man has always had some idea of that Law and that he has sought to know and obey it, however crudely. This was to be expected since there is in him wherewith to know and obey the Law. Since man has a natural capacity to reach the universal, he cannot but have had always some conception of the ultimate universal. For are we not always more or less aware that, above the experiences and solicitations of our time and place, there are laws not of our own making, laws outside of us which we learn gradually and more or less easily through experience and which cannot be violated with impunity?

But here Babbitt would go farther. He makes bold to assert that not only is the Law outside of man, but that the Law is within man, at least to some extent, and that it may be within him in proportion as he tries to discover its dictates. The higher will is above man and in man. How can Babbitt establish such a startling, all-consoling fact, experimentally? Well, is it not true that we are aware not only of a Law above us, outside of us, but moreover that, whatever may be the ultimate explanation, we are also conscious of urges within us that violate that Law? We are conscious that what we call our feelings, our desires, and even our reason ever tend to excess. We yearn for unlimited sensation and power and for ultimate explanations that are evidently beyond our ken. We have in us what the Middle Ages called the *libido sentiendi,* the *libido dominandi,* and the *libido sciendi.* Our whole natural self ever reaches beyond itself. We come here to the crux of the question. If our natural self is thus ever tending to disorder, are we not also inevitably aware, is it not also an immediate datum of consciousness, that these tendencies to disorder of our natural self may be checked and that we can actually achieve order? But if, Babbitt concludes, there is in us the power to check our natural self, then that power must be supernatural and hence ultimately divine. Not only is the Law, the Will of God, above us, but the Will of God is within us. We have not only a natural self but we have a supernatural self, not only a lower self but a higher self, not only a lower will tending to disorder but a higher will which enables us to achieve order, and which, like the cognitive glimpses of the Law reached by the higher imagination, is felt as a check upon the tendencies to excess of our natural selves. In proportion as we meditate upon these findings of the higher imagination, these glimpses of the abiding Law above us, we shall bring the lower will into conformity with the higher will, we shall take our place in the order of the universe, we shall fit into the cosmos, and, instead of the tumult of our irreconciled desires, we shall experience harmony. In proportion as our whole self unites with the divine in us we shall know that peace which passeth understanding, through the sense of having reached the abiding spiritual values in the midst of a changing physical world. Spiritual philosophies, opposed to the merging of man with nature, call man a "rational animal," but Irving Babbitt would go beyond this. Since man is evidently not self-disciplined, since on the contrary natural man tends to excess in his every activity, there must be something in him to oppose and check the excesses of his natural self, else he could never reach a harmonious life in conformity with the Law. If to be a rational animal is the natural estate of man, since his rationality is not sufficient to insure his right conduct, there must be in him more than rationality, if he would rise superior to his own weaknesses. Man, therefore, as Babbitt conceives him, is not only a rational animal endowed with natural reason and will, but a rational animal in whom is felt also the presence of a higher will ultimately divine. Such is the complete formula of Babbitt's humanism.

But the Christian will immediately say: What Babbitt finds thus in man ready to help his natural rationality to live according to the Law is what the Christian calls grace. "No doubt," Mr. Babbitt would answer, "the mistake of the naturalistic age was precisely to lose track of this element in man in its effort, with the deists, to get away from the quarrels about Christian grace. What I am therefore trying to do is to call attention to the actual presence in man of that supernatural principle ready to help check the inevitable tendency to excess of the natural reason and will, without going into the discussions to which the Christian doctrine of grace has led. Let the Churches continue to discuss the doctrines that may grow out of the presence of a higher will within man, at least let not those who do not wish to enter into those discussions deny that presence. How the higher will comes to be there I do not pretend to know, but as a positivist, I must recognize the fact, and as a positivist also, because of the inveterate tendency of the whole natural man to excess, I must recognize its necessity." Again and again, but especially in his more recent shorter essays in which he sought to give the substance of his doctrine, Babbitt has told us that he "planted himself on the naked psychological fact" of this opposition between man's natural tendencies to excess and an element of supernatural will in him, and that, since this fact is an immediate datum of consciousness, he could do so and still remain positivistic and critical. Referring to Mr. Walter Lippmann's statement that the modern man had lost the belief "that there is an immortal essence presiding like a king over his appetites," Mr. Babbitt asserts: "This immortal essence is, judged experimentally and by its fruits, a higher will." Why then not affirm it "as a psychological fact, one of the immediate data of consciousness, a perception so primordial that, compared with it, the denial of man's moral freedom by the determinist is only a metaphysical dream"? The divine element in man "is felt in its relation to man's ordinary will or expansive desires as a power of vital control." It is not a deduction any more than the fact of our natural tendency to excess. It is an *immediate* perception: "Positively one may define it [the higher will] as the higher immediacy that is known in its relation to the lower immediacy — the merely temperamental man with his impressions and emotions and expansive desires — as a power of vital control [*frein vital*]." There is therefore not the least doubt that the assertion of the presence in man of a higher will set against the excessive desires of his natural self is the ultimate principle of Babbitt's psychology and of humanism as he understands it.

Because man in the naturalistic age lost the sense of his true nature, he lost the humility which it behooves him to have, since, in view of the disordered tendencies of his natural self, he must always be ready to discipline this natural self in harmony with the action of the higher will in him according to the standards which his imagination and reason may enable him to conceive.

Man loses this necessary humility when he thinks that his "ordinary will," his "expansive desires" are good, as the English deists, and in their wake Rousseau and the romantics, or all those Babbitt calls the "sentimental naturalists", always tend to do. He loses it also when he thinks that reason alone, through knowledge, can ensure virtue, as the Stoics and the eighteenth-century rationalists held. He loses it again in so far as he thinks that material progress is the end of man and hence can secure his happiness, as those Babbitt calls the "Baconian naturalists" are constantly doing. He did not lose it when he thought, according to Christianity, that he depended to a large extent upon the grace of God to control his "ordinary will and expansive desires"; but, on the other hand, he was unduly humiliated when, as in Calvinism and Jansenism, he was led to think that he had no part in deserving the free gift of God's grace. But man is neither unduly humiliated, nor, on the other hand, does he lose humility, if he feels, present in himself, a higher will, a divine will, to which he must learn to submit his "ordinary will" and "expansive desires." The existence of this higher will within him is for him "a source of awe and humility." He thus keeps "the ultimate degree of spiritual self-reliance" even while he submits humbly his "natural self" to this supernatural will. Thus would Babbitt solve the problem of being "at once humble and self-reliant." The assertion of the need to do so is part of his challenge to naturalism, for it is the loss of this humility which explains its failures in all domains. Only in this submission to the higher will in him, to the principle in him that is "ultimately divine", will man find not only peace but the solution of the problems of character both individual and social.

Nor have we here a negative doctrine, as some critics would maintain. The flexible standards which result from the co-operation of imagination and reason become an ordering influence upon the tumultuous impulses of the natural man. Life is energy, but the highest life is the most complexly canalized energy. Thanks to the action of the higher will on the basis of the standards furnished by the higher imagination and reason, man becomes a microcosmos instead of remaining a microchaos. To deride the existence in man of some type of *frein vital* is to deny him the possibility of any ordered activity. To lead him to trust as a guiding principle his lower imagination is to condemn him to wander in a dream land of chimeras which soon may become a nightmare. To encourage him to rely wholly upon his analytical reason is to leave him a prey to misguiding, prideful overconfidence or to the static sterility of formalism. To leave him depending wholly on his natural will is to forget that it is prone to side with all the excessive tendencies of his appetites. But to recognize in him the possibility of a combined action of the higher imagination, the reason, and the natural will, in the service of a higher will, present in him, is to open to him the full possibilities of a humanistic development.

Whereupon other critics will say: Why do you not say, the possibilities of a humanistic and religious development? If Babbitt's humanism includes the idea of a will which must be ultimately the will of God at work within man, it reaches the level of religion. Does humanism then aim to take the place of revealed religion? The relation of Irving Babbitt's humanism to revealed religion is evidently so important, and has given rise to so many discussions, that it needs to be considered in a separate study. But, before taking it up, it will repay us to review in turn a critique of naturalism as far-reaching and as thoroughgoing as that of Irving Babbitt, developed independently and from a different psychological angle.

IV

THE RATIONAL IMPERIALISM OF ERNEST SEILLIÈRE AND AMERICAN HUMANISM: A COMPARISON

IN the United States, the revolt against naturalism may still look like a new and isolated phenomenon, even though it is admitted that the adherents of the American humanistic movement are already numerous. But if we look to Europe, and especially to France, where naturalism had such an early development, we discover that it began long ago to yield ground before a many-sided and vigorous attack. American thought, therefore, in so far as it remains naturalistic, is really lagging some fifty years behind this evolution. Materialistic realism, which we so lately imitated, had its apogee in France between 1870 and 1890; and the impressionism, born of disillusionment, which we are but beginning to disown, was denounced by French critics even when it flourished in the nineties. In fact, to find the moment in the evolution of French thought which corresponds to the work of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More, we may go back to the publication, in 1882, of the *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine* of Paul Bourget, which we have already mentioned. The critical attitude which he assumed towards his beloved early masters, Renan and Taine, symbolizes the beginning of the repudiation of naturalism which has been more and more marked in France ever since.

Much remains to be done before we can thoroughly understand that the limitations of the pseudo-realism of Zola or of the disillusioned mood of Anatole France are as keenly realized in France as those of the romanticism of George Sand or of Hugo, and that French thought has long been working its way towards that genuine positivism Babbitt speaks of. This positivism would restore the sense of the dualism of man's nature and bring about the final rejection of the monistic conceptions which an uncontrolled imagination and a pseudo-positivism fastened upon us. But, among all the authors who testify to this radical change, no one can be of greater service, perhaps, to us than Baron Ernest Seillière, not only because of the amplitude of his work — he has written some fifty books and hundreds of magazine articles — but because, at about the same time as Irving Babbitt, he too began a systematic examination of the fruits of naturalism since the eighteenth century and developed a critical method so close to that of American humanism that a study of his work may enable us not only to realize how far from being uncorroborated by others is Babbitt's critique, but also to understand more exactly his doctrine through comparison with another. The fact that the methods of approach of Baron Seillière and Irving Babbitt are sufficiently different to show their independence of each other only adds to the value of their concordant findings.

Born in 1866 of a distinguished Lorraine family, Ernest Seillière passed through *l'École Polytechnique,* but his independent means permitted him to consecrate his whole life to uninterrupted study. This explains how it was possible for him to publish some twenty volumes between 1893 and 1917, and some thirty since. The fact that he became a literary chronicler on the *Journal des Débats* immediately after the appearance of his first works, and that his books are largely made up of these chronicles further accounts for his publication, at times, of several books a year. Another factor in his favor was that after *Polytechnique* he went directly to Heidelberg, where he stayed two years studying history and philosophy, and learning enough German to write in that language, in 1905, a study of Peter Rosegger, a Styrian novelist, and, just before the war, a study of Goethe. But, especially, it enabled him to be one of the most indefatigable analysts of German thought, a fact of the utmost value in the development of his life's work, which was to be, to use his own words, " the philosophical history of romanticism " or " the origin of contemporary ideology." He began his survey, in 1897, by a study of Ferdinand Lassalle, the founder of the German socialist party, followed, in 1899, by *Literature and Ethics of the German Socialists*. Four years later, a series of volumes, under the general title of *The Philosophy of Imperialism,* shows that he had perfected his method and developed his psychological approach to the study of history and literature. These volumes include *Gobineau and Historical Aryanism; Nietzsche, or Apollo or Dionysos; Democratic Imperialism: Hobbes, Rousseau, and Proudhon; The Romantic Malady: Stendhal and Fourier*. From time to time, he sums up his results and deepening convictions: *Introduction to the Philosophy of Imperialism* (1911); *Toward Rational Socialism* (1923); *For the Centenary of Romanticism: An Examination of Conscience* (1927). Thanks to these recapitulations, studies of his philosophy by others which he has republished at the end of many of his volumes, and the odd half-dozen of books published on his work, it is not only easy to get at his thought but it is even impossible to sum it up without repeating others.

What then is his method and his psychology? Like Irving Babbitt, he perceives clearly that back of a literary product there is a philosophy, and that a history of literature which does not first concern itself with a philosophical background is wholly superficial. Likewise, he does not pretend that his philosophy or psychology is a complete system. He too utilizes only such items as are immediate data of consciousness and can be judged by their fruits through the literary and historical record. It is therefore not strange that, like Babbitt, he finds in man natural impulses that need to be directed, checked, or harmonized, if man is not to fall into excesses, and that he often finds in literature expressions of these excesses. Now one of the first data of consciousness, and the most evident recorded tendency of man, is what the Middle Ages called the *libido dominandi,* the lust of power, but which in its essence is but the primordial and indispensable will to live, to make the best of one's environment, the most of oneself. Like all human impulses it has therefore a legitimate purpose. This instinct M. Seillière calls "imperialism." But if it is essentially good at its source, like all other human urges, it needs to be disciplined, else it will make men tend to ruthless domination. At all events, says Seillière, let us be realistic and objective, and recognize this "imperialism" as an integral and necessary part of human nature. Such is his first principle.

The next characteristic item of his philosophy is reached less from self-examination than from the record of history. Is it not true that, everywhere and at all times, man, in his will to live and prosper, and even in his excessive tendency to dominate, has sought a supernatural ally, and tended to believe that the gods or that God is with him and against his enemies? Thus "imperialism" becomes what M. Seillière calls "mystical." Here again we may have a most legitimate natural tendency. Man may reason his way to the idea of God, of God's will, and of the necessity to make his will conform to God's. This is the essential element of true religion. But what M. Seillière calls "mysticism" is the perverted opposite of this: to imagine God's will to coincide with one's will to power, to think oneself Messianic. How frequently men have fallen into this delusion of *Gott mit uns!* This fancy to which M. Seillière applies the term "mysticism" — to be taken in the sense of pseudo-mysticism — may therefore be defined as the emotional certitude of an alliance between the will of God and one's will to power. Thus man is revealed to be inveterately "mystico-imperialistic."

But there is another *libido* which the Middle Ages also isolated objectively: the *libido sentiendi,* the lust of feeling, especially of sexual feeling. Now feelings in general are evidently also an integral and essential part of human nature. The sexual feeling in particular may merge with the *libido dominandi,* as its satisfaction adds to the sense of power. But it is also a matter of observation that, singly or combined with the will to power, the will to passion is susceptible of the grossest abuses. And yet the record of the race is there to show that, here again, man tends to legitimate his indulgence by making it coincide with God's will, even if to do so God must be merged with nature. Thus we get what M. Seillière calls "passional mysticism," one of the most common forms of "the romantic malady."

Thus we see that, while M. Seillière agrees with Irving Babbitt in noting that man's natural energies are ever prone to excess, he further notes very shrewdly that man ever tends to justify these excesses by confusing them mystically with the will of God. He is therefore prepared to find in the record of man's history every type of "mystical imperialism."

For Seillière, as for Babbitt, the turning point in the history of man's conception of his nature is to be found in the generation of Rousseau and chiefly in the latter's work. It is with Rousseau that "mystical imperialism" becomes "naturalistic mysticism." That is, the constant tendency man has to assert himself and to justify the excesses of this self-assertion by considering them to be God's will, became much more acute in the eighteenth century, because God was then finally merged with nature. Man should follow the dictates of his nature because his nature is good, because, as Rousseau's disciples will further develop, nature is God, because man, God, and nature are inseparable. This merging of God, man, and nature gives us, as opposed to humanistic dualism, the monism of the naturalistic age which Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More have so boldly challenged. What they call naturalism, M. Seillière calls "naturalistic mysticism," thus stressing further the emotional drive behind the movement.

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Another distinctive and peculiarly valuable feature of M. Seillière's work is that he goes much farther back than

Irving Babbitt in tracing the genesis of Rousseau's thought. This is specially valuable as it helps to restore an historical perspective that has been sadly distorted by naturalistic prejudices.

A radical separation is commonly made between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance — for example, in such generalizations as the following: "The Middle Ages had scorned the body. Hence all the follies of asceticism. And if the body was curbed by the spirit, the spirit itself was held in suspicion and submitted to a severe discipline. . . . But instead of this somber asceticism, the Renaissance proposes as an ideal to man the full and free development of all his faculties. The body is rehabilitated. . . . Man again begins to love life. It is this panegyric of nature, this hymn to life, which Rabelais intones. Nature is essentially good, etc." Until the misrepresentations latent in such antitheses are cleared up, humanists and naturists must continue to talk at cross purposes, for the foregoing passage confuses utterly humanism with naturism. The author here cited goes on quoting as proof of his thesis the rule of Rabelais's *Abbaye de Thélème:* "Fais ce que voudras," "Do as you please," and even its explanation: "For people of noble minds, well born, well instructed, conversing in honest company, have, by nature, an instinct and a goad which ever urge them to virtuous deeds, and keeps them from vice: which instinct they call honor." But, as we have already noted, far from having here a praise of natural goodness, we have a praise of acquired goodness, a confidence in the effects of aristocratic culture. The "by nature" here means "habitually," "as a result of humanistic discipline." In fact, the upshot of the Renaissance was the taking on of the classical disciplines to such a point that the naturistic revolt of the eighteenth century against discipline came partly as a reaction. On the other hand, it is not true that mediaeval civilization as a whole represented only religious discipline. In fact, religious ideals scarcely appear in secular literature, outside of the nobler *Chansons de Geste*. Instead, we have the cynical realism of the *fabliaux* and the *Roman de Renart* and of the second part of *Le Roman de la Rose* — in short in the very days of St. Thomas and St. Louis, a naturalism far less counterbalanced than the grosser side of Rabelais. But, especially, we have, almost as early as the *Chansons de Geste,* the development of the *courtois* spirit leading to a code of morals which Rabelais evidently did not tolerate in his *Abbaye.* His knights and ladies are not Lancelots and Guineveres. The all-important fact, the fact which must come to be fully appreciated before we recover the perspective of literary, social, and even philosophical history, is that the development of social life, in what we call the Renaissance period, and all the literature which expresses this development, is, for the greater part, a direct continuation of this mediaeval *courtois* spirit and of the social life of twelfth-century Provence. T. F. Crane's *Italian Social Customs in the XVIth Century* would suffice to establish this. The Renaissance, far from liberating the mediaeval knight and lady from an asceticism which they had never accepted, largely killed, on the contrary, their lyrical romantic spirit. It was in spite of the Renaissance, in spite, especially, of the stern Stoic spirit of discipline which it brought in, and because the current of mediaeval romance was continued in the pastoral novels of the early seventeenth century which Rousseau knew, that it lived on to be worked by him into a new "passional mysticism." The truth is that one whole aspect of the Middle Ages was romantic, and that the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century *mal romantique* was in part a revival of one side of the mediaeval temper.

It is this perspective of history, so badly distorted, which Baron Seillière helps to restore, by tracing the genesis of one aspect of Rousseauism back to its mediaeval sources in his book: *The Romanesque Origins of Romantic Ethics and Politics.* The origin of the Provençal love lyric is by no means clear. Whence came this peculiar *courtois* love, neither erotic nor conjugal, Ovidian nor Christian, but the inspiration of knightly deeds and courtly manners? Ultimately, no doubt, from Plato and the neo-Platonists, whence it could seep into the Western world through Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite, Boethius, and some of the Church fathers, till, through the southern clerics, it reached the troubadours, just as much of the matter of the *Chansons de Geste* had reached the *trouvères* through the monasteries. In any case, the elaborate code of *courtois* love is fully exemplified in the Knights of the Round Table as Chrétien de Troyes pictures them; and, through him, it is destined to conquer Europe. Its vogue spread throughout the Middle Ages; it passed to the Italian courts, as Crane has shown; it explains one side of Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio. The Spanish romances revived its themes and restored them to France, in the sixteenth century, in the story of *Amadis*. So that the Renaissance with its study of Plato only reinforced the current. The acquaintance with Theocritus and Longus also helped to introduce it into the pastoral. The *Diana* of Montemayor, the *Galatea* of Cervantes, the *Aminta* of Tasso, the *Pastor Fido* of Guarini, as well as the *Amadis*, in turn explain *L'Astrée* of d'Urfé, which inspired the French society of the first half of the seventeenth century, and which exercised on Rousseau, as he himself tells us, a decisive influence. The point is that, whether in mediaeval romances or Renaissance tales, the tendency is to pass gradually from " neo-Platonic " idealism to actual seduction, so that Rousseau's *Julie* but follows a long tradition. Into the same current of love tales, the ancient myths of the Golden Age had also been rewoven. They were moreover reinforced by the accounts of the natural goodness of the savages of the New World. Montaigne already glorifies *le bon sauvage*. Even Jesuit missionaries oppose his ways to the corruption of the civilized peoples, a development which Rousseau again will but amplify and which will have an influence in the development of the " natural religion " of the deists and naturalists in general. There are of course many distinctions to be made in this long story, and M. Seillière does not fail to indicate some of them — for instance, in his *La Calprenède and the Classical Novel* (1922). He opens, however, another entire field of further research by his studies of "Quietism" and of the place to be assigned to Fénelon in the development of Rousseauism in his *Mme Guyon, and Fénelon, Precursors of Rousseau* (1918). These studies bring up another question of great general interest: that of the relation of Protestantism to Rousseauism. Baron Seillière opposes the rationalized mysticism of the Catholic Church to the irrational mysticism of idiosyncratic and isolated individuals perpetually tending to break out in new heresies. He notes how, for some twelve centuries, the Church, with its ever selected sacerdotal élite, guided and organized the tumultuous religious aspirations of man, establishing an equilibrium between his rationalistic and mystical tendencies. Both the Renaissance and the Reformation broke this equilibrium. Luther represents an irrational mystic reaction from the anti-mystical rationalism of the Renaissance, so that his faith in direct inspiration, with its utter trust in the individual, led to a mystical imperialism not only destructive but self-destructive inasmuch as each mystic, left unchecked by anything above himself, or the normalizing influence of a corporate body, could develop his own mysticism into a doctrine. This tendency remains in the Protestant movement, breaking it up into numberless sects, and making its left wing perpetually tend to pure naturalism; but it was so one-sided that it could not but produce an early reaction among the Protestants themselves. This is well represented by Calvin and the currents stemming from him, which are in reality attempts to rationalize again into doctrinal churches and creeds the Protestant mystical movement.

Baron Seillière does not admit that Rousseauism can possibly follow directly from Luther or even Calvin. For the mysticism of both took the form of exaggerating the evil tendencies of human nature. "How then," asks Seillière, " could Rousseauism, the essence of which is to proclaim man naturally good, be derived from Protestantism which declares him radically bad? " The truth is, according to M. Seillière, that the Rousseauistic mystic exaltation of the goodness of the natural man and, in particular, of his emotional life, which, it may be held, was but one side of Rousseau's contradictory thought, but which is the side taken up by his disciples because it was in the general trend of a long evolution, goes back to the " passional mysticism " of the *courtois* current. But here Baron Seillière adds an important contribution in calling our attention to more immediate antecedents of Rousseauism, namely, " Guyonism " and " Fénelonism," which themselves link with the *courtois* current.

For, within Catholicism itself, mysticism ever tends to break out of bounds. Still disciplined within orthodoxy in St. Theresa, François de Sales, or Jeanne de Chantal, it lost all " measure " in the doctrines of other Spanish and Italian mystics, notably in the " quietism " of Molinos condemned by Rome, and culminated in France in the semi-quietism of Mme. Guyon. The latter had a group of followers in the diocese of Annecy, where Rousseau was to meet Mme. de Warens, herself affected by this doctrine, which is a curious mixture of religious aspirations and sentimentality, and easily leads to sensualism. M. Seillière defines Rousseau's *" maman "* and mistress as " a provincial *précieuse* " who would introduce into religion the itinerary of the *Map of Tenderness,* that amorous guide which Mlle. de Scudéry expounded in her *Clélie*. Nor is the imperialism natural to man absent from Mme. de Warens's character, as is indeed the case with all individualistic religionists proud of their direct alliance with the divine. Mme. Guyon tended to disparage the part of human reason and will in the work of salvation, in favour of a complete abandonment to the grace of God. According to " quietism " proper, man was to remain wholly passive in acts of love. Religion became a mere expansive emotion. Righteousness is not to be conquered by man in a struggle with the evil in his nature, concupiscence, and evil powers outside of him symbolized as " Satan ", but through direct relationship between man and God, established precisely by man's ceasing to make efforts that God may act the more surely in him. Temptations are held to come from God himself and will cease when man thus lovingly surrenders to God. Such was the source of the pseudo-Catholicism of Mme. de Warens and the doctrine which Rousseau could learn from his stay in Annecy, that is, a religious sentimentality and " natural religion " which, like the neo-Platonic refinements of *l'amour courtois,* might easily lead, as it actually did in the case of Mme. de Warens and Rousseau, to sensual indulgence through its destruction of the virile elements of character. Now, Fénelon, naturally torn between the imperialistic impulses of his aristocratic nature and his Christian humility, found in Mme. Guyon a sister soul. Just how far he reacted against her on the side of orthodoxy is a disputed point. The great Bossuet, as naturally virile as Fénelon was feminine, brought the question to an issue; and the doctrine of Fénelon was promptly condemned by Rome. Fénelon submitted, though M. Seillière doubts that his sincerity was complete; but " Fénelonism " was none the less to continue to exercise an influence both directly and through Rousseau, who tells us himself that he became at Annecy " devout almost in the way of Fénelon."

Here then is another proof that, to understand anything about the naturalistic age, one must do precisely what Irving Babbitt has done: centre his attention upon Rousseau. Upon his work, centuries of " mystic " love-making and pseudo-mystic religion converge. His books are the great reservoir which gathers the sentimental currents of the past and from which flow to our own day those of the naturalistic age.

The life work of Baron Seillière, which, at first, disconcerts by its very amplitude, is thus seen to possess a splendid unity. The rapidity of its production, much accentuated in the last twelve years, becomes intelligible when we note that these volumes but add material to a central inquiry and that this material largely consists of reviews of books bearing upon this inquiry, thus making available a large amount of documentation. Whether we agree or not with Baron Seillière's philosophy or with his conclusions, we cannot escape the necessity of examining all this material in detail, and, if need be, of retracing his steps and investigating further the numerous "leads" he has given us. His works and those of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More make apologies for naturalism which do not take such data into consideration appear puerile and futile.

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Returning then to Rousseau, after tracing the genesis of Rousseauism back to the twelfth century, Baron Seillière proceeded to study the several streams of development of the "mystic imperialism" which flow from him. We thus come back to the questions Irving Babbitt has investigated but through a different approach. As Seillière sees it, Rousseauism is the fountain-head of the various types of "modern mysticism" through which, in the Occident, individuals and social groups justify their imperialistic tendency, their love of power and self-assertion, by an alliance with a "God-Nature" of which Rousseau was the prophet. We thus have "passional," "aesthetic," "social," and "racial" mysticism. Catholic critics, l'Abbé Bremond, of the French Academy, in particular, have objected to the use in this sense of the term "mysticism", which, in Catholicism, is alien to sensuous feelings, flows from grace, remains in touch with reality and intellect, and is, above all, humble. What M. Seillière wishes to call our attention to, however, is that man's tendency to recognize divine powers above nature, to enter into an alliance with them, and to justify his actions by considering them the will of these gods or of God, has persisted when God was merged in nature. Baron Seillière's various types of Rousseauistic or romantic mysticism are then more clearly described by the term "naturistic mysticism" which he also uses. "Naturistic mysticism" is, then, the mysticism of the naturalistic age.

In its "passional" form, this mysticism makes the seducer say, with the St. Preux of Rousseau: "An eternal decree of Heaven destined us for each other." This will be re-echoed by the Werther of Goethe with his defence of love as a divine impulse; by the René of Chateaubriand: "Thou alone, Supreme Being who made me as I am can understand me"; by the Byronian heroes who mix their appeals to God and to Satan; by the heroes of Mme. de Staël: "It is Nature, it is your lover who speaks to you." In George Sand, whose work M. Seillière studies in detail, we have the defence of the divine right of woman to love again and again the worthy and the unworthy, with lovers considered as the gift of God. Musset, in turn, makes constant appeals to God to justify his loves. Dumas *fils* not only rehabilitates the courtesan but makes passion even when due merely to physical attraction justify adultery. With the passing of this third romantic generation, however (if we take the first to be that of Rousseau, and the second that of Chateaubriand) the name of God tends to disappear, the secularization of "passional mysticism" is completed, and God-Nature appears as natural instinct. We have Flaubert with his "*Madame Bovary c'était moi*"; and finally Zola, imperialistic in temper, and pseudo-scientific, who considers "thought a function of matter" and is particularly interested in "decomposition."

The "aesthetic" type of "naturistic mysticism" makes the writer in general, but especially the poet, allies of God or of God-Nature. Running through German thought from Klopstock to Nietzsche, brought into France by Mme. de Staël and Liszt, it becomes a theme of the French romantics with Hugo and Vigny. "This will kill that," writes Hugo; and Balzac explains: "The writer has replaced the priest." Balzac himself sees the danger, but his words remain as a description of the mystic conception the romantic writer has of himself: "He consoles, he cures, he prays, he prophecies. Humanity is his flock and meditates his words. The pontiff of this terrible and majestic power holds his mission not from kings nor the great, but from God." Flaubert himself used the expression " aesthetic mysticism." He declares that it is his religion, and that art is his country. It may, however, be said for him that he reacted against the conception that the artist has only to let himself go to be great. His tireless self-discipline, at least in matters of literary technique, made him a veritable ascetic for art's sake. The curious Barbey d'Aurevilly offers the case of a romantic who, converted to Catholicism, finally tries to convert Catholicism to romanticism and returns to " Satanism." But in Stendhal, in particular, M. Seillière finds a typical devotee of the religion of art, wholly given to the indulgence of the *libido sentiendi*. For him, if the maximum of enjoyment is to be found in the contemplation of the beautiful, the beautiful is passion in the natural state, that is, as violent as possible. Hence his aesthetic cult becomes an admiration for the purely impulsive *lazzarone*, " the eldest son of nature." He has no patience with civilized Scotland which furnishes but one capital crime in six years. He calls the sentiment of duty the torturer of the northern people — especially of the English, who tremble at its very name. He is haunted by the idea of the beautiful crime of passion. Oscar Wilde but re-echoes his words: " Crime is to the inferior classes what art is for us aesthetes, simply a method of procuring extraordinary sensations."

If " passional " and " aesthetic " mysticisms have thus led to the inversion of all values, to a veritable " Satanism," with the cult of sensual indulgence and the exaltation of crimes as a proof of " virtu ", " racial mysticism " has bred the irrational exaltation which helped to bring on the great war. Mediaeval France believed in the " *gesta Dei per Francos*," revolutionary France believed in its mission to spread " Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity ".

But if French patriotism is very real, it is nationalistic rather than racial. The reason is perhaps that France is a geographic and historical rather than a racial unit. It should be noted also that in republican France the " nationalists " and even the *" Action Française "* have never been as strong as the socialists. There is certainly no such thing as a pan-Gallic movement. Baron Seillière finds a mystical racial imperialist in Cecil Rhodes, who sought to fulfill the purpose of God by working for the happiness of humanity through the superior white race, and more specifically through the Anglo-Saxon race, which he considered the furthest advanced in the direction of justice, liberty, and peace. But " racial mysticism " is the special characteristic of Germany for the very reason perhaps that, as compared with France, Italy, Spain, and England, it lacks a natural geographic unity. Baron Seillière traces the beginning of Germanic " racial mysticism " through Klopstock, Lessing, the *" Sturm und Drang "* group, Herder, the young Goethe, Fichte, Kleist, Arndt, Koerner, Jahn, Savigny, Mueller, Haller, with Hegel giving it its philosophical prestige. Our modern era was for Hegel the specifically Germanic period of humanity. Numerous historians followed Hegel's lead: Gervinus, Niebuhr, Strauss, Lassen, Movers, Feuerbach, Klemm, and many others. Seillière quotes the following characteristic sentence from the Hegelian Leo: " The Celtic race, whether in Ireland or France, is always moved by a bestial impulse (*ein tierischer Trieb*), whereas we Germans never act but under the impulse of thoughts and inspirations truly saintly." But, quite ironically, the development of " Pan-Germanism " received a powerful impetus from a Frenchman, the Comte de Gobineau, and from an Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain.

Gobineau was an aristocrat with a mania for genealogy. He traced his own, to his satisfaction, to the German invaders and even beyond. Hence his interest in Germany. As he knew German, he read the Hegelians who were reinterpreting world history in terms of Germanic ambitions. Hence his *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races*. The Aryans, especially the German branch, had been destined by God to be the organizers of human societies. Gobineau considered, however, that these original Germans had all disappeared — except himself (!) — as Germany had become Celtic in the West, and Slavic in the East. His Germanism was a pessimistic retrospection, natural enough about 1850. He did not see its dangers, in spite of the warning of the scholarly de Tocqueville. But about 1880, a few months before the death of both, Gobineau and Wagner met. Wagner, himself a Hegelian, became much interested in Gobineau's work and had it highly recommended in the *Bayreuther Blaetter*. It thus reinforced the mystical pan-Germanism in process of development; and Gobineau, merely an enthusiast for the past of the Germans, was made a prophet of their future. Among his commentators, M. Seillière mentions Heinrich von Stein, Ludwig Schemann, but especially Chamberlain, who had married a daughter of Wagner and become a German citizen. In his *Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* Chamberlain utilized Schopenhauer and Wagner and taught that the Vedas are the sacred books of Aryan Europe and that the metaphysics of Brahmanism has been continued by German thought. He actually ignores the genuine Germanic religions, but espouses instead Jewish prophetism and original Christianity as an Aryan and therefore Germanic influence in Palestine. This is continued by mediaeval Germanic mysticism through Eckardt, Tauler, Suso, and Jacob Boehme, one of the direct inspirers of the German romantics. Thus primitive Aryan thought, once expressed in the Vedas, was, he maintains, continued in the Occident by the Germanic race and flowered in Kant and Goethe. Hence the mission of the Germans to work out a new religion as a help in their vital struggle. For the sublime teaching of their " racial brother ", Jesus, came to them distorted by a degenerated Judaism and by the Mediterranean nations, a mere " chaos of peoples." Jerusalem and Rome are to be replaced by Benares, Koenigsberg, and Weimar. Let the German race in the twentieth century perfect this mystic creation of a new religion, else the Judaico-Mediterranean contagion will bring about its decadence. Chamberlain had continuators — Ludwig Woltmann for instance — who, taking up his hint that the great Italians of the Renaissance were geniuses because of their descent from the Lombards and Goths, sought to demonstrate by their physical characteristics that all the great men of southern Europe had German blood. An interesting proof that the thesis of Chamberlain was taken seriously is that the Emperor William II personally assisted in having his book placed in public libraries. It is not surprising of course that Germany, once it had attained to national consciousness, should feel it irksome to admit that its centre was first touched by civilization some twelve hundred years after Pericles. That its racial mysticism should find a way to invert history so as to annex Brahmanism, Christianity, and the Renaissance is truly startling; but M. Seillière has a right to point out that such mysticism springs so spontaneously from human nature that it may well continue to be a factor to be reckoned with. Paul Elmer More has shown, for his part, how German Biblical criticism boasted of having raised religious thought from the lower reaches of Greek intelligence to the purer altitudes of Teutonic spirituality by transmuting the Ideas of Plato into the ideals of Hegel. This is but another instance of how far racial mysticism can colour national thought and even scholarship. Who would dare to assert that this same mysticism did not exercise an influence on the German *Welt-politik* before the World War? Evidently, if we are to have an intellectual Locarno, we shall have to get rid of such methods of approach to the study of history.

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As for " social naturistic mysticism," the history of its excesses, as studied by M. Seillière is of no less immediate interest. It starts with the contention that, as the man of the people is closer to nature, he is less spoiled by civilization than the aristocrat or the bourgeois, hence nearer divine inspiration. Evidently we have to distinguish between the "democratic mysticism" of the French Revolution and "the proletarian or plebeian naturistic mysticism" of the Russian. M. Seillière studies the first in Edgar Quinet, who sees in the French Revolution the realization of the gospel of "the eternal plebeian Jesus Christ" whose doctrine, he holds, the Church distorted. France as the Messiah of the revolutionary spirit was crucified at Waterloo, but at the Revolution of 1848 the "pure Gospel" won the day. "Let us show the world," Quinet cried, "that the times we thought to be postponed for centuries have dawned and that we now possess forever the Republic of the children of the same Father, the true city of God." Mme. Quinet, writing about the audiences at his lectures, and those of Michelet and Mickiewicz at the Collège de France, reveals the truly mystic exaltation of his followers: "The three professors and prophets incarnated the divine ideal of the society of the future. As soon as they appeared, an immense acclaim arose from this idolatrous audience, hungry for justice and right, to which they brought the bread of life." Quinet went into exile on the advent of the Empire and lost, for a time, much of his faith in the people. Hailed, nevertheless, on his return as a patriarch of democracy, he was elected as a radical deputy from Paris, and, though he died before the triumph of his party, he bequeathed to it the anticlericalism which featured the republican régime practically up to the eve of the World War.

M. Seillière studies even more in detail the development of that "proletarian mysticism" which is now inspiring Russia. Developed early after the French Revolution by Babeuf, St. Simon, Lamennais, and Leroux, it fills the novels of George Sand until 1848. She mystically conceives the people as filled with divine inspiration, and as possessing reason and goodness as special gifts of God. M. Seillière studies in particular Fourier, Proudhon, and

Karl Marx. Fourier would substitute instinct for reason as the guide of man in the securing of social harmony because God's Providence speaks to him through instinct. But which instinct is primordial? At first, Fourier selects the sexual. He would rehabilitate polygamy and sexual promiscuity as being much more social than egotistic monogamy. As he meets opposition, he then proposes as a substitute, until man becomes more enlightened, gastronomy as a means of developing a community feeling which will impel all men to any type of work. But what about scavenging, for instance? Well, children love filth. Let them do it: "They will find in the career of scavenging a vast field of industrial glory and unitary philanthropy." The theory is that each will work according to his instinct, the Providential urge in him. But the contradictions soon appear. Fourier comes to doubt that all necessities for social life can be thus easily provided. Because the originally instinctively virtuous man has been spoiled by civilization, force will have to be used in the first stages of the establishment of the new order. Finally he sees the need of a long preliminary transition period between our corrupted bourgeois society and the communistic utopia, and so he would begin merely with the regulation of commerce. A mystic approach, then utopian dreaming, coercion, finally compromise before the facts of human nature, still denounced, however, as perversion due to civilization — such is the course which proletarian mysticism seems bound to run.

Proudhon likewise starts as an extreme plebeian mystic, speaking of the absolutely equal capacities of all men, for nature so willed it. Individual differences are but accidental and transitory. Geniuses? "Well, if they think they are different, let them live apart. Workers, you can and you have the power and the duty to dispense with them." Hence social inequalities are due to fraud. "Property is theft." Indeed the street-sweeper should be paid more than the doctor, for his work is rougher. All services are equal. Yet, finally, Proudhon, too, escaped from his mysticism. In fact M. Seillière credits him with many realistic observations. He even opposed universal suffrage because the discovery of law is a matter of science in politics as well as in physics. Hegelianism helps him to feel comfortable before antitheses; and, in his *System of Economic Contradictions,* he confronts lucid statements of rationalistic individualism or bourgeois political economy with those of romantic equalitarian socialism, leaving the synthesis for the future, forgetting that there can be no syntheses of contradictory elements. Karl Marx broke with him for having so fairly stated the bourgeois point of view. As a matter of fact, though Proudhon held that the capitalist wrongs the individual worker because he does not pay him the product of the collective force due to the convergence of efforts, he also saw that this collective force is due to leadership, so that, though capitalism may lead to abuses, its fundamental principle of greater reward for leadership is sound. The Revolution of 1848, however, threw Proudhon back into a new "frenzy" — to use his own word — of plebeian proletarian mystical exaltation. He now maintains, on the basis of the equal dignity of all, in spite of differences of capacities, the right of all to all functions. The wars of Italy led him to sing a Hegelian paean to war. He recognizes that competition is a normal element in society. He foresees that economic warfare will follow political wars. Antithetically, he speaks of universal and perpetual peace as an ideal to be attained. He remains inconclusive on all issues, but at least he sums up the many contradictions which remain for us to solve, and his books still vividly set forth the problems of our day, social and international.

In Karl Marx, M. Seillière sees also a Hegelian influence. His "mysticism" takes the form of setting up "Productive Force" as a form of God-Nature which inexorably shapes history. In the Occident, it incarnated itself in feudalism during the Middle Ages; in the bourgeoisie, with the French Revolution; presently, it will do so in the proletariat. Hence the power of Marxism to inspire enthusiasm. Not only is a proletarian order about to be inaugurated, but it will bring heaven upon earth, a kingdom of man, in which the struggle of economic classes will cease and there will be a rapid multiplication of instruments of production for the good of all. No wonder that Marx's mystic *Communistic Manifesto* has remained the gospel of proletarian imperialism. But M. Seillière is ready to credit Marx personally with having, no less than Proudhon, gone a long way toward rationalizing his mysticism. There is much obscurity in his work on *Capital* because of the fragmentary way in which it was published; but his *Letter on the Gotha Program* (1875) shows that, toward the end of his life, he too realized that the communist state could not give the worker the integral product of his work but would have to keep for social improvements and the upkeep and development of industry so much of this product that, as M. Seillière remarks, except for the amount awarded to the leadership responsible for the perfecting of production, Marxism would practically do what is done under the bourgeois régime, with the difference that all these subtractions from the product of work would be made by the state.

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Thus has M. Seillière surveyed in all domains the tendency to mystico-imperialism which he finds inherent in human nature and which so easily leads to irrational excesses. More recently he has again turned his attention to German thought: *New Religions and Ethics in Germany,* (1927); *Freudian Psychoanalysis,* (1928); *The Wisdom of Darmstadt,* (1927); *From the Goddess Nature to the Goddess Life,* (1931). In his *The Romantic Religion and its Conquests,* (1930), he recapitulates much of his work and begins to turn his attention to the United States, analysing the Humanistic Movement, the economic doctrine of Henry Ford, the hundred per cent Americanism of Mr. Feather, and the works of Siegfried and Romier. He has, besides, published studies on *Les Gon-*

courts, (1927); *Edmond Scherer,* (1930); *Marcel Proust,* (1931); *J.K.Huysmans,* (1931), and *Baudelaire,* (1932). His last three volumes (1932) under the titles *Romanticism and Religion, Romanticism and Morality, Romanticism and Politics,* apply his critique to numerous recent publications and give further abundant proof of its penetration. All these more recent works would themselves require a special study, but perhaps even this inadequate survey of Baron Seillière's works may help to show how directly they bear on all our problems and discussions, and give an idea of the almost inexhaustible mine of information they bring together and of the further studies they suggest. His earlier books, like those of Irving Babbitt, now appear almost prophetic. At least, we have seen the curve which they outlined continued to our day. " Passional mysticism " is still with us, though secularized into the deification of instinct; " aesthetic mysticism " still has adepts both in literature and life; " racial mysticism " had its logical culmination in the World War; but Hitlerism, Fascism, and the *" Action Française "* we still have, nor are we in the United States wholly free from their counterparts. As for " proletarian mysticism," Russia is even now staging its full development. Nor is it yet certain whether occidental civilization can survive all these mystico-imperialistic aberrations. For, as Irving Babbitt has reminded us, Nemesis is ever ready to punish irrational excesses.

M. Seillière then would agree with the whole of Babbitt's critique of the naturalistic age. He challenges with him the naturalistic merging of God, man, and nature. He believes with him that human nature is *sui generis;* that it is a double nature irreconciled; that man is not naturally good in the sense that he does not attain balance, proportion, righteousness, or even sanity, instinctively; that he must work spiritually to achieve a harmonious life; that he is ever prone to excess but that, on the other hand, there is within him the power to check the disordered impulses of human nature. In short, M. Seillière might be called a humanist, and it has even been proposed that his doctrine be called humanism. It is evidently difficult to deny the right to this designation of a doctrine which thus distinguishes " a law for man " distinct from " a law for thing." Yet there is no doubt that the attitude of M. Seillière toward the imperialistic tendencies of man differs from that of Babbitt, and that the process by which he would correct their possible excesses is essentially different from the one proposed by the leader of the American humanist movement.

For, whereas Babbitt opposes to the natural appetites, reason, and will of man, a higher will, ultimately divine, and is thus forced into an apparent opposition to every purely human aspect of man, Baron Seillière looks upon man's subconscious imperialistic impulses, together with their tendency to present themselves in a mystical alliance with the divine, as the essential motive power of man. But furthermore, if M. Seillière recognizes with Babbitt that these impulses are prone to excess, and that they must be checked, the check he would oppose to them is merely reason. In short his programme of humanistic control is that the subconscious imperialistic impulses be brought into the focus of consciousness in order that their tendencies to excess may be examined critically, tested, organized, and guided into salutary channels by reason. It should be added that reason for him cannot be dissociated from the carefully treasured and consciously held synthesis of the experience of the race to which man must ever be ready to add the data of new experiences. In a word, M. Seillière would be satisfied with a " rational imperialism."

With this we remain evidently on dubious ground. For instance, M. Seillière quotes the following from Premier Mussolini's speech in the Italian senate in May, 1926: " Our [Italian] imperialism is not an aggressive explosive imperialism which leads to war. . . . I believe, and in this I am sustained by my studies and by books which are the common patrimony of cultivated men, I believe that every being who wishes to live possesses imperialistic tendencies and that, in consequence, the peoples who represent the coördinated and conscious ensemble of living human beings must, if they wish to live, develop a certain will to power. Otherwise they will vegetate and become the prey of stronger peoples who have developed further the means of this will to power." We evidently have here an echo of M. Seillière's doctrine, as he himself seems to believe. If the imperialistic tendencies are good, the question remains whether they can be so guided or, if need be, restrained, by aught save principles that have their source in something superior to man. Recent events seem to show, for instance, that Mussolini tends to conceive no such principles above the state, and therefore above men, in the name of which, for instance, the state should curb its will to dominate the individual. Babbitt has met this issue squarely: "The essential contrast for me," he writes, "is not, as for M. Seillière, that between a rational and an irrational imperialism, but between imperialism and that quality of will in man which is, in every possible sense of the word, anti-imperialistic." He then points out that M. Seillière would run together stoical and Christian ethics, while he himself would separate them as incompatible: "Stoicism," he continues, "in both its ancient and modern forms, I regard, at least in its total trend, as false and impossible; whereas I hold that at the heart of genuine Christianity are certain truths which have already once saved western civilization and, judiciously employed, may save it again."

Here we come evidently to the very heart of all our discussions about humanism. If Irving Babbitt's psychology is humanistic, then M. Seillière's and the Stoicism which it recalls is sub-humanistic. If M. Seillière's doctrine is humanism, then Irving Babbitt's is a superhumanism. I was therefore led to ask Baron Seillière a direct question on this point and to add that the question also arose whether his doctrine, like that of humanism, might not be accused of pretending to replace revealed religion. He very kindly answered: " Does imperialism introduce us to the essence of the human soul? Perhaps not. At least, it has such an importance in the behaviour of man that I believe it worth while to analyze its various manifestations so as to increase that treasure of synthesized experience of which human reason is made in so great a part. Reason, thus understood, remains for me the principal check of the *libido dominandi*. But," he hastened to add: " My doctrine has no pretensions to replace religion but would be its ally by throwing light upon human behaviour. Christianity, for me fully rational in its ethics, would seem to be still called to form the surest framework of human effort for social betterment. My works testify to my admiration for its highest expression in Nicole, Bossuet, Bourdaloue, in France, and for the great ethical results of Puritanism which gave such stability and power to Anglo-Saxon nations and which may well continue to do so, though it may need readjustment in the light of the increased experience of humanity." And again: " My philosophy is directed against irrational imperialism, unfortunately so universal, as indeed might be expected. For who can flatter himself that he submits perfectly to reason the essential impulses of his being? But if it is to the will enlightened by a reason more or less developed that I appeal to insure social progress, I hope for the crowning of the work by ' grace ' for those who have faith, although like Mr. Babbitt, I wish to remain within a positivism worthy of the name, and you know that I am far from considering as such in all its aspects the naturistic mysticism of which Comte was the prophet." M. Seillière's exact position on this point is further seen in a statement published in J. M. L. Boudeau's study of his work: " To the Christian author of these pages I wish to state again my firm adherence to the sane pessimistic psychology of Christianity which warns us to curb the imperialistic instinct of our being — as well as to the lofty ethics of its great doctors and to the wise conduct of the Catholic Church in its canalizing of mysticism and its direction of souls, grounded on an admirable knowledge of man. This moral discipline teaches us to orient our action toward rational ends of order, and justice, and peace and to develop in our hearts, the beneficent social impulses whose fair name is Charity. *Religio Christi Caritas*."

To which Mr. Babbitt would evidently retort: What about those who have not the Christian faith? [1] Thus, the study of Baron Ernest Seillière's work may help us to appreciate more fully what the American Humanistic Movement represents so far as it has followed the leadership of Irving Babbitt. M. Seillière is writing in a Catholic country whose intellectual élite remains in such intimate touch with revealed religion that it can, like Descartes, make a purely rationalistic approach to the study of problems of human conduct and yet know that its ethos will continue to include the Christian point of view. Babbitt, on the contrary, has realized that, in Protestant countries, and in particular in America, with the wane of Puritanism, with what he calls the capitulation of many Protestant churches to humanitarianism, and with the spread of an undiluted naturalism among the intelligentsia, the case is different. Under these circumstances, if man has in him something ultimately divine, it must be reasserted on purely positivistic principles, if we are to avoid the punishment which always follows upon naturalistic excess. Hence his insistence that the humanism we need is not merely the assertion of rationalism as opposed to irrationalism, but the vivid realization that there is effectively in man something superior not only to his imperialistic appetites but even to his natural reason and will. What Mr. Babbitt would have us note within man, as we saw in studying his philosophy, within at least every man of good will, every man who yearns to discipline what he feels are the unharmonized urges of his nature and even the tendency to excess of his natural reason and will, is the presence of a higher will which, since it may enable him to control this natural reason and will, is evidently supernatural and hence ultimately divine. Irving Babbitt would thus note experimentally the possibility of the presence in man of the equivalent of Christian grace not only in those who have the Christian faith but in all others, an assertion which it seems even Catholic theology would approve since, as we shall have occasion to see, it maintains that God's grace is freely given to all men, " even to the heathen."

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[1] Mr. Babbitt would further point out that a distinction should be made between Christian charity, which is a supernatural virtue by which we love God for His own sake and our neighbour as ourselves for the love of God, and "social impulses," merely for the love of man, which may be but humanitarianism, distinctly naturalistic, and unreliable, in view of the naturally selfish tendencies of man and of the fact that, rationally considered, natural man may actually not be lovable, so that such naturalistic love of him must be based on imagination, remain purely sentimental, and thus be wholly insecure.

At any rate, it should be evident how the life work of Baron Seillière links with that of Irving Babbitt. Not only are they one in their challenge to naturalism, but they unite in the reassertion of the soundness of Christian ethics and genuine Christian modes of thought, the more interestingly that they both approach the question as positivists. The difference between them, outside their treatment of grace, seems to be that M. Seillière puts more trust in reason than Mr. Babbitt; but it should be noted that, for the former, reason includes the experience of the race which Babbitt also makes so much of, and that, besides, the latter also gives an important place to reason since he would submit to it, if not the elaboration, at least the application of the standards to be acted upon in conformity with, and with the help of, the higher will. The monumental work of Baron Seillière should also enable us to realize better how forward-looking American humanism has been, to understand how it happened that an exposition of its doctrines attracted at once the attention of the French Academy, and was endorsed not only by many eminent men privately but through magazines and reviews; how, for instance, such men as Fortunat Strowski, Henri Bremond, Léon Brunschwig, Camille Jullian, Jacques Maritain, Romain Rolland could unite recently to discuss the question: *Toward a New Humanism;* how, in short, the word *humanism* is being now more and more widely used in France to sum up the twentieth-century temper. Many recent events show the consequent social and political tendencies of this temper, characterized as they are by a judicial attitude, wide-awake to the realities of human nature, to the many forms of man's natural "imperialism," but confident of being able to elicit order from their conflicting impulses. The new French positivism stands opposed, with Baron Seillière, to the degrading of man's estate below the humanistic level. It recognizes fully the province of revealed religion which nineteenth-century naturalism rejected. Aesthetically and socially, it would disown the "naturistic mysticism" of romanticism, without ceasing to recognize the possible values in the forces of passion in the heart of man when properly guided. Politically it repudiates Jacobinism or any state action unmindful of the truly grounded rights of the individual. Economically, it looks fearlessly forward to any necessary readjustments of the capitalistic system. Internationally, it warns against nineteenth-century "racial mysticism" and every form of "irrational imperialism." It calls for a virile development of character, for social peace, and for international co-operation. In short, in every domain, it gives us an intimation of what a humanistic reconstruction may help us to achieve. But it should be evident that the psychological solution of the problem of conduct, as understood by Baron Seillière, brings up, as inevitably as the psychology of Irving Babbitt, the question of revealed religion. This is due to the fact that both have a dualistic conception of the nature of man. Our next step in comparative analysis should therefore necessarily be, it would seem, an inquiry into the tradition of this dualism.

V

NEO-SCHOLASTICISM AND THE TRADITION OF DUALISM

As opposed to the inveterate monistic tendency of naturalism, humanism reasserts the dualism in man's nature. This doctrine, as Irving Babbitt has often recalled, has an oriental as well as an occidental tradition. We should expect it since, as Babbitt has established anew, this dualism may be apparent to any one who examines critically the immediate data of consciousness. But as he wishes to be truly positivistic, truly "experiential" as he calls it, he naturally searched through the records of the race for the confirmation of his own findings. For what possibility is there of determining the constants of human nature by a mere consultation of our own experience or of such experiments as we can devise? As Morris R. Cohen expressed it recently in opposition to John Dewey's "experimentalism": "Experience in the personal and ordinary sense is but an infinitesimal portion of what is going on in the world of time and space, and even a small part of the world of ordinary human affairs. To identify the substance of the world with the fact of our experience of some part of it is to set up an anthropocentric universe, compared to which the mediæval one is sane and respectable. For the mediæval one rebuked the silly and arrogant pretentions of humanity by setting against it the great glory of God." It was the conviction of what Cohen further calls "the absurdity of identifying the whole realm of nature with our little human experience" that early led Irving Babbitt to confront the experience of the East with that of the West in an effort to reach as much time and space as possible. Thus he came to read deeply in Buddha and Confucius.

He found the teachings of Buddha to be the more precious in that he based his doctrine neither on authority nor on tradition but sought to establish his thought on a positive and critical basis. And yet some 500 years before Christ he encountered our very problems and testified to the dualism of man's nature. He had a sense of the flux and evanescence of all things and consequently of the threat of universal illusion even keener than that of any naturalist, and yet his supreme message was the reality of the abiding, of the Law (Dhamma) within man: "Be ye lamps unto yourselves. Look to no outer refuge. Hold fast for a refuge unto the Law." He does not pretend to explain the whole mystery of life, an attempt which leads to assign as the limits of facts, the limits of man's capacity to understand. But in the concentration on this Law, which he feels as truly within him as the sweep of impressions that assail him indissolubly mixed with illusion, he sees the type of action, the work worthy of man, an ethical working (*appamâda*) which will develop a genuine inner life. As he expresses it: "By rousing himself, by strenuousness, by temperance and control, the wise man may make for himself an island which no flood can overwhelm," in other words an island of ethical character around which the flux of impressions will beat only to surrender whatever of abiding human value it may carry. Thus he will escape the supine drifting with the current of desire, for Buddha the gravest of all vices, spiritual and moral indolence (*pamâda*). What man must do to assert what characterizes him as man is to exercise the power that is in him of holding fast in the midst of the flux to the Law that is in him, of growing through the selection from the flux of what may be in conformity with that Law. He will thus enter upon "the path" of ethical growth. The end of this "path" cannot, according to Buddha, be grasped by the finite intelligence. But one thing is clear. Ethical work is in the axis of whatever next life there may be and produces its fruits even in this one. Progress on the "path" will manifest itself negatively by an extinction (*nirvâna*) of the expansive desires; positively it will be revealed by an awakening to the Law and by a gradual increase in poise, centrality, peace. The ethical self thus developed will exercise control over the acquisitive self athirst for sensation and power; and, as he grows with the Law, with the abiding, man will enter into communion with those who are submitting themselves to a similar ethical discipline. The danger is, of course, that this emphasis will tend to hardness and indifference toward others. But Buddha has also written, "Even as a mother cherishes her child, her only child, so let one cultivate a boundless love toward all beings."

Later Buddhism was to depart widely from the positive and critical spirit of its founder and from the ethical heights it attained. But we may retain as the virtues which Buddhism did reach, at least as an ideal, those that Asoka, about the middle of the third century before Christ, caused to be carved in stone at various points throughout India: Compassion, liberality, truth, purity, gentleness, peace, joyousness, saintliness, self-control.

As for Confucianism, though, like Buddhism, it failed to develop all its promises, it also testifies to the possibility in man of choosing between a higher and a lower type of life. Ethical knowledge, for Confucius, was enshrined in the ancient classics of his people, but it was because he believed that they revealed the abiding values, the wisdom of the ages which linked ultimately with the Will of Heaven. For him, the sages who wrote them had been endowed with wisdom for the benefit of the children of men. The fact that his testimony in favour of the dualistic conception of man's nature is thus wholly in terms of this life, even in the consideration of motives of conduct, only makes it the more striking. His aim was self-improvement through the continued practice of the selection of the best which is to be found between extremes. For him, as for Buddha, man is master of the formation of his character through the power to choose out of the flux of solicitations which assail him those which correspond with the abiding ethical values. We are told that, after passing through the various stages of knowledge and moral effort from the age of fifteen, he said that at seventy he could follow what his heart desired without transgressing the law of measure. For such is the fruit of the inner ethical work, " the work which other men cannot see," as he himself called it. Thus man can be " always progressing and never coming to a standstill ", though like Confucius' ideal ruler Shun, he may seem as " one who did nothing but sit on his throne religiously self-observant ". Thus man can learn to define his terms and " make words correspond with things ", to " take far views and avoid near troubles ", and " by living a life of simple truth and earnestness help to bring peace and order in the world ". We have here again a truly individualistic solution of problems of ethical progress based on the distinction between passing and abiding values. Confucius laboured all his life, through the most disheartening disappointment, to set his country in order. He considered man made for society — we should say today for social service. But social service was for him the example which can be given only by the man who has developed character through the inner life of ethical selection. " Where such men are, there good government will flourish; but when such men are gone, good government decays and becomes extinct."

Thus, in the teachings of Confucius as in those of Buddha, we find, no matter how mixed with points of view wholly remote from us, truths that we can test daily, which are thus proved to be abidingly true, and which point to a dualism in man's nature.

Within a hundred years after the death of Buddha, and about fifty years after the sage of China had died in retirement, Socrates began to walk about the Agora, uttering the words destined to be woven into the dialogues with which Plato was to enchant the Mediterranean world. Never had the unaided mind of man soared so serenely above the evanescent multiplicity of things to grasp the unity at the heart of change. We shall have occasion to dwell at length on the thought of Plato when we come to consider the work of Paul Elmer More. There we shall see that, in spite of the fact that his yearning for the Idea still makes him the great secular initiator in the conviction of the existence of a spiritual world, his doctrine was so distorted by neo-Platonism as to lead also to that insufficiently critical mysticism which ever tends to merge man with the divine and thus to strip him of individuality. But after Plato came Aristotle. Never had so great a master found so great a disciple or one better fitted to safeguard the best of his doctrine. Plato was the poet, Aristotle the logician. The more he is studied, the more we must marvel at the piercing power of his intellect. No wonder that the civilization that arose out of the dislocation of the Roman power and thought, could not recover fully the secret of clear philosophical distinctions until it had studied his works. No wonder too that Western Europe long hesitated to abandon even those tenets of his which dealt with material nature and could be superseded only with the development of closer physical observation. But his great work was not in the study of multiplicity as such, but, like that of his master, in the attempt to solve the problem of the relation of that multiplicity to unity, of the changing to the abiding. As Babbitt has insisted, Aristotle was truly critical and positivistic. It is from the study of the particular that he deduces the universal. And here, he improves on his master Plato. If in every being he distinguishes an abiding universal within the particular and changing elements, he considers this universal not as existing apart but as recognizable by our minds in each individual. He founds psychology by distinguishing in man the senses, which can only reach the particular changing aspects of things, and the intellect, whose capacity is precisely to abstract the universal from the particular, to live in terms of universals, of concepts, and not merely of images. Philosophy and art for him cannot be dissociated because the artist's mission — unlike the historian's, for instance — is, no matter what his medium may be, to give a sense of the universal in the particular, of the abiding values behind the detail, to make the work of art significant for all times and places. He thus gave us the ever precious formula of perennial classicism. Happiness is to be reached by the exercise of all of man's natural activities, but only when they are fully harmonized both by the avoidance of excess and by the due subordination of the lower to the higher, with the highest, those of the intellect, as the source of the greatest satisfactions. Above man and nature was God — a cold God, it is true, with no dealings with men, but nevertheless clearly conceived as the prime mover of the universe and the ultimate end of man. Buddha and Confucius, as we have just seen, had become keenly aware that there are in man urges that find their end in the enjoyment of the evanescent, and yet that there is in him the capacity to appreciate the fleeting character of such pleasures and to find a higher satisfaction in the seeking of permanence above the flux of change. They thus reached the conception of the dualism in man's nature. But Confucius did not rise much above practical precepts for the conduct of life; and, though Buddha may be said to have reacted against many current beliefs of his time, the view that Irving Babbitt with some of his later interpreters takes of his doctrine as the attaining of happiness through the acceptance of the abiding Law in the heart of man and the consequent dying to the desires of the lower self, has long remained obscured by the more prevalent conception of Nirvâna as extinction or annihilation of the individual personality. The study of Oriental thought is no doubt valuable in establishing the antiquity of man's conviction of the presence in himself of two orders, of a lower and a higher nature. But the clear separation of man from nature and God, leading to a genuine humanism, derives practically, if we leave aside for the moment the Hebraic tradition and the question of revealed religion, from Greek thought and its continuators. However, as the history of Platonism has been in measure that of its heresies, so that its influence, especially because of neo-Platonism, has constantly tended to turn man's conception of himself back to pantheism, it is rather the disciples of Aristotle who maintained the dualistic tradition. It is Aristotle who clearly established the estate of man as such: that is, as a being who can conceive the universal, who can generalize, and who, because of this capacity, is revealed to have an abiding personality; for such a capacity must be a spiritual principle, since no physical activity could apprehend the unextended universal. If then we would work out this clear separation of God, man, and nature, as distinct entities — the very essence of humanism as opposed to every form of naturalism — we must recover the Aristotelian tradition.

Here we come to one of the most mystifying turns in the history of thought. The priceless inheritance of Aristotle, the very philosophical Magna Charta of man's estate as such, had a development worthy of itself in the Middle Ages. It led to an ardent intellectual activity throughout Europe which lasted for centuries so that it had the advantage of a corporate consideration by hundreds of the ablest minds of the day. Moreover it found in St. Thomas Aquinas an exponent whose genius can only be compared to that of Plato and Aristotle themselves. Yet the great scholastic synthesis which perfected the philosophy of the Stagirite, itself the undoubted summary of the best thought of antiquity, is, at least in the English-speaking world and outside of Catholic centres, practically unknown, or is at best considered, even in representative philosophical circles, as an inconsequential doctrine that need not be inquired into or that may be dismissed with contumely on the basis of some sentence or other culled from its decadence. The present attitude would be wholly unexplainable, did we not have to admit that, because of our post-Reformation and post-Renaissance prejudices, because, too, of the development of naturalism, a development which could only be possible precisely because the permanent values of the Aristotelian tradition had been thrown aside along with its obsolete aspects, we are still in the process of recovering slowly the true perspective of European cultural history. The central position which scholasticism should occupy in the history of philosophy cannot be given back to it until the general indifference or ignorance about the true relation of all the intellectual and social developments of the Middle Ages to modern civilization as a whole, to which reference has been made in the study of Baron Seillière, has been dissipated. Fortunately, in the field of philosophy, as in that of cultural history, there has been recently a good deal of progress. A very valuable book published in 1926 reveals that American professors of philosophy could still say that they knew little or nothing about scholasticism, but at least, they were ready to add that the revival of its study had their best wishes. Further evidence of this trend was the founding in 1923 of a chair of the history of scholastic philosophy at Harvard, the first holder of which was Professor Maurice de Wulf of the University of Louvain, and the second, Professor Étienne Gilson of the Sorbonne where he also holds a professorship in the history of mediaeval thought. A further proof of the growing realization of the imperative need of restoring to this history the place to which it is entitled in that of European thought is evidenced by the fact that Professor Gilson was further called to found an institute for the study of scholasticism at the University of Toronto. The foundation at Harvard of the "Mediæval Academy," and the studies published in its organ *Speculum,* help to show further that it is at least realized that we cannot dismiss the culture of the centuries which preceded the Renaissance as of minor, if not negligible, importance in the history of the Occident.

The revival of a due realization of the fact that scholasticism is the true link between Aristotelian humanism and any present-day restoration of the dualism of man's nature to the centre of philosophical thought could not take place without a renovation of scholastic studies by those best fitted to initiate them. This was done, following the tribute paid by Pope Leo XIII to the doctrine of St. Thomas, especially through the foundation of the Higher Institute of Philosophy at Louvain, under the direction of Cardinal Mercier. Evidently no mediaeval doctrine, no matter how permanent the highest results it had reached, could hope to appeal once more to the world at large without its taking into consideration all subsequent findings of value. This work had never been wholly neglected even in the English-speaking world, as the *Stonyhurst Philosophical Series* would suffice to show. What was needed, however, to keep the scholastic method of approach constantly active was evidently a rallying centre of common endeavours. Cardinal Mercier's understanding of this task, as expressed in 1891, is enlightening: " Since individual effort feels itself well nigh powerless in the presence of the field of observation which daily continues to widen, it is necessary for association to make good the insufficiency of the isolated worker, and for men of analysis and men of synthesis to come together and form, by their daily intercourse and united action, an atmosphere suited to the harmonious development alike of science and of philosophy. Such was the thought that inspired the foundation of the Institute of Philosophy at Louvain." Its influence has already been world-wide. Its programme has been taken up by other schools, and it is already evident that in France in particular, as shown for example by the work of Gilson and Maritain, it is thoroughly realized that mediaeval thought must become part of the equipment of all those who would deal with the problem of the nature of man and of its consequences. After comparing the humanism of Irving Babbitt with the parallel development of the rational imperialism of Baron Ernest Seillière, we should be able to throw more light on its special emphases and implications by confronting it with the central modern interpretation of that Aristotelianism from which it stems, and which is today represented by neo-scholasticism.

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Until about the ninth century, the philosophy devised to explain the doctrines of Christianity was largely Platonic. The human soul, as conceived by Plato, was originally in contact with the realm of "ideas" above the physical world, so that, even when imprisoned in a body, it still had reminiscences of this higher realm. Knowledge of the abiding ideas for such a soul did not need to be reached by reasoning, but by a concentration upon the spiritual reminiscences, by the attempt to look directly on the abiding ideas, in short by the intuitions of the higher reason. In such a conception, the higher reason (*noûs*) and not the discursive intellect (*diánoia*) is the highest self-activity.

This mystical doctrine has evidently great attractions. It accords with the natural aspirations of man to reach directly more certainty than the discursive reason can possibly give. It fits in readily with the Christian revelation of God's original gift to man of that direct contact with Him which was lost through "the Fall" but which was partly restored through grace. The mystical attitude is religious and reverential and warmed by the longings of love. It remained and will always remain enticing, and will be resorted to whenever men get tired of the coldness and limitations of intellectualism.

In fact scholasticism did not develop without protests from the mystical schools, fearful of the possible excess of its rationalism. For scholasticism, though often denounced as subordinating reason to the authority of Revelation, deals with man wholly on the natural plane, though it considers this plane to be both material and spiritual, and it sets up intellect as the supreme natural faculty of man so understood. So much so that since Kant disparaged again the powers of the intellect in his *Critique of Pure Reason* and drove philosophers into agnosticism, or at most into an agnostic pragmatism, or else into pure intuitionism, scholasticism has remained the only great philosophical system to trust the capacity of the intellect to reach ultimate reality. As we have seen, even Irving Babbitt finds fault with the stark intellectualism of Aristotle.

What then is the nature of the intellect for Aristotle and the scholastics? First of all, it is spiritual. It is a form of activity in man which could not possibly appertain to material substances, though this does not mean that brain processes are not essential to supply it with the material for its operations.

At once, we part company with all materialistic psychologists. Let " behaviourists " and others study the reactions of the brain all they wish. They may provide valuable data on the processes which accompany the supplying of material to the intellect and on the physical reactions which may accompany its activities, but they can never explain the totality of these activities.

In short, scholasticism comes to reinforce the dualistic psychology of Irving Babbitt on points which he has not treated systematically. Man is matter and spirit. Man is proved to be spirit by the operations of the intellect, though at the same time he is so essentially matter, as well as spirit, that matter limits absolutely the possible operations of the spirit in him.

To prove this, let us take one of the most immediate data of consciousness: self-consciousness, the consciousness that the processes going on within us are truly our own, which, combined with memory, gives us the indestructible conviction of our abiding personality. This means that the " I " reflecting on my acts, and the " I " performing these acts, are identical; that I am both subject and object; that I act on myself. Now, no physical particle can thus act on itself. Therefore to be able to act on myself, in this absolute way, I must have in me a principle that is not physical: a spiritual principle.

Scholasticism would consider this one argument sufficient to establish the spirituality of the intellect. But the other characteristic acts of the intellect are held to point as inevitably to its spiritual nature. These activities are: abstraction or the capacity to attain universal ideas or concepts, generalization, comparison and discrimination, judgment, reasoning. Let us take them in turn. When we say: " I see a horse, a house, a lamp, a triangle, these two apples and these two apples make four apples," we are recording perceptions of particular objects. But when we say: " The horse is an animal. Houses shelter men. Lamps give light. Triangles have three angles. Two and two make four ", we are using universal ideas or concepts, terms that apply to all the objects of the same kind, and we are making generalizations about them. We have abstracted from the space and time of the particular objects, from the particular qualities of colour, size, or form that may differentiate these various objects of the same kind; we speak only of the oneness which they have in common; we have reached the abiding reality in the midst of change, the *unum* in *pluribus,* the one in the many of Plato, the universal. I look at one house, then at another. I say: " This house is bigger than that house." I have compared, discriminated, and made a judgment. I add: " I need a ten-room house. This house is a ten-room house. Therefore the size of this house suits me." I have reasoned. Even though I may have done so unconsciously, I have held in mind the abstract quality, the standard that makes the house suitable. Now scholastic philosophy maintains that if there were no spiritual principle in me, I could not thus abstract the universal, compare, judge, discriminate, or discover relations or reason. For the abstract or universal notion — horse, house, lamp, triangle — is not a concrete object. Therefore it cannot produce a physical stimulus, and hence it cannot be apprehended by or held in a physical organ. Nor could I, unless there were a spiritual principle in me, compare or discriminate. For, to do so, both objects must be held in consciousness together, and both must be simultaneously acted upon by a discriminating agent, since comparison and discrimination are acts distinct from the sensations or images of the object compared. Now the sensation of a physical organ cannot attend to itself, for this again would require that a physical particle act upon itself. Much less can two sensations of a physical organ compare each other or discriminate between each other, for this would require that physical particles act on themselves as well as on each other and do so at the same time, an even more obvious physical impossibility.

Reasoning is impossible to a physical agent for the same reasons, inasmuch as reasoning is the comparison of two judgments. Moreover, the extracting of a third judgment from these two because they contain the same term, is even more impossible to a physical organ, because reasoning is thus a jump from two knowns to an unknown. The jump to this unknown, the relation discovered, is not a material object, since, by its very definition it was not an object of experience. It cannot therefore be the object of a physical organ. I conclude that the size of the ten-room house suits me, not because I have tried to live in it, but because I have lived in a ten-room house before and because this house is a ten-room house. The suitableness of this house, the standard I have in mind, does not exist in space, it is not physical. It is a relation which I may discover between a future object and a past experience, but the relation itself is abstract. It records that this particular house meets one of the conditions that all houses must meet to suit me. It is the comparison of a particular house with my universal standard of size for suitable houses. Thus, ultimately, reasoning depends upon the capacity of the intellect to conceive the universal.

This realm of abstraction from time and space and the particular is the realm proper to man, the capacity to enter which, thanks to the intellect, differentiates him from the animal. It is the characteristically human mode of life. Thus would scholasticism reach the plane of a spiritual humanism.

Because the animal has no intellect, no purely spiritual capacity, he is barred from this realm and therefore cannot progress. The higher animals at least, can, it is true, profit by their experiences and apply this profit *within* their experiences, but they cannot make the jump to the inexperienced because they are shut up within time and space, within the particular, within the many, because they cannot reach the universal, the abstract, the one, and so cannot generalize. They cannot perceive that, as one object is suitable for a purpose because it possesses a certain characteristic, a different object would be just as suitable because it also possesses this characteristic, or be more suitable because it possesses it in a higher degree. They cannot make such inferences because they cannot abstract this characteristic out of its object for comparison with the abstracted characteristic of another object, and thus they cannot leap into the unknown out of time and space. Because they cannot abstract and thus see a relation in its timelessness and spacelessness, they cannot transfer one experience in one time and space across timelessness and spacelessness into another time and space. Therefore they cannot plan. Discovery is beyond them. And even scientists who try to establish materialistic evolution from the animal to man are ready to admit the appearance of man as superior to the animal only as soon as they have discovered the crudest tool showing a generalizing process suiting particular objects to a universal end, or the many to the one. A dog may bring his master an object he has seen him use in a given circumstance, but he will never bring him one which he has not seen him use in this connection and which would be equally or more suitable. He cannot jump from one particular through an abstracted universal attribute to another particular object. He lives and is locked up in the rounds of his particular experiences. It is true that, as evidence of intelligence in the universe, animals are as wonderfully mysterious as man. Their instinctive aptitude to perform the complex acts necessary for their growth, preservation, and reproduction may be startling, but they work only too evidently within the limits of a closed circle. Hence the uniquely miserable and yet glorious estate of man. His destiny is not wholly determined. He can modify it. He has evidently ends to reach. He cannot reach them automatically. His life is not wholly an unfolding cycle. It is always partly made up of leaps into the unknown; and, such is the power of generalization of the intellect, that it cannot only discover new truths, new goods, new beauties, new values, but conceive, however dimly, the ultimately true, good, and beautiful, the ultimate universal, the Infinite Good, which is its ultimate end and the end of its own appetite, the rational will.

Thus would scholasticism begin the explanation of the mystery of man's nature. Man is a rational being. He possesses an evidently spiritual principle of life, an intellect capable of reaching the abiding reality in things, and beyond things, by analogy, the ultimate abiding reality which alone can account for the universe of things. And this intellect has an accompanying appetency for goods and truths and beauties, and ultimately for the absolutely true, good, and beautiful which it calls God. But the enormous consequence is that if we can perform operations which no material organ could perform, if there is thus shown to be in us a principle independent of matter, and therefore spiritual, then this principle is logically immortal, for the spiritual, the immaterial, is necessarily free from the corrupting agencies in matter. Thus, in noting how we reach the abiding in things, we have reached the immortally abiding in ourselves. It is the abiding in us that reaches the abiding in things.

On the other hand, if scholasticism distinguishes sharply between human nature and the rest of nature, and thus establishes the plane of humanism by its analysis of the nature of the acts of the intellect and of its appetency, the rational will, it no less sharply leaves man immersed in nature. If man is a rational being, he is a very special kind of rational being. He is a rational animal. Hence precisely the mystery of his nature and all the limitations on the exercise of his spiritual rationality. For scholasticism holds, with Aristotle, that the spiritual part of man, his *soul* — to restore a word which materialistic schools have logically abandoned — is so completely immersed in his body as to be the animating principle of its every particle. In Aristotelian phraseology, the soul is the form of the body. Both form but one nature, one person. The "I" that reasons is the "I" that perceives the exterior world through the senses and that is conscious of perceiving and reasoning. How this is possible, we can never understand. To this extent scepticism is rational. To hope for an ultimate explanation is to fall into the *libido sciendi,* the lust of knowing more than man can know, which can but lead us to pseudo-science and pseudo-positivism. All we can say is that it is an immediate datum of constant experience that mind and body thus interact. The instinctive fear of death, in spite of pain and suffering, even by the most spiritually minded, is an added testimony. The acts of the intellect are evidently spiritual; but the intellect is absolutely dependent upon sense-impressions and upon the imagination, hence upon brain action, for the material of its ideas. According to scholasticism, there are no innate ideas. It was precisely the mistake of Descartes on this point, with his complete separation of mind from body, that led to the tendency to deny either one or the other term and started philosophy upon the wild-goose chase of a monistic explanation of God, man, and nature with all the resulting naturalistic confusions.

Thus, in the psychology of scholasticism, we have a higher and a lower self. The higher self is wholly constituted by the intellect, which includes the capacity to remember, and the rational will, with their accompanying emotions. For emotions, according to scholasticism, are merely the agreeable or disagreeable accompaniment of cognitive and appetitive activities. The lower self is constituted by the sensuous activities, that is, those which are wholly of the body: the activities of the senses, of the imagination, of the sensuous memory, and the sensuous appetites. The latter are the natural cravings of the bodily organs for the exercise or the preservation of their functions: hunger, thirst, sleep, exercise, sex, and the cravings of the senses and imagination for sensation, all of which may be accompanied by feelings of pleasure or pain.

Hence the mystery of man's nature. There are in him two separate and divergent orders of capacities, those of the abiding intellect and rational appetite, which aspire to the One, which instinctively crave to know and love the ultimate abiding essence of things and have for their ultimate end their ultimate cause, God; and those of the organs of the sensuous cognitions and appetites, whose ends are in the many, in the changing aspects of things, and which consequently instinctively seek in them their delectation. Man, then, by his very nature, because it is a double nature, is a living conflict. Whereas, in the animal, all instincts work automatically and mechanistically, in harmony; in man, on the contrary, the instinctive tendencies, because they are of two orders, material and spiritual, diverge toward unharmonized sets of ends, some tending to the one, others tending to the many. There are thus in natural man " two laws discrete not reconciled," what St. Paul called the law of the spirit and the law of the members.

This brings us to the question of man's freedom or of his capacity to decide to which of these laws he will give allegiance. If the intellect were not an activity still dependent on sense impressions and therefore condemned to glimpse the universal only through a veil of illusion, if it could conceive clearly the ultimate, its ultimate end, the Infinite Good, there would be no question of freedom in this seeking. Intellectual freedom implies some degree of ignorance. If we are convinced that two and two make four, we have no freedom left in the matter. Theologians hold logically that the " Beatific Vision," the direct knowledge of the ultimate good, removes freedom. What we call freedom of thought and of action, the sense we have of not being determined to hold to what we conceive or to act upon it, is due to the fact that we do not conceive clearly enough what is true and especially what is our ultimate good. It is therefore natural that we should be conscious that we can will freely, in spite of all arguments to the contrary. The spontaneous judgment of mankind testifies to it, as revealed by the universal notions of merit and demerit, praise and blame, the deserved and the undeserved, punishment, remorse, and repentance. Scholasticism is careful, however, to note that deliberation and free will by no means characterize most of our everyday acts. As children, we are mostly creatures of impulse; as grown-ups, we become quickly creatures of habits. After a certain age, our character, the sum of our original tendencies and of our acquired habits, both intellectual and moral, determines all our actions to a large extent, and completely most of them. This, however, only partly pushes back the question, for this very character, in so far as it is made up of acquired habits, is itself in part the result of past acts of free will. What then is the process of these "free acts"? Here are a few elements of the scholastic answer.

The internal impressions of our physical activities, the exterior impressions of our senses, the concepts of our intellect, present to us objects that awake in us an impulse, a feeling, that tends to issue in action, or else a more clearly felt desire, a yearning, for the good apprehended. These objects constitute motives of action. In most instances, I shall carry out spontaneously my impulse and desire. In fact, it is advisable that I do so automatically, as the result of habit, if it is one of the thousand indifferent or valuable acts of life. In cases where important action is to be taken, especially involving questions of right and wrong as I understand them, acts of free will may begin. Even here they may not do so, for, though these acts may be out of harmony with my moral ideal or with my interests, I may act, after some hesitation, along the line of least resistance. This would be the mere acquiescence of a man of "weak will"; and many of us are such. Or, I may merely wish that I could have the object without acting or resolving to act in order to possess it. In this case again the will has not come into play. But the choice of action to be made may be so important with reference to my ideals or interests, to the universal standards with which my intellect is ready to test the particular circumstance, that I shall become conscious of stopping short before acting, of deliberating, of beginning an anti-impulsive effort. Now I am solicited in two ways: to act or not to act in a given direction. Deliberation means the comparison, through consideration in the focus of consciousness, of competing motives. It might be asked: Does this not occur in the animal? The difference seems to be this: The animal may consider two particulars in succession but not simultaneously. Moreover, he certainly does not compare them with a universal. In short, his stronger particular urge or motive will prevail directly. With man, on the contrary, because of the spiritual activity that is in him, there is the possibility, not only of simultaneous holding of alternatives, but of their comparison with universals.

We have clearly here an act of the intellect. It is the intellect that passes judgment on the motives of action furnished by the desires, awakened in my imagination, in my sensuous self, by the representation of a possible gratification and the accompanying urges of emotion or passion. It is not my imagination that decides. If my spiritual intellect were not a factor in the situation thus raised in my imagination, my sensuous appetites would act at once, either through chance or through past experience, in favour of the most pleasant gratification. On the other hand, if my intellect saw its own end perfectly, this end would become the stronger motive. The doctrine of free will does not mean that I am going to act without motives. It means that when all the conditions for an act are present, I may act or abstain from acting. How can that come about?

The all-important point is that, although all the competing motives have some good in them for either the sensuous or supersensuous aspect of the self, since otherwise they would not have awakened desire or stopped impulse, nevertheless, none are fully determining because none are apprehended by the intellect as completely good. If one alternative were the Infinite Good and if the intellect of man could have a clear apprehension of it, then, we have already seen, there would be no freedom of the will. But the intellect does not so conceive God. "The inadequate and obscure notion of God possessed in this life," writes Maher, "the difficulty of duty, the conflict of man's pride and sensuality with virtue, all make the pursuit of our true good disagreeable in many respects to human nature, so that we can only too easily and freely abandon it." "In the conditions of the present life," adds Cardinal Mercier, "the performance of the good and especially of the service of God is attended by obscurity for the intellect and by fear, toil, and privations for the will, so that this latter faculty, of which the adequate object is the total good, may not always will what is its true good." In other words, though the intellect compares the particular motives of action with universals, with some standard, it conceives so imperfectly, so much through a veil of illusion, that even its higher standards do not determine action. Thus man remains free. He has to work out his destiny. He has to concentrate in order to conceive the standards in conformity with his higher nature. He has then to school himself to choose the particular in accordance with them. He must especially see to it that his imagination remain under the control of the intellect, else he will mistake its fancies for true ideas and take them as standards. Here begins the final drama in the dual nature of man. This drama hinges on the amount of attention, slightly more or slightly less, given to the rival standards held by the intellect, with which the intellect compares the rival urges. If the alternative is between finite goods, it is clear that there may be something in favour of either even when referred to some standard. Even if the alternative is to commit or abstain from an immoral act, good may be seen on both sides: on one side good for the sensual appetites, on the other good for the higher self. Even the good that may be apprehended as the moral law, even the thought of God's will, too dimly conceived as the highest good, may not prevail. In short, the intellect is unable to conceive the universal, and much less minor standards, as absolute determinants. Therefore, no motive which the intellect may hold as a universal with which I, the abiding real being whose possible activities we are discussing, may compare the particular urges, is wholly determining. All my activities therefore leave me with a certain amount of freedom. I have therefore a free will. I can withdraw my attention from one set of standards to another; I can shift it to phantasms of the imagination born of the powerful sensual urges; I may decide upon insufficient evidence. I cannot choose without motives, but as no motive can be supreme over all others, as no standard can be apprehended by the intellect so perfectly as to be determining, I can choose which motive is to prevail. Scholasticism is fully ready to recognize, furthermore, that the will may in turn act upon the intellect and the other activities. It can influence the intellect, strengthen or weaken its judgments, affect the senses, stimulate or restrain emotional states.

But here we come upon a mighty consequence. Since man so imperfectly apprehends the abstract universal good which is the formal object of the will, since he therefore remains so much at the mercy of all the urges of his being, it is no wonder that there rises the question of the possibility of a will in man superior to the natural intellect and will. In fact, such a principle would seem to be a necessity, if man is to reach his ultimate end, the universal good. The scholastic analysis of the freedom of the will thus seems to point logically to the conception of the higher will we have found in the psychology of Irving Babbitt, or to the conception of Christian grace.

No sooner do we realize how completely but how imperfectly man is separated from the rest of nature, no sooner have we caught sight of his humanity, than we must realize also that this humanity of man points to religion, which would establish more assured connections with the ultimate good and so with his ultimate end.

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So far, it should be noted, we have dealt with the nature of man as such, a rational animal, spirit and body, intellect and rational will on the one hand, and senses and their own appetites on the other. We have analysed the terms " natural intellect " and " natural will." What about the term " imagination "? For scholasticism, not only the five senses but the imagination are sensuous activities. How does scholasticism come to consider the imagination as a sensuous faculty, as opposed to the spiritual intellect and its appetite the rational will? Quite simply. By imagination is meant the capacity of forming images of sensible objects when these objects are not present, as opposed to the capacity of conceiving abstract ideas of those objects as is done by the intellect. When I think of table, or lamp, or triangle, I do not necessarily think of a square or round or small or large table; of an electric or oil lamp, of a street or parlour lamp, of a modernistic or Roman lamp; of a right angle or of an isosceles triangle. All these qualities, and all other possible qualities, have been stripped off by the abstractive power of the intellect, although the intellect could never have reached these universal concepts if the senses had not presented to it some particular objects of each kind. The intellect it is, then, which reaches the one, the universal element in each species. On the contrary, the imagination can reach only the particular. I *think* table, lamp, triangle. I do not *imagine* them. On the other hand I see or I imagine a table, a lamp, a triangle. To imagine them is to have a picture of a special table, lamp, or triangle. The imagination, unlike the intellect, does not deal with universals.

It deals with particulars. It reaches only the many, not the one. An image is extended. It is the opposite of an abstraction. The objects of the imagination are the same as those of the external senses. In fact, in scholastic terms, the imagination is an internal *sense*. It is but the last stage of sense perception. It may therefore operate by means of a physical organ. Animals may have images.

The neural mechanism of sense perception and imagination is of course still little understood in spite of the physiological and experimental studies of our day, but the scholastics, elaborating Aristotle, saw the need of a stage of unification of the separate testimonies of the several senses as to the several qualities of the object, and of a further stage which gives the consciousness of the totality of that object. Though they ascribed these two processes to what they called an internal sense, they did not hold that this sense had a special definitely localized organ. But, whatever connections of nerve fibres and muscular sensations may be needed to explain it, they held, and the neo-scholastics hold with them, that it could not be fully explained except by the conception of the dual nature of man, a body informed by a spiritual principle. So that, as St. Thomas puts it, all sensibility belongs neither to the soul nor to the body, but to the compound subject made up of both which thus possesses a unity of nature — an animal as opposed to a merely vegetative nature. For, although sense perception is organic, on the other hand a sense organ cannot be conscious of its own acts, since a physical particle cannot act on itself. Mere consciousness, as much as self-consciousness, necessitates the presence of a spiritual principle. If the intellect is a purely spiritual faculty as is shown by the fact that it reaches the unextended, the one, the mechanism of sense-perception is psycho-physical. It depends on both the animal body and the animal principle of life, which Aristotle called the animal soul. The sensitive soul does not exist before, nor can it survive the organic body with which it is compounded and which it informs. It is not in the strict sense immaterial, since it is not independent of matter, since it cannot transcend it as the intellect of man can; but it can produce activities superior to those of purely physical forces. Such it is in the animal. In man, the psycho-activity of the animal soul is taken over by the spiritual soul, likewise immersed in matter, likewise dependent upon bodily organs for all the material of its activity, but capable of acts upon this material in which material organs have no part. The imagination, as the last stage of sense perception, is thus seen to be not a purely spiritual nor a purely material but a psychophysical phenomenon. Scholasticism admits, however, that it is hard to exaggerate the decisive role of the psychophysical imagination in human life, because the stream of consciousness for a being who, like man, is spiritual but whose spirit is, like the human soul, the form of the body, is necessarily wholly made up of concrete images or symbols. This is a most important point. The human soul, because it is spiritual, can conceive the abstract, the unextended; but, because in this life it thus mysteriously forms an integral compound with the body, it cannot apprehend the abstract otherwise than in the forms of sense experience: it must immediately translate it into images or symbols. Thus the abstract notions of the intellect are at once expressed in terms of human, that is, always partly of physical, experience; and the most abstract symbols that man can reach, the spoken or written word, which seems to have been at first a mere pictorial representation, remains physical. Man, because he is made up of body and soul so intimately united, cannot think pure thought in the sense of direct knowledge or absolute intuition. He cannot communicate through pure thought; but, because he is spiritual as well as material, he can devise language, a highly developed medium of expression with a minimum of imagery, and make it express even the abstractions and relations he reaches with the spiritual intellect. But how precarious is this medium for this type of expression, all those who try to discuss abstractions through words know only too well. Such words as liberty, democracy, religion have to be constantly redefined, and stripped of the false images with which they become clothed by the imagination. Hence the plea of Socrates for definition as he sought to make the one, the universal, stand out from the many, from the particular, in the imperfect clarity which man can reach.

Here we come again to the heart of the mystery of man's nature, of his constant sense of frustration, of his everlasting latent yearning for an unattainable. For while his intellect is capable of abstracting the true, the good, and the beautiful from the flux of phenomena and of conceiving it as its ultimate object, timeless and limitless, in the Being he calls God, man cannot, with the mere powers of his human nature, reach this supreme Being, or even conceive Him; and, behind the word God, he must necessarily put anthropomorphic images that correspond down the ages to the limited conception he may have been able to reach of the ultimate good, truth, and beauty.

This, however, is but one aspect of the decisive importance of the role of the imagination in human life. Because the spirit in man is in such an intimate touch with the body, consciousness is a stream of images; but, on the other hand, because the impressions of the bodily senses are in such intimate union with the spirit, the imagination, as the ultimate organ of sense perception, is not merely receptive but active and thus creative. It not only receives images, but it can combine them either under the pressure of the mere sense activities or under the guidance of the intellect. Here we may come to a full understanding of the role of the imagination in human life. Which shall gain control of the imagination, the purely sensuous appetites or the intellect, the lower self or the higher self? If the lower self gets the control of the imagination, both receptive and creative, it will deform reality at its source and lead man into a world of fancies and chimeras out of touch both with the laws of ultimate spiritual reality and with the laws of his human nature. Man will fall below the level of the reason. He will lose his estate of man. Such has been the fate of many representative men in the naturalistic age. If, on the contrary, man utilizes the activity which makes him truly human, which separates him from the rest of nature, if he keeps his imagination in close touch with the intellect, then he will not lose his way in a fanciful world of myths and chimeras, but will gain imaginatively genuine notions of specific goods, truths, and beauties — at least so far as it is given to man to realize them. If, in consequence, he chooses rightly, he will harmonize his several appetites, rational and sensuous; and, each power in his being thus reaching its end in its proper relation to every other power, he will live a harmonious human life, and, to that extent, he will experience happiness.

Evidently, the imagination must remain under the guidance and at the service of the intellect and of the rational will, if man is to reconcile the two laws that are in him, the law of the spirit and the law of the members, if he is to choose rightly according to his highest end. The drama of human life is evidently fought in the imagination.

But here again we may well reflect on how precarious is the estate of man. As his very intellect visions so imperfectly, in the data furnished by the senses, the ultimate universal, its own highest end; as this highest end, moreover, must remain for the intellect an abstraction, since it is only by analogy that, on the basis of the sense data, it can conceive it at all, how easy it remains for the sense impressions and sense urges which are of concrete things to get the control of the imagination and turn man from the ultimate end which the existence of intellect in him reveals him to have. Thus, after reflecting on this activity of the imagination, we are brought to understand, even more clearly than when we discussed the problem of freedom, how logical it is to expect that there should be superadded to man's nature a principle superior to intellect, a will superior to his natural will. If the intellect of man aspires to the ultimate good, and if his imagination can help him so little to conceive it, how legitimate it is to believe that this ultimate good must have been manifested to man, that if man attunes his will to the Will of God, the Will of God may come to the help of the will of man. Thus again do we find psychology pointing to the need of religion.

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We have now analysed the terms "intellect," "will," and "imagination" as used in scholasticism to denote the activities of man's spiritual-physical or human nature. What about the other term in our previous discussion? Does scholasticism ignore completely the possibility of "insight" or "intuition" — that is, of more direct processes of knowledge than those of the intellect? May not this power enlighten us more than the intellect?

This raises one of the most interesting questions because it leads us to note how scholasticism refuses to overemphasize either the spirituality or the animality of man. To say that man can know only the concrete, the many, because he is wholly limited to sense perception, as the materialistic psychologists do, is to exaggerate his animality. To claim that he can know the One, the ultimate abiding reality, directly, by intuition, is to exaggerate his spirituality. Scholasticism takes the middle position. Man can know the abiding essence of things, the universal, but only through the power of the intellect to abstract from sense data. Furthermore, we can manipulate the abstract only in terms of images or symbols. Our incapacity for absolute intuition — that is, for direct knowledge of the universal — marks our precise place in the scale of beings. We are more than animals and less than angels. We are rational animals. The intellect may, for instance, reason its way to the attributes of God by the negation of limitations and by analogy, but we cannot know God directly nor even conceive him except in anthropomorphic terms, through the imagination.

Does scholasticism then never use the term "intuition" or "insight"? It certainly does, but only to denote such immediate perception as can be reached through sense or intellect. We may call the perception of material objects sense intuition, and we may call the immediate apprehension of the essence of objects through the concepts of the intellect, intellectual intuition.

Thus would scholasticism refute Kant's contention that we can know things only under subjective conditions that human nature imposes upon them and which necessarily makes impossible any contact with the real. It is true that we can have knowledge only within the limitations of human nature, but these limitations do not necessarily shut us off from the abiding. The notions of time and space which Kant considered as moulds which sense perception imposes upon things, and the categories of systematization into which the analytical intellect classifies facts, are not anterior to experience and therefore do not interpose between reality and the self wholly subjective elements. Though we may conceive unlimited time and space, real time and real space are limited and contingent; and these contingent notions are posterior to experience and hence are not imposed on experience by the intellect.

Sense-experience, plus intellectual abstraction of the universal from the particulars of this experience, of the one from the many, expressed in images or symbols by the imagination — such is the constant and only process of knowledge, according to scholasticism.

The other cases to which the term "intuition" in scholastic discussion is often applied will also prove reducible to the same formula. There are first what may be called the intuitions of everyday life, and further the so-called necessary truths, the elementary moral notions, and, most interestingly, conscience. Let us begin by the so-called intuitions of everyday life. Though reasoning is the syllogistic comparison of judgments, scholasticism recognizes that we seldom reason through formal syllogisms. The intellect consequently seldom resorts to formal analysis. In everyday life, conclusions so often follow upon mere perceptions, that they may appear to be reached directly by intuitions. Rational life would indeed be a slow process if it had to develop syllogistically, just as the motor-acts of everyday life would be hopelessly slow, if they had to be consciously attended to. What happens is that, just as we learn to perform physical acts unconsciously, so we learn to meet rapidly intellectual situations. We reach conclusions, and, at most, think of a premise to justify them. On the basis of past experience, we make inferences of all sorts that often defy logical exposition. We are then said to possess various skills, tact, power of diagnosis. We become experts in special fields, or we can exhibit common sense at least on most occasions. We have here evidently what may be called " intuition." Pascal called this power *" esprit de finesse."* Cardinal Newman called it the " illative sense." Irving Babbitt, as we saw, recognizes it as an aspect of analytical reason — " good sense " or " common sense."

That this sense does not imply an activity superior to the intellect may be more fully understood by examining the other processes which scholasticism sometimes calls intuitions. These are necessary truths and moral axioms. According to scholasticism, these higher truths, these aspects of the universal which man can reach, like all universals, are also reached wholly by the intellect. By " necessary truths " are meant the axioms of mathematics and logic, such as: " The whole is greater than the part," " what is greater than the greater is greater than the less," " nothing can both be and not be at the same time," etc. These, scholasticism holds, may be called intuitions, but only in the sense that the intellect can apprehend them quickly on a very limited basis of experience. Thus scholasticism is shown again to take a middle position — in this case, between the extreme of innatism which would hold that we are born with such ideas, that they are innate, and the extreme of empiricism which maintains that such ideas are merely the sum of experiences. We are not born with such knowledge. We are born with no knowledge whatsoever. All the knowledge we have naturally must come from sense experience; but we are born with a spiritual intellect, and, after we have reached a certain age, this spiritual intellect is capable of making quickly and easily, on the basis of very little sense-experience, generalizations that yield universal notions, that transcend the sum of all possible sense experiences. After experience with a few object-relations, the intellect formulates, with a rapidity and finality that may be called intuition, and as a universal transcendent truth, such necessary truths as the above.

The same applies to elementary notions of right and wrong. Again scholasticism mediates, this time between the innate moral sense of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson which led to the theory of the natural goodness of man popularized by Rousseau, and the doctrines of the sensationalists and materialistic evolutionists who would base such notions on individual or race experience of pleasure and pain. Man is not born with an innate knowledge or sense for good as opposed to evil, nor is he restricted by his nature to knowledge of good and evil only in terms of pleasure or pain derived from experience. But, just as in the case of mathematical and logical axioms, when we have reached the age of reason, the intellect can apprehend easily, when confronted with experience, the elementary distinctions between right and wrong, gratitude and ingratitude, justice and injustice, loyalty and disloyalty, and as in the case of the logical axioms, the intellect can generalize moral experiences into universal principles. Applied to moral axioms this capacity of the intellect was called by St. Thomas "synteresis."

What then is "conscience"? For scholasticism, it is merely the conclusion of a syllogism by which a particular case is recognized as falling under the universality of such a moral axiom. So much so, that both the ready recognition of the general principle and of its application in a particular case is apt to be distorted by conditions of living, by climate, passion, physical or intellectual degradation, which explains how " conscience can easily become erroneous or perverted if care is not taken to educate or to follow its dictates." How then does " conscience " so readily come to be taken for something above the intellect of man, and to be even referred to as the voice of God in the heart of man? The fact is that the intellect itself is truly a link between God and man. If there is a spiritual principle in man, it must link with the spiritual source of all life. An activity in man capable of reaching the abiding must have its source in the abiding. Here Revelation would only confirm the logical deductions from the facts of human psychology. " Let us make man in our image. . . . Let him dominate over all the earth." Through the intellect, capable of reaching although imperfectly, the concepts of the universal true, good, beautiful, and moral, through the rational will capable of loving them, man may share in the thought and the will of God. Here again, scholasticism takes the middle ground. Man is not God. God is not man. The spiritual intellect, with its appetite the rational will, constitutes man a person, distinct from God. Because it works through a body, this intellect does not apprehend the true, the good, the beautiful, the moral, God, directly; and so the will is not irresistibly drawn to them and thus remains free to turn away from them; but nevertheless these universals remain the ends of the intellect and will, and the objects of their aspirations. God truly calls to man, and inevitably man tends to answer. This explains why the cognition of right is accompanied by the special feeling of an obligation to seek it. The seeking of their natural ends by the intellect and will is felt as an authoritative compulsion, an absolute duty. What each man thinks is right, he feels bound to do, even if it entails pain, a proof that pleasure and pain are not the source of morality. In regard to what he calls duty especially, man feels approbation or disapprobation, satisfaction or remorse. This is what he often calls rightly the dictates of conscience though even these dictates, these feelings, can be darkened and perverted if they are unheeded, just as they can be strengthened into permanent habits, into a permanently trustworthy character, if they are followed. Here again scholasticism mediates. Man is neither automatically good nor bad. His intellect and will seek the true and the good as their end. But it is one of the mysteries of man's nature, as we saw, that they seek it uncertainly; that the images of sense, of the particular, of the animal urges, even of the intellectual lusts, constantly tend to displace the universal concepts of the true end of man. Man, because of his complex dualistic nature, matter and spirit, has to labor with intellect and will to build up the habitual reaching of his highest end, to insure the victory of the spirit which differentiates him and sets him off as man, distinct from the rest of nature. " Insight " or " intuition " is in terms of intellect. It explains the genesis of some of its standards, but it does not transcend its powers.

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Thus we must come to examine further, still on a purely human basis, the great problem of values, of the determining of standards in all domains, the original problem which, Irving Babbitt proclaimed, had to be solved before there could be critics in literature. What is the true, the good, the beautiful, the moral, must be clearly understood before we can judge whether any given act, any given work, is true, good, beautiful, or moral.

We shall see that, here again, in this all-important question of the true, the good, and the beautiful, the scholastic answer remains wholly in terms of the intellect, the special activity of man as such.

Viewed with reference to a particular object, knowledge is conformity with fact. With reference to the universal, truth is the conformity of a particular being with its universal nature. Evidently then, the universal nature of a being must be known before we can determine whether a particular being is true — true to its universal type. Here we can catch again the relation of the imagination to the intellect. The imagination gives the final record of the particular. The intellect furnishes the universal which makes known the nature of the being. Sense impressions give the imagination a picture — say, of a tricycle with only two wheels. So far as the sense record of this particular tricycle is concerned, we have truth. If I say: this object has two wheels, I am correct. But if I have seen other tricycles, the intellect has abstracted from them the concept that tricycles should have three wheels. Comparing then this tricycle with its universal standard, I shall conclude that this tricycle is not a true tricycle because it is not true in reference to its universal, to its type, to the standard according to which it should be judged. Without the abstracting power of the intellect, which gives me the universal norm of the being to be judged, I could not know truth. It is the intellect which furnishes standards, though the imagination may record them for me in an image which I shall use in my comparison. The universal is the true. The universal and the true are the end of the activity of the intellect.

Now we may come to the question of the good, as the end of the rational will. As we saw, the rational will is but the appetite which follows upon the universal-conceiving activity of the intellect — or, more precisely, both are aspects of the activity of the ego. As soon as the ego knows the true, it tends toward it as the good, in proportion as the intellect reveals it to be its end or a means of satisfying its end. If the ego were fully conscious of its ultimate end, it would tend to it inevitably in the act we call the will. The ego is free merely because the ego's consciousness of its ultimate end is imperfect. If you consider your home as your end and you know it is at the end of a certain railroad line you are not free to take another, because this railroad line is for you the true and good line. The same universal that is the object of the intellect is also the object of the rational will. The particular which is true, because it is true in relation to the universal, is also good, because, since it conforms to its nature, it fulfills its end. It is good for you in so far as its end coincides with yours. This tricycle is not true because it has only two wheels, and the standard tricycle has three. The standard tricycle is good because it has what corresponds to the exigencies of its nature, because it fulfills its end, because it has what is necessary for an object of this nature to be conformable to its end. This particular tricycle is good for you in so far as an object of the nature of the standard tricycle is good for your end. This particular two-wheel tricycle is not good in so far as it does not correspond to the exigencies of the nature of the universal standard tricycle. It is not good for you because, falling short of its standard, it is not good for your end. It is then the intellect that gives you the standard of the good as well as of the true, though the imagination may record in images both the standard good and the particular which is not good. Note that the " badness " or the " evil " in the tricycle is not due to something positive it has, but to its lack of something it ought to have. The two-wheel tricycle is bad because it falls short of the exigencies of its standard nature. Evil is defection from a universal standard. We should note also that a thing is good only in terms of the end to be reached by an object of a certain nature, and good for you only in terms of your ends. If there is no end, there is no good. Deny teleology, and the word goodness means nothing.

This brings us to the question of morality or the ethical good. It is simply, according to scholasticism, the goodness of particulars considered in reference to the universal end of man, hence in reference to his special nature. Consequently, it is impossible to establish whether a particular being or act is moral unless we know what the end of man is, which means unless we know what is his nature; or, to put it in another way, our system of ethics depends upon our conception of man's nature and consequent end.

For Aristotle, the nature of man is established objectively by his capacities, his possible activities, with the intellect as the highest activity. His end is therefore in terms of these activities. Here we have an ethics on a purely human plane, and the proof of right conduct or activity will be also subjective. It is the state of well-being which is called happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*) and which follows upon the normal activity (*ἐνέργεια*) of man's faculties in perfect correspondence with his nature. Moreover, to the perfect exercise of each activity, sensuous or intellectual, corresponds a special pleasure (*ἡδονή*). Sight, hearing, feeling, taste, smell, social and intellectual activities, all beget pleasure which in turn stimulates the activity. Some pleasures follow upon the relief of painful sense cravings such as those of hunger, thirst, fatigue; but most are wholly dependent upon the normal exercise of a capacity.

But if pleasure follows upon the activity of man's capacities, it must be activity at its best. Now, as may be proved also experimentally by a study of the feelings which accompany the activities of the self, this activity must be neither too weak nor too intense. There must be in the object a sufficient stimulus, and the capacity to reach it must be sufficiently energetic to make the most of it; but if, on the other hand, the stimulus is too strong or the activity too unrestrained, there will be a diminution of pleasure and even positive pain. Thus too weak or too loud a sound, too powerful a taste, smell, light, too elaborate an ornamentation, too complex an intellectual process is not pleasant. It is then at a certain medium of activity that the greatest pleasure is to be found as a witness to the greatest happiness. Hence Aristotle's famous doctrine of the golden mean.

Indeed, Aristotle perceived not only the need of achieving this mean, but he saw clearly that, since there are in man various activities the reaching of whose ends may all yield pleasure, they not only have to be individually controlled, but they have to be controlled with reference to one another, since the ends of man's complex nature are multiple. Order has to be introduced into his legitimate reaching out to these ends. If man is to reach the sum of his ends, he must establish the hierarchy of his activities. Aristotle naturally found that the activity of the intellect was the highest, since it is the activity which distinguishes man from other animals. He therefore concluded that the contemplation of the universal was his highest possible activity.

If the intellect is the highest instrument of knowledge, as well as the highest human activity, then we cannot go beyond Aristotle's theory of happiness. Happiness coincides with the activity of the human capacities. The highest happiness is the exercise of the highest activity — that of the intellect. But to be active is not to reach an ultimate end; it is merely to go toward it. The intellect constantly reaches universals in the many; but this is merely to reach species; it falls short of reaching the ultimate one that includes all ideas, the Supreme Being, God, to whom Plato aspired, but whom he does not seem to have distinguished fully from the Ideas. The intellect may evidently grasp the logic of the existence of this Supreme Being, but only very fitfully and imperfectly; and hence, unless there is in man a form of perception more powerful than the intellect, he may find happiness in his highest activity, but not a complete happiness, in so far as this activity remains short of reaching its supreme good in its supreme end.

Moreover, intellect, though present in all men, is evidently much more powerful in some. If intellect is the capacity to reach unity in multiplicity, only the higher geniuses can know the higher happiness of the higher unifications. And then, too, as Aristotle himself recognizes, only the leisure class can lead such a life of ever greater activity in the pursuit of unity. Hence the higher happiness can be only for the few; and what Irving Babbitt calls the stark intellectualism of the Greeks can lead only to an aristocratic doctrine. Greek humanism was aristocratic. Renaissance humanism was no less so.

And yet, outside of Plato and Aristotle, we get, both in antiquity and modern times, ethical systems which are even less satisfactory. Aristippus and Epicurus reduce the good or end of man to mere pleasure, Aristippus stressing self-controlled sensuous pleasures, and Epicurus, freedom from pain to be secured in many instances by suppression of desire. The Stoics reach again a higher doctrine in making the end of man not pleasure but action, conformity with the laws of nature which are ultimately divine in origin, so that they are to be followed even in the absence of pleasure or actual pain. However, this doctrine, besides breeding a pride of intellect which the powers of the intellect do not warrant, must end in ethical defeat, inevitable in proportion as the supreme end of man is but imperfectly apprehended. We may then pay the highest tribute to the great thinkers of antiquity who by sheer power of intellect reached so near to an ultimate One, to the conception of the supreme good as the supreme end of man. But we must admit that they remained short of solving the ethical problem which grows out of the mysteriously complex nature of man.

Does scholasticism, with Aquinas, offer us a more inclusive solution? It begins by including the Aristotelian ethics. As good is the end of all capacities, each capacity in man, sensuous and spiritual, has its own good, and, in so far as it is reached, begets pleasure. Pleasure is then legitimate. But, as in man there are many capacities, sensuous and intellectual, though all are good individually, man, to attain the end of so complex a nature as his, must work out their hierarchy, so that the activities leading to the attainment of the special goods as their ends may be harmoniously correlated. For man is a single person, though his capacities are multiple and at cross-purposes. Since he is a unity, he must have one good as his supreme end which can be reached only through the proper integration of the several ends of his capacities. This one end is the moral good, righteousness, all of man's actions at one with what he ought to be. But what ought he to be? Man ought to be evidently the highest that he can be. He is by nature a rational animal. The highest end of his nature is therefore to be rational. All his actions, including his animal actions, ought to be harmonized by reason, else his rational nature, his highest nature, will not reach its end. Thus we are back to intellect establishing the true, the universal type of action, rational action, to which the particular action should conform. As to sensuous goods, the intellect, establishing judgments on the basis of experience, may well accept Aristotle's standard of the golden mean. It may even accept them in the exercise of the spiritual capacities, which indeed never act without the concourse of bodily organs, which consequently suffer from excess and know fatigue. It may easily recognize that sensuous indulgence will lead to the neglect of the exercise of the spiritual faculties.

Thus scholasticism could readily utilize Aristotle. Has it gone beyond him? Undoubtedly. It establishes that the intellect on the basis of slight experience may discover some universal standards of personal and social morality (synteresis) according to which the ethical value of a particular action may be judged (conscience). It conceives more clearly the universal good, the ultimate universal. It reasons its way to the existence of God, not merely as the prime mover, as the pure act, but clearly as the end of man; for it holds that unless there is an ultimate good or end, the entire series would be aimless, life would have no meaning. Moreover, scholasticism escapes from the Aristotelian consequence that the highest happiness can be only for the few. Perfect happiness (*beatitudo*) may be reached by all men. It consists for man in reaching his ultimate end, which is God. On the other hand, as God cannot be apprehended adequately in this life, perfect happiness can be reached only in the next. Even though scholasticism establishes this thesis rationally, could it have done so without getting a clue from Christianity? It is for the historians of scholasticism to tell us. However this may be, scholasticism recognizes that the intellect must leave us with only an abstract notion of this supreme end, so imperfectly conceived as to leave the ego free to disregard it, and so much at the mercy of its lower nature that it may readily turn from it. The true and the good! Man can undoubtedly conceive them. But the imperfect knowledge of them which the intellect may reach will not suffice, as the Greeks were prone to hold, to insure right conduct. So that even imperfect happiness is difficult to reach in this life. Again the question obtrudes: Is it possible that man should be left thus without further hope of righteousness? The haunting possibility of an activity in man higher than the intellect will not down. The more we study the problem of values, the more we must tend to surmise that man must be even more than a rational animal.

Before looking farther into this possibility, however, we need to examine the question of the beautiful. This is specially important in so far as we are interested in the discussion of literary and artistic values in general. Scholasticism treats the beautiful as one of the emotions. We call a thing beautiful when it awakens in us the special type of emotion which has come to be called aesthetic. But when is this emotion awakened? Scholasticism answers: Upon the contemplation of the expression of order and perfection. It defines order as the exact adaptation of things to their ends. This implies the subordination of particular things to their general purpose, the co-ordination of the parts among themselves in the relations required to reach the end of the whole being; while perfection is the completed realization of a being's end, or at least the possession of whatever is required to reach it. At once we may note that there may be as many types of perfection as there are types of being, each with a special end, and that each can attain only the perfection natural to its type. Further consequences follow. The aesthetic emotion is of the senses as well as of the intellect; and it has a varying element, both objective and subjective. The object may possess order and perfection and yet not be sufficiently impressive to awaken the feeling that it is beautiful. The object may possess them, and the observer may be incapable of discerning them.

Thus the beautiful is not identical with the good. The beautiful must be good in the sense that it reaches its end, but all good things that reach their end are not necessarily beautiful. My key may unlock my door: it is therefore a good key, but not necessarily a beautiful key. The useful is not necessarily the beautiful. Neither is the beautiful identical with the true. Every beautiful thing is true since it has the perfection of its type, but everything that has the perfection of its type is not necessarily beautiful. My key is a true key as well as a good key, but again, it may not be beautiful.

Experience teaches that aesthetic emotions follow sensuous and intellectual perceptions only if the object has a complexity sufficient to stimulate them with a certain degree of intensity. We come back to the necessity of perfection and order. To stimulate sufficiently the sensuous and intellectual perceptions, the object must be complete and have reached with all clarity possible its perfection through the order necessary to reach it; and, as order means the proper co-ordination of parts with reference to the whole, the complex necessity for a sufficiently intense stimulus will be assured in proportion to the number of parts co-ordinated. Thus, a thing will appeal to us as beautiful if it possesses unity in variety. The variety offers the elements of strong stimulation; the unity permits of concentrating vigorously upon them. When we talk about the beauty of simplicity, it is only when we are conscious that the simplicity implies the reduction to unity of several elements. A wide panorama is beautiful in proportion as its details are co-ordinated in a harmonious whole. A mathematical or scientific formula is beautiful in proportion as it reduces a multitude of facts to an all-embracing formula or statement.

We have here evidently but another instance of the relation of the particular to the universal. And thus, though in the rousing of aesthetic emotions sensuous perceptions play a great role, yet it is the intellect which conceives the order and perfection of the universal type to which the particular object must conform to be beautiful. It is the intellect which establishes the standard by which the object is adjudged beautiful, and without such a standard, more or less consciously known, we could not pass judgment.

How then does the intellect establish its standard? As it always does, by abstracting the universal type from experience with particulars. The wider the experience, the more likely will the type be the most perfect possible. The artist must have such a standard in mind before he can put order into his work and bring it to the perfection of its type. To secure it, he must exercise both intellect and will. But here in particular we may catch the exact relation of the imagination to both. The imagination does not give the standard, but still the standard of beautiful things can never be abstract. It must therefore be seen or heard in the concrete, in images, visual or auditory. Moreover, without the imagination, the artist could not abstract a standard higher than his actual experience, than the models he has seen. But the imagination is dynamic. It can rearrange the sensuous data. It can therefore furnish the intellect the occasion to abstract from this added data a type not yet devised, an original type; and once it is conceived, it can clothe it in new images and enable the artist to hold it as an internal model. As he must have willed to concentrate his attention upon the possibilities of a new standard or type, the combination of will, intellect, and imagination makes him creative and original, and enables him to create standards yet unknown. In fact the same is true for progress in any field. The imagination holds the key to the rearranging of the data of experience from which the intellect can conceive new standards, objects, or relations hitherto unconceived by man. The scientist or the inventor depends on the imagination as well as the artist. In the formulation of hypotheses, in the realization of a discovery, will, imagination, and intellect must concur. The original genius in whatever line must possess them in a high degree. We should not forget, however, that to keep from indulging in pure fancy out of touch with reality, as is the case in dreams, the imagination must remain in contact with the intellect. The intellect may conceive new universals " on the wings of the imagination," but the imagination unchecked by the intellect gets out of touch with the real and is soon lost in mere fantasies.

What about the spectator or critic? Here we come to the subjective element. The spectator can appreciate the beauty of anything perceived only in proportion as he is capable of discovering its order and perfection. The full beauty of a great symphony, of a great invention, of an all-embracing mathematical formula, of an army manœuvre will appeal only to the initiated. The same is true of works of art or literature, though in even a slightly educated community many may be able to appreciate their beauties more or less consciously. To be truly and consciously critical one must be acquainted with the standards of the *genre*. The intellect must have abstracted the type from experience with particulars, and the imagination must picture its more or less idealized reproduction. It is for this very reason that, without standards, there can be no criticism worthy of the name. Education is necessary for all but a superficial enjoyment of the beautiful.

Hence the scholastic definition of the objective and subjective elements in the problem of the beautiful: " Objectively, beauty is that quality of a work whereby, on account of a happy co-ordination of its various parts, an ideal type to which it is related is given intense expression and made to excite admiration." And subjectively, " the perception which gives rise to aesthetic pleasure consists in an understanding of the value of the elements which make up the perfection of a work, and it therefore entails a comparison between the work and the ideal to which it was meant to give expression."

But if art must have standards, if it must be classical in the sense of exhibiting the order and perfection possible to an object, a given art form has not necessarily reached its perfection, it may not have attained the best possible order. Nor is it ever impossible to devise new art forms which can also exhibit order and perfection. The critic therefore must both know standards and be open-minded about the creation of new standards. He must try to see if the artist has not truly imagined some, and whether he has succeeded in bringing them to perfection. He must be on the watch for the creative artist, though he has the right to hold him to the desiderata for beauty: that is, to unity in variety, to as much order and perfection as possible; for the need of these is based experimentally on the psychological exigencies of man's nature.

So far, in speaking of the beautiful, we have merely spoken of form: unity in variety, order, and perfection which have to do with the aspects of things; and we have seen that a good or true object is not necessarily beautiful. Now we may ask: Does the beautiful need to be good and true? The answer is that in reference to itself a beautiful work, so far as form is concerned, is good and true, since it cannot be beautiful without being true to type and at the same time fulfilling its end. Every beautiful work of art, every work that has order and perfection according to its kind, is thus in a sense good and true. Ontologically, every being is good and true in proportion as it is the being it was intended to be, as it fulfills the perfection of its nature. A lion or a boa constrictor, in proportion as it has all the perfections of its kind, and variety in unity, may be considered beautiful.

The question may well be raised, however, whether a work of art can be good, true, and beautiful on the basis of its form only. The answer should evidently be negative, because its form is not the only factor that determines its type (the true), and its end (the good), while the perfection on which depends its beauty demands that it fulfill all the possibility of its type and that it reach its end. What should be the type and the end of a novel, an epic, a tragedy, a comedy, a poem, a painting, a statue, a piece of architecture? We have here much work to do before our terms can be properly defined. Evidently there is left much room for variations and originality. The literary critic, for instance, would have been in the wrong if he had discouraged the " tearful comedy " of La Chaussée, or the " bourgeois drama " of Diderot, because it was a *mélange des genres*. However imperfect the experiments in these new *genres* may have been, they were brave attempts at finding a new type and at meeting new ends, and they proved to be the predecessors of later successful attempts to break away from the mere alternative of classical comedy and tragedy. The critic has the duty to scrutinize what the creative artist is trying to do, whether the new type he is seeking, the new universal he has conceived, is truly one and not a mere chimera of his imagination. Once he has caught the artist's purpose and seen its possible significance, it is his further function to state whether, in his opinion, the artist has lived up to his idea. But the critic should certainly maintain an open mind as to the possible new conceptions of the artist, and be patient and charitable about his attempt to express them, for it is not likely that a valuable idea can be carried out without much experimentation, often unsuccessful. In short, the critic should never forget that, if the genuinely creative artist is to be criticized fairly, he must be judged on his own merits with reference to the abidingly true, and not simply on precedent.

But the question also rises whether to be beautiful a being should be ethically good. Here again we come back to the question of ends. Morality is the conformity of a human act with the end of man. The panther cannot be taxed with immorality when it springs on the hunter. We call the criminal's killing of a policeman immoral. And yet it may be as beneficial to him as the slaying of the hunter was for the panther. Why then is not the law of the jungle the law for man? You cannot tell unless you know his ultimate end. Pragmatism can give you no answer. The killing of the policeman has " worked " for the criminal. His killing of the policeman was immoral as were his other crimes, because, scholasticism would say, the end of man is to live according to the abiding law for man, the law in conformity with the rational nature of man, and ultimately with the law of God, justice, which does not permit the taking of a human life, since it is the life of a spiritual individual that does not belong to you unless it has been forfeited by placing your own in jeopardy. But, whether immoral or not, the spring of the panther may be beautiful and the criminal's killing of the policeman may be beautifully planned and executed. The beautiful and the moral are not the same. A work of art may be great aesthetically and be ethically valueless or very poor aesthetically and ethically sound. Moreover, man has, within limits, a right to the enjoyment of his sensuous appetites. The feelings attached to intellectual activity such as novelty, surprise, wonder, curiosity, the sense of the ludicrous, the emotion of pursuit in sports, games, plots, even the free play of the imagination within certain bounds are all legitimate. Man has a right to everything that tends to facilitate and beautify life. For if man is spirit, he is also body; and moreover the spirit and the body of man form but one compound. Scholasticism is not puritanical, nor ascetic. This is a point often missed. The Middle Ages were full of pageantry. If the Renaissance saw the aristocracies intensify social life and develop its artistic background, it was because of the increase of wealth. It did not usher in the beautifying of life even though it changed its fashions. Our modern Main Street is singularly drab compared to that of a mediaeval town. All that scholasticism would ask, in accord with Aristotle, is that all enjoyments be disciplined, that they remain moral — that is, subordinated to the end of man's rational nature. Asceticism was a " counsel of perfection " for the few, that exceptional men might show that it is possible to sacrifice the pleasure of the senses for the higher pleasures of the spirit. Scholasticism itself would leave to man the enjoyment of every activity in its own place. It thus sets the arts free for the expression of every phase of life. It would even encourage art for art's sake, for it procures enjoyment superior to inartistic pleasures which are grosser though still legitimate. It merely condemns immoral art for art's sake — that is, art unworthy of man's estate as man, a rational animal, and not merely an animal — which of course does not mean that there will not be a possible hierarchy of works of art. A beautiful drama remains superior to a beautiful dinner. A technically perfect novel which evidently reaches true human values will be superior to one as technically perfect which distorts reality. But, as Cardinal Mercier expresses it: "The field of art is as wide as the beautiful. The beautiful is the manifestation of order in whatever province it be realized, moral or non-moral, profane or religious; order, no matter in what, is beautiful, and its expression is ever worthy of the artist's talent."

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We have touched on but a few aspects of scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophy. We have not mentioned its cosmology, criteriology, or logic. We have taken only a few items from its natural theology, ethics, and ontology. We have, at most, recalled some of the teachings that bear upon our subject from its psychology and theory of beauty. But one point, at least, should have been made clear. Scholasticism singularly reinforces the humanist's reassertion of the special estate of man as distinct from the rest of nature. Humanism, in challenging naturalism on its pure sensationalism, on its inconsistent claim that man, like the animal, is locked up in the particular and does not reach the abiding antecedent reality, has but recovered the sense of the great realization of the scholastic centuries, that man is shown to be *sui generis* through his capacity to attain to universal concepts, to reach the one in the many. It is "a matter of positive perception that there is an element of oneness in all the particular objects that belong to the same class," wrote Irving Babbitt. Neo-scholasticism puts behind that statement generations of minute study of all its aspects and implications. Irving Babbitt saw clearly that on the question of the universal depended the problem of standards, just as on the problem of standards depends civilization itself. Scholasticism worked out the problem of values, as we saw, completely on that basis. Man lives as a rational being only when he deals directly or indirectly with universals, when he either discovers standards or applies them in particular cases. Then he knows a human as opposed to a mere animal life. It is only because of that capacity to reach the universal that he can progress and that he can conceive ever more clearly his ultimate end. It is from the day that philosophers lost again their hold upon this basic truth that we were caught once more in what Babbitt so well calls "the naturalistic trap," and that man, sinking back into the animal world of the particular, was left at the mercy of his impressions, bereft of all possibilities of establishing values, and indeed more helpless than the animal, since the latter is determined by instinct.

It is because, in France in particular, where naturalism early reached a high development, these consequences have been grasped anew for at least a generation, that its doctrines have been repudiated from many angles. The revival of the study of scholasticism is but one of these anti-naturalistic manifestations. Because of the wealth of intellectual tradition thus recovered, this revival is bound to remain basic. In its own day, the development of scholasticism was itself due to a renaissance of tradition as the word "renaissance" is applied to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Italy and to the sixteenth in France. If these centuries are thus designated because they recovered the rhetoric and poetics of Antiquity, why not the thirteenth century, which recovered Aristotle and Roman law? On the other hand, if the fourteenth- to sixteenth-century Renaissance of literary craftsmanship and miscellaneous pagan thought was such a glorious event, as no doubt it was, though no more than the recovery of Aristotle had been, why, after damning the Middle Ages for their supposed scorn of the classics, do we, in our own day, so disparage the classics, which the Renaissance recovered, in favour of a social science still to be born and likely to be still-born? The fact is that, when the social reorganization after the barbarian dislocation of Western Europe in the ninth and tenth century was sufficiently advanced, there was a continuous renaissance of the study of Antiquity. The development of scientific discovery in the seventeenth century was certainly not a product of the sixteenth-century classical Renaissance, since on the contrary it was the result of the first emancipation of the western peoples from the tutelage of Antiquity. That scientific progress to our own day has insured much material progress is obvious, but that we have had any ethical progress since the thirteenth century would be hard to prove. Compare for instance the ethics of the World War with the words of St. Louis to his son: "And if it fall out that it is needful that you should make war . . . give diligent command that the poor folk who have done no wrong or crime be protected from damage to their vines, either through fire or otherwise, for it were more fitting that you should constrain the wrong-doer by taking his own property (either towns or castles, by force of siege), than that you should devastate the property of poor people. And be careful not to start the war before you have good counsel that the cause is most reasonable, and before you have summoned the offender to make amends, and have waited as long as you should. And if he ask mercy, you ought to pardon him, and accept his amends, so that God may be pleased with you." If the survival of the cruelty of judiciary procedure is recalled, the answer is that it also was an inheritance from Antiquity. Any sharp opposition, therefore, between the so-called Renaissance and the Middle Ages only hides the true perspective of man's intellectual progress. The essential human tradition, the tradition of man as such, is the tradition of the realization by man of his capacity to conceive the universal. It stretches back to Plato and Aristotle; it reaches its highest point of exposition in thirteenth-century scholasticism. The fourteenth- to sixteenth-century revival of the literature and art of Antiquity continues it through the further study of Aristotle, and makes it flower in the French classical literature of the seventeenth century. It is only since Descartes that we have lost our hold upon it, and have, in consequence, slipped into the philosophical decadence which has landed us in mystic naturism characterized by the aberrations so lucidly analyzed by both Seillière and Babbitt.

It will remain to the credit of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More that, at the peak of the development of this mystic naturism among us, they so courageously criticized it, and so clearly called for a recovery of the humanist tradition. That in France the corresponding movement should be both scholastic and humanistic was to be expected, both because of the French intellectual atavisms and of the neighbouring Louvain movement, and especially because both scholasticism and humanism, stemming from Aristotle, are really one in seeking truth in the avoidance of extremes. " Scholasticism," writes Cardinal Mercier, " looked for the golden mean between extremes in all the problems it strove to solve; and this moderation found its expression in their realism, their dynamism, their evolutionism, their ideology, their theory of the union of body and soul, of the compatibility between duty and happiness, and their conception at once objective and subjective of the beautiful." " Thomistic philosophy," he writes elsewhere, " avoids on the one hand the false empiricism of the positivist and on the other the false idealism of the pantheist, which are the two tendencies which have directed all non-scholastic systems of philosophy." That in France the revival of scholasticism, like our humanistic movement, is to be envisaged as the attempt to renew the tradition of the abiding through the reassertion of man's capacity to conceive the universal and the antecedently real, in opposition to the development of philosophy since Descartes, is well brought out by Maritain.

"On the question of the veracity of our powers of knowledge," he writes, "philosophers still divide roughly into three groups. First, the complete sceptics — impressed by the extreme abundance of errors formulated by men, and by philosophers in particular, they doubt the veracity of reason, and say that truth is beyond the reach of man.

"Secondly, the rationalists — they think that truth is easy to reach: hence they undertake 'to submit all things to the level of reason', that is, of a human reason which has no need of being humbly and patiently disciplined, either by reality itself, or an authority, or God; hence they tend to subjectivism, which takes for the criterion of truth the knowing subject, not the thing to be known, and which thus dissolves knowledge; or toward individualism, which calls on each philosopher to construct his own philosophy by himself and his own conception of the world (*Weltanschauung*); or again toward naturalism, which pretends to reach perfect wisdom through natural capacities alone and rejects the idea of 'Revelation.' Descartes was the initiator of modern rationalism, and Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, his more or less direct disciples. But Kant completed the Cartesian revolution, and his pantheistic successors Fichte, Schelling, Hegel merged man in the divine. Through Kant, and the subjective philosophy stemming from him, rationalism, as in the time of the Sophists, rejoined its contrary, scepticism, and the anti-intellectualism of the modernists.

"Thirdly, the anti-intellectualists — they are so called, because, *despairing of intellect and reason,* they seek truth in will, instinct, sentiment, or action (Rousseau, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Bergson, William James, and the pragmatist and modernistic school). They must also be counted among the sceptics — not that they declare truth to be inaccessible, as do the complete sceptics properly so called, but because they declare it inaccessible *to the very one of our cognitive powers which is precisely made for it,* and because in thus rejecting *intellect and reason* they deprive us effectively of our only normal way to reach it.

" As opposed to all these schools, the school of Aristotle and of St. Thomas teaches that it is neither impossible nor easy but difficult for man to reach truth. Thus it stands radically opposed to both scepticism and rationalism. It sees in the abundance of errors formulated by men, and by philosophers in particular, a proof of the weakness of our cognitive powers, but an additional reason to love truth and to seek it more carefully, and even a means of increasing knowledge (by the refutations and elucidations which these errors suggest). It holds, on the other hand, that *the intellect is our only natural way of reaching truth,* but that it must be informed and disciplined, first and primarily, *by reality itself,* for it is not intellect which measures things but things which measure intellect; secondly by our predecessors in the search for truth, for science is a coöperative enterprise and can be extended only through the continuity of a living tradition; finally by God if it has pleased Him to reveal any aspects of truth."

With his fellow neo-scholastics, then, in the co-operative enterprise of restoring philosophy to its rightful place, Maritain would insist that our only natural way of reaching truth is the intellect; that in our search for truth we must keep in contact with tradition, with the work of those who have grappled with the same problems, whatever their solutions may have been; that the ultimate source of truth is reality itself, which the intellect is capable of grasping in universal concepts; that, besides, as the existence of a spiritual order has been established, it is illogical to deny *a priori* the possibility of a Revelation. Hence Maritain's formula for cognition: " Our sensations and our images present to us directly particulars; our ideas present to us directly universals."

Between them, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More have taken the same positions. They both have reproved rationalism for its overconfidence in reason, for its subjectivism; and More, for the monistic rejection of the possibility of a Revelation; whereas they both likewise oppose to anti-intellectualism and complete scepticism, the possibility of reaching the abiding one in the changing many through the conceiving of the universal.

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We are now prepared to compare the psychological terms of Irving Babbitt with those of scholasticism. We must recall that at the end of every avenue of our psychological inquiry we have found a question mark. We have seen that man's intellect can conceive the universal, and even the ultimate universal, God, but that he can do so only imperfectly because of the intellect's dependence on the senses, and is thus left free to turn from his highest good. We have seen further how, as a consequence of this, the urges of his lower nature can easily gain control of the imagination and swing the ego to their indulgence. We have noted how hard it was for the Greeks who continued to trust entirely in the intellect to solve the problem of conduct. So that we came to surmise that to insure its solution we should be able to find at work in man a principle superior to the intellect and rational will as scholasticism understands them, or to the " higher imagination ", to which Irving Babbitt assigns the reaching of the universal.

The great originality of Babbitt's psychology, we have further seen, is precisely that he answered this question. As a result of his positivistic inquiry he does find at work in man a principle superior to any cognitive power. This principle he calls the higher will. In studying his psychology we have seen the justification of his findings. It remains for us to inquire whether the whole scholastic outlook, even though scholasticism proper as a purely philosophical system does not discuss the mysterious principle at work in man which would make him more than a rational animal, is not on the other hand ready to recognize the existence of such a principle.

Let us sum up first of all the agreement between scholasticism and the psychology of Irving Babbitt. Both hold that the nature of man is essentially different from that of other animals, and that man, and *a fortiori* the whole of nature, is radically distinct from God. Both stand therefore in opposition to all doctrines which identify in any way God, man, and nature; but both point to the existence of a supernatural as well as to that of a natural order. In short, both repudiate all monistic doctrines and all their consequences. For both, man constitutes an order of his own. He is not pure spirit, he is not pure matter. He is both spirit and matter. Both moreover would be positivistic and experimental, in so far as they both would start with the observation of facts — for instance, the acts of which man is capable; but scholasticism would go much farther than Babbitt apparently cares to go in deductive speculations from these facts. Both, however, would denounce the false empiricism of the positivist who denies facts of a spiritual order, as well as the false idealism which denies facts of a physical order. Both, too, remain semisceptical in the sense that they deny to human reason the hope of ever giving total explanations of reality — for instance, how spirit and matter interact in man. Both believe, however, as opposed to Kant, that man can reach reality, the abiding one, in the multiplicity of change, or the many. Both are therefore to that extent intellectualists. The only essential difference between them up to this point is in the use of terms.

" It is a matter of positive perception," writes Babbitt, " that there is an element of oneness in all the particular objects that belong to the same class." For scholasticism, it is the intellect which reaches this oneness in the many, or, in other words, which abstracts the universal from the particular. Irving Babbitt calls this power: "the higher imagination," and often refers to it as "imaginative insight" or "intuition." He reserves the word "reason" for what scholasticism calls the analytical use of the intellect which compares particulars with particulars, or particulars with universals in judgment and reasoning. Scholasticism, on the other hand, reserves the word "imagination" for the last stage of perception, which can both record in images the perceptions of the senses and the abstractions of the intellect, of which we are conscious as a continuous stream and which may or may not be under the control of the intellect and will. Irving Babbitt himself applies the term "lower imagination" to this stream of images when it is uncontrolled by intellect or will. The conception of mental processes is therefore the same. The difference in the terms used so far may be equated as follows:

Scholasticism:	Babbitt:
Intellect	Higher Imagination
Intellect applied in comparison, judgment, reasoning: "reason"	Reason
Imagination controlled by intellect and will	Higher Imagination
Imagination not controlled by intellect and will	Lower Imagination

It is clear that, in both systems, we get in touch with reality through a combined use of an abstracting power and an imaging power.[1] But when we come to the use of the word "will," we have an entirely different situation.

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[1] After reading the above passage, Professor Babbitt kindly drew up the following statement which is here inserted verbatim as a most valuable, since authoritative, summing up of his exact position: "The relation of imagination and reason is one of the most difficult aspects of this whole subject. In view of the multiple meanings that have been attached to both 'reason' and 'imagination,' it is almost impossible to treat it without ambiguity. Regarding my own position, it is well to remember that I have said

As we have seen in studying Irving Babbitt's psychology, his theory of the " higher will " is the distinguishing mark of his humanism. It seems to be wholly original with him. It is so peculiar to him that most of the discussion concerning his doctrine shows that it is not fully grasped either in its nature or in its implications. In fact, even his fellow-worker, Paul Elmer More, in his last statement on the relation of Babbitt's humanism to religion, does not seem to bring out fully how, when Babbitt speaks of the higher will, he does not speak of the natural will but of an entirely distinct and superior element.

" Against monism and its fruits," writes More, " all our militant humanists, if I understand them, are openly or virtually in protest. The question at issue is thus ultimately one of philosophy or psychology. Against those who teach that man is totally submerged in natural law, the humanist lays emphasis on that in man which distinquishes him generically from other animals and so in one part of his composite being, lifts him out of the more narrowly defined kingdom of nature; and the humanist assumes for himself this title as opposed to the naturalist because this super-added element, or faculty, however named, is what marks off a man as *human*. Against those

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that ' though the imagination gives unity, it does not give reality.' Such reality as man may attain, if by reality one understands the achievement of universals, can issue only from a right coöperation between reason and imagination. If one emphasizes too exclusively the rôle of reason in the formation of universals, one is in danger of turning the universals into absolutes, of falling, in other words, into mere rationalism. True standards in any field result from the establishment of a right relationship between the power in man that *perceives,* the power that *conceives,* and the power that *discriminates.* A chief source of ambiguity in the use of the word imagination is that, historically, it has been applied at times to the power that perceives and at times to the power that conceives. I sum up my whole position by saying that the only thing that finally counts in this world is a concentration, at once imaginative and discriminating, on the facts. To a concentration of this kind on the more significant facts of human experience I often apply the phrase ' higher imagination '." The whole subject, Professor Babbitt would further note, is discussed from a somewhat different angle in the introduction to his *Democracy and Leadership,* pp. 11–17.

who still hold that man is only a fragmentary cog in the vast machine which we call the universe, moved by the force of some relentless, unvarying, unconscious law, the humanist asserts that we are individual personalities, endowed with the potentiality of free will and answerable for our choice of good and evil. Against those who reduce man to a chaos of sensations and instincts and desires, checking and counter-checking one another in endlessly shifting patterns, the humanist points to a separate faculty of inhibition, the inner check or the *frein vital,* whereby these expansive impulses may be kept within bounds and ordered to a design not of their making. Against those who proclaim that a man can only drift, like a rudderless ship, with the weltering currents of change, the humanist maintains that he is capable of self-direction, and that character, as different from native temperament is a growth dependent on clarity and strength of purpose. Against those who, to appease the stings of conscience, assure us that we are what we are by no fault of our own, that, as we have no responsibility for our character, the lesson of wisdom is to shuffle off any sense of regret or remorse or fear; and against those who go further in flattery and, through each and every appearance of delinquency, assert the instinctive total goodness of unredeemed nature — against these, the humanist contends that as free agents we are accountable for defalcations and aberrations and that self-complacency is the deadliest foe to human excellence. On the other hand, the humanist will not stand with those who jeer at human nature, as if men were in no better state than rats in a trap, rushing distractedly hither and thither, hurling themselves upon their bars in a pitiable frenzy of impotence."

This passage evidently aims to sum up the dualistic position of Babbitt's humanism as opposed to all monistic materialistic schools, but it seems to leave insufficiently differentiated " free will ", which the materialists deny, from that very special higher will, *frein vital,* or " inner check " which is the distinguishing mark of the humanism of Babbitt. " The humanist asserts that we are individual personalities endowed with the potentiality of free will and answerable for our choice of good and evil . . . the humanist points to a separate faculty of inhibition, the inner check, or the *frein vital* whereby these expansive impulses may be kept within bounds and ordered to a design not of their making." Are the " potentiality of free will " and " the separate faculty of inhibition, the inner check ", one and the same thing? The wording leaves this crucial matter in doubt. Yet there is no doubt that in the psychology of Irving Babbitt they are not only not the same activity but that they may be opposed to each other. Everything that Mr. More says here about humanism could be said about scholasticism, if the term " inner check " or " higher will " refers to the same activity as " the potentiality of free will." But Irving Babbitt's humanism goes beyond scholasticism proper precisely on this point. As opposed to all monistic doctrines which identify in any way God, man, and nature, both are dualistic doctrines; but the dualism of Irving Babbitt is not couched in the same terms as the dualism of scholasticism. Both speak of the higher and the lower nature of man, but each means something different by these terms. Scholastic psychology, as we saw, leads us to realize the need of a spiritual element in man superior to the activities of the intellect and the rational will, but it does not pursue the matter. Scholasticism considers man only as a " rational animal." His rationality is his higher nature; his animality, his lower. Irving Babbitt also recognizes the need of a spiritual element in man to reinforce the natural intellect and will of man. But he does not stop there. He asserts that actually such an element may be felt in man as a datum of consciousness, as a higher immediacy. For Irving Babbitt, man is more than a " rational animal." He is a rational animal in whom there is felt, in a greater or less degree, the presence of a higher will, ultimately divine. If there were not such an element in man, Babbitt would hold, there could be no adequate solution of the problem of conduct, because the natural reason and will of man are so prone to excess and bewilderment that they are insufficient to solve it. He finds them so manifestly unreliable that he assigns them along with the senses to the lower nature of man. What then constitutes for him man's higher nature? The answer is: the use of the " higher imagination " in harmony with the " higher will." In other words, Babbitt finds in man the equivalent of Christian " grace," the study of which for scholasticism, belongs to the domain of supernatural theology or revealed religion. The following comparison of terms may help to make this clear:

Revealed Religion:
God's Will in Man: Grace.

Scholasticism:

Higher nature of man.	Intellect. Reason: merely an activity of the intellect. Free will.	spiritual activities which on the basis of data furnished by the senses perform acts impossible to matter.
Lower nature of man.	Senses. Imagination, and sensuous appetites.	purely animal activities.

Babbitt's Humanism:

Higher nature of man.	Higher will. Higher imagination.	Humanistic Plane.
Lower nature of man.	Natural reason. Natural will. Senses. Lower imagination. Sensuous appetites.	Naturalistic Plane.

N. B. The higher and lower nature of man, according to scholasticism, form one compound. Grace is a superadded free gift of God.

The above discussion refers to " faculties " only as modes of psychical or psycho-physical energy: the several *activities* of the one human being distinguished according to their special nature and object. Those who reject " faculty psychology " use corresponding, or even the same, terms, in their discussion of human activities.

It is clear that both points of view stand opposed to materialistic naturalism which would merge man with animal nature, and in fact to every form of naturalism which would merge God, man, and nature. It is not so clear, however, that it is advantageous or even possible, etymologically or historically, to deny the right of the Aristotelian-scholastic position to the term *humanism,* though it should be perfectly evident that, both etymologically and historically, any doctrine that merges God, man, and nature has no right to it.

We still need to emphasize, however, that, though scholasticism, as a natural philosophy, does not touch the question of grace, the scholastics themselves were never out of contact with the theology of revealed religion, so that the whole scholastic outlook, after all, like that of Irving Babbitt, recognized the presence in man of a principle of control superior to natural intellect and will. In fact, theology teaches that man never existed purely in the natural human order, but that the order of grace was always present in him. Here then is the solution of the question we have found perpetually obtruding in our analysis of the psychology of natural man. Man is truly more than a " rational animal." He is a " rational animal " in whom, as Irving Babbitt would have it, there is at work a principle superior to the natural intellect or higher imagination and natural will. As Cardinal Mercier expresses the complete scholastic point of view, including this supernatural aspect of man which however scholasticism, as a philosophy, does not study: " From the moment of his creation God as a matter of fact assigned to the first man, and to all his descendants, a *supernatural destiny,* that is to say, a destiny above the exigencies of all created nature and beyond its power of attainment. At the same time He gave them the supernatural means which were requisite for the realization of this end." If scholasticism, as a philosophy, does not study this aspect of man, it is no wonder that Irving Babbitt, as a positivist, does not wish to enter into the theological aspects of this question; but, on the other hand, as a positivist, he has the right to testify to his experimental findings, even though they point to the same mysterious fact. It is the more interesting to have him do so in that he remains wholly critical.

We evidently need, however, a broader term than that of humanism to include, and yet leave us free to keep clear, both methods of approach to this integral estate of man. The term Human Integralism would seem to be called for. Our difficulty in analysis would then be solved as follows:

HUMAN INTEGRALISM

THE SCHOLASTIC AND THEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION:

MAN	Supernatural life:	the life of grace in touch with God's Will	freely given to all men, but explained only through Revelation.
	Human life: (Higher nature of man)	the life of the intellect (with its appetite: the will) dealing with universals, including those of "natural religion." (Analytical reason is one of its activities.)	Humanism.
	Animal life: (Lower nature of man)	the life of the senses (with their appetites), and imagination, dealing with the particular.	Naturalism.

THE EXPLANATION OF IRVING BABBITT:

MAN	Higher Activities in man	Higher will.	meditation on	Individual Religion.[2]
			acting as check on natural order	Humanism.
		Higher imagination.	used to reach universals	
	Lower Activities in man	Natural reason. Natural will. The senses and the lower imagination, all dealing with the particular.		Naturalism.

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[2] Irving Babbitt often uses the term "religious meditation" for the term "individual religion."

In any case, the comparison of Irving Babbitt's humanism with the system which, as the heir of Aristotle through St. Thomas Aquinas, has the longest dualistic tradition, not only enables us to understand better how this humanism stands opposed to all forms of naturalism, but fully prepares us to study further the unavoidable question of its precise relation to revealed religion.

VI

THE RELATION OF DUALISTIC HUMANISM TO RELIGION

WE have just seen that the nature of Irving Babbitt's conception of the higher will is the key to the relation of his humanism to religion. Because the higher will is easily confused with the natural will, because, too, the precise nature of this higher will, in reference to Christian grace, is so hard to isolate, it is not strange that the question of the exact nature of the revelation of humanism to religion should have been raised many times and from various angles. Mr. Allen Tate, Mr. T. S. Eliot, Dr. Fulton J. Sheen, and Paul Elmer More himself have challenged Babbitt on this issue.

First of all, we have the many passages where Irving Babbitt refers to revealed religion. It must be admitted that they may not all appear consistent. For instance Babbitt writes: "I am for coming at my humanism in a positive and critical rather than in a merely traditional manner. To this extent, I am with the naturalists, who have from the start been rejecting outer authority in favour of the immediate and experimental." Here Babbitt seems to oppose critically established data to traditional religion. The believer in revealed religion would not agree that he accepts it uncritically. He would hold that he believes not through credulity but because the content of his belief has been either historically or positively established, and because, though it must end in mysteries as all human knowledge must, it has been demonstrated not to be contrary to reason. But, in such passages, Babbitt is only emphasizing his method which starts with immediate data of consciousness and not with facts that can be known only through a revelation. This is not to take a stand against this revelation or its possibility, any more than scholasticism takes a stand against Catholic theology because it asserts, in the words of Cardinal Mercier, that "Philosophy is a study formally independent of all authority" and that "the essential elements of science-principles, conclusions, and the certainty of the evidence between them, are independent of all Church authority." Babbitt merely recalls that he is meeting the positivists on their own ground — in fact, that he is more completely critical than they are. However, that there is a real danger of misunderstanding in such statements is shown by the fact that one of his most prominent disciples, Professor Norman Foerster, seems, as Mr. T. S. Eliot early noted, to miss this point, and considers humanism as antithetical to revealed religion.

Mr. Foerster tells us that his attitude toward all "the great organized religions" . . . "save certain futile forms of Protestantism" . . . "is one of respect and admiration"; but there are both in his chapter on "Humanism and the Twentieth Century," and in his "Note on Humanism and Religion," certain expressions which indicate grave misunderstandings. For instance, he tells us: "Humanism hesitates to pass beyond its experimental knowledge to the dogmatic affirmations of any of the great religions. It cannot bring itself to accept a formal theology. . . . " Now, this is fair enough; but he adds: "a formal theology . . . that has been set up in defiance of reason, for it [humanism] holds that the value of supernatural intuition must be tested by the intellect." As Mr. Eliot has hinted, Mr. Foerster here wanders far off from his critical tether. The formal theology of revealed religion, by definition, does not depend on man's intuitions but on God's revelation. Moreover, it is not untested by the intellect as Mr. Foerster seems to think. Theologians take good care to establish that dogma is not contrary to reason, though, of course, as reason itself would lead us to expect, it must reach beyond reason. Revelation must necessarily end in mystery; but Babbitt himself points out that for man every avenue of knowledge must likewise do so, and he admits that the nature of his higher will is as mysterious as any tenet of revealed religion: “ The higher will must simply be accepted as a mystery that may be studied in its practical effects, but that, in its ultimate nature, is incapable of formulation.”

In his “ Note on Humanism and Religion,” Mr. Foerster recognizes that humanism is not a religion, but again he adds a sentence which shows his tendency to make assertions far beyond Irving Babbitt’s critical position: “ Operating in the critical rather than the dogmatic spirit, it [humanism] conceives that the old religious solutions are inadequate.” Such a sentence is itself patently more dogmatic than critical. In opposition to the attitude of suspended judgment of Irving Babbitt, Mr. Foerster would thus make humanism take a dogmatic position on matters outside its domain. This is further shown when he writes: “ Mr. Eliot asserts that pure humanism, as I have used the term, ‘ repudiates religion,’ is ‘ incompatible with religious faith.’ If he had been still more explicit, he should have said that pure humanism is incompatible with a dogmatic, revealed religion; *that is true, I think* (italics mine). When religion in this sense is united with humanism, the result is, literally, an ‘ impure ’ humanism or, more properly, some kind of ‘ Christian humanism.’ (For us, says Mr. Eliot, ‘ religion is of course Christianity.’)” Here again, it would seem, Mr. Foerster makes humanism trespass beyond its limits and pass judgment on the possibility, truth, and value of revealed religion. But to do so would be to attack it dogmatically instead of remaining in that most non-committal position of Irving Babbitt. Even Huxley, for instance, never went that far in his controversies on the existence of God. As Henshaw Ward recalls: “ He never denied that there is a personal God; he was simply unable to get in contact with God; so he had to remain ignorant; he coined a word: ‘ agnostic ’ to describe his ignorance.” In fact “ he considered that the most illogical and brainless act conceivable was to deny the existence of God. He simply confessed that he had no knowledge of the subject." Now, if there is one quality which distinguishes humanism, as Babbitt understands it, it is to be thus wholly critical or sceptical in the sense of refusing to venture out of its own domain. If humanism has laid itself open to the accusation of taking a stand against science, it is not because it opposes science as science, which would evidently be absurd, but because it points out that science has no basis for becoming dogmatic out of its own province of the observation, formulation, and utilization of physical phenomena, a truth which every genuine scientist recognizes. What sense would there be, therefore, in humanism presuming to dogmatize about revealed religion? Any humanist may affirm or question the fact of a revelation or any of the tenets of any dogmatic religion, but not as a humanist. Mr. Foerster's assertion that humanism " conceives that the old religious solutions are inadequate " or that it is " incompatible with a dogmatic revealed religion " make him as " impure " a humanist as would the contrary assertion that humanism establishes the fact or incorporates the dogma of a revealed religion. On the other hand, Mr. Foerster seems to be wholly within the limits of humanism when he writes: " Humanism believes that there is need as well as room for a working philosophy mediating between dogma and scepticism and devoid of revelation and ecclesiastical organization." Nor is there anything original about this, as no philosophy as such depends on religious dogma or ecclesiastical organization. To define more exactly the special position of Babbitt's humanism in relation to revealed religion we should therefore have to be more specific, perhaps somewhat as follows: Humanism does not utilize revealed religion. It may be accompanied by belief or unbelief in it, but in any case, it takes no stand against it. Humanism is established critically by the observation of the immediate data of consciousness and by the study of the record of the race. Such observations and study reveal that man's intellect and will, as well as senses, are constantly prone to excess; but they also reveal at work in man a principle of control over them, and consequently superior to them. This principle is designated as the "higher will," "inner check" or *frein vital,* and as it may be exercised over the natural activities of man, it is apparently of supernatural origin, so that it corresponds to grace in the Christian system. Its utilization in the curbing of excess and in thus securing a harmonious functioning of man's natural activities, through mediating between extremes, constitutes humanistic living. The standards for thus mediating between extremes, the universal principles of decorous or humanistic living, are to be sought by imaginative concentration on the experience of the race and applied, with the help of the higher will, as reason dictates in the particular circumstance.

The humanist thus has humility in that he recognizes the necessity of submitting his lower self — namely, natural intellect, will, and feelings — to the discipline of his higher self — namely, higher will and higher use of the intellect and imagination.

But furthermore, the humanist, thus working out the mediation between extremes, might further meditate on the universal principles, the wisdom of the ages, discovered by the abstracting and imaginative concentration of the men of the past and present who have lived most harmoniously. He might reflect that these universal principles must tally with the divine ideas, that the harmonious actions called for by them and carried out with the help of the higher will, must tally with the Will of God. He would then think in terms of the Kingdom of God rather than merely in terms of the circumstantial kingdoms of man. After experiencing happiness through harmonious living, he might acquire peace through the sense of the conformity of his life with the Will of God. In this sense humanism might come to have, in and by itself, a religious aspect.

Whereupon the critics of humanism may say: Precisely; humanism would be a religion. It would take the place of revealed religion. Humanism, as Mr. Foerster says, " conceives that the old religious solutions are inadequate." " Humanism is incompatible with a dogmatic revealed religion."

There would seem to be no doubt that a given humanist might in his own life make humanism take the place of revealed religion. There seems to be equally no doubt that Irving Babbitt himself hopes that many will do so, in fact that this is the task to which he would confine himself. For there are actually many men who conceive that the old religious solutions are inadequate, who are not ready to accept the dogmatic religion of the Occident, historical Christianity, whether as Catholicism or dogmatic Protestantism. There is the whole of the Orient never converted to Christianity and even now beginning in turn to drift away from its own religious or humanistic disciplines, from Buddhism or Confucianism. There are in the Occident many who have abandoned Christianity. Where shall they all go? Shall they accept the answer of Diderot? Is naturalism the only possible alternative? The message of Irving Babbitt is precisely that naturalism is not the only alternative, and that the alternative chosen should not be naturalism, for all the reasons contained in his challenge which we have analysed: because naturalism has been tested by its fruits and found wanting; because further adherence to naturalism will only bring further and worse catastrophes; because, since naturalism is essentially monistic while human nature is really dualistic, naturalism is fundamentally wrong on first principles. What Babbitt asserts is that the other and saving alternative to naturalism is humanism, which reintroduces the element left out in the transition from the Christian to the naturalistic age, the second element in man's dual nature, the spiritual element of a higher will ultimately divine.

There is no doubt about all this, but on the other hand there is no truth whatsoever in the statement that " humanism is incompatible with a revealed religion." On the

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contrary, while the naturalist, with his monism, makes all religion impossible, in the sense of a link between man and something above nature, since monism merges nature, man, and whatever force it might recognize as God, humanism, with its dualism, with its reference to a spiritual realm above nature, not only points to the need of religious meditation, but puts man in an attitude of receptivity toward revealed religion. That is precisely what has happened in the case of Paul Elmer More, so much so, that after doing so much to distinguish humanism from naturalism, he seems to have come to minimize its own religious aspect, its possible more advanced stage of religious meditation. To Irving Babbitt, humanism may be more than a half-way house on the slope of spirituality. But whether on the slope or the summit, it surely is on a height where man may commune with God, rising above the plain of naturalism where man is satisfied to commune with himself.

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In spite of all these possible misunderstandings, the doctrine of Irving Babbitt has attracted much favorable consideration in Catholic circles, both here and abroad. And it well may do so, since it calls attention to the fact that the natural will, intellect, and sense in man are prone to an excess which is patently an evil, a point of view which corresponds to the Christian doctrine of concupiscence. Nor can it fail to interest Catholic critics to find Babbitt denouncing the confidence of Stoics, rationalists, and humanitarians in the all-sufficiency of human reason and their optimistic, prideful trust in the capacity of natural man to lead an ordered life. Moreover, Babbitt's detailed study of the record of this naturalistic confidence, and of the consequent disorganization of human character and social catastrophes, the punishment visited by Nemesis on excess, is but a constant commentary on the Biblical assertion that "the wages of sin is death."

That Babbitt's doctrine however would be condemned by Catholics in so far as it would pretend to take the place of revealed religion, or to make the latter unnecessary, goes without saying. This no doubt explains the comments of Dr. Fulton J. Sheen on the doctrines of Babbitt and More. Dr. Sheen accuses Babbitt of being a Pelagian, and More, to whom he assigns one of " the two greatest non-scholastic minds in the world today " — the other being credited to A. E. Taylor of Scotland — of being a semi-Pelagian. Pelagianism, he sums up as " a doctrine taught by a great student of Greek philosophy, Pelagius by name, who held that human nature by its own power is able to save itself without the help of God's grace." Pelagianism was condemned at the Council of Carthage in 418, whereupon arose semi-Pelagianism or the doctrine that " man needs grace but that by natural good works man could merit grace." " Our modern humanists," Dr. Sheen writes further, " who ask us to reject the Superhuman Christ either because Eternal Life is not necessary [Mr. Babbitt], or because faith in Him is reducible to ' imagination ' [Mr. More] are asking us to fly into the face of forty centuries of experimentation." We have here a proof of the danger of confusion on the relation of humanism to religion, as soon as humanists seek to dogmatize as such in the field of revealed religion. It is, however, hard to understand how Dr. Sheen can say that either Mr. More or Mr. Babbitt " ask us to reject the superhuman Christ," when Mr. More, after the most searching study, as we shall see later, not only accepts but defends against " modernism " the formulation of the Council of Chalcedon that Christ was both God and man, and when Mr. Babbitt looks to Catholicism for support. And then, where did Mr. Babbitt ever say that " Eternal Life is unnecessary " ? If he had said so, he would clearly have stepped out of the province of humanism. Dr. Sheen must evidently have misread him, for there is no such sentence in his writings or such opinion ever implied. In fact, such a statement is wholly contrary to his whole critical attitude. Indeed, elsewhere in his article, Dr. Sheen recognizes that " Mr. Babbitt admits that above the humanist level there is another, the spiritual one of the supernatural or grace."

However, Dr. Sheen's misunderstanding of Babbitt's humanism appears more clearly when he sums up Babbitt's psychology as follows: " Modern thought, Mr. Babbitt further concedes, has failed to find an adequate substitute for that supernatural principle of grace. Mr. Babbitt believes, however, that it can be found by appealing to a principle of Eastern thought, namely, the supremacy of the will. Writing in the Forum (Feb. 1930), he asks, ' Why leave the affirmation of such a will to the pure traditionalist? Why not affirm it first of all as a psychological fact, one of the immediate data of consciousness? ' In other words," continues Dr. Sheen, " instead of appealing to grace and the supernatural order, Mr. Babbitt refuses to adventure into it, believing that man can perfect himself thanks to the energies of the human." We have here apparently two misunderstandings. There is no doubt, as we have seen, that Mr. Babbitt refuses to venture into the supernatural order, because it is a separate domain, dependent upon revelation, outside the field of his critical method; but this does not mean that he denies its existence, since on the contrary his humanism leads him to believe in its existence. He has followed footsteps to a door. These footsteps lead him to believe that there is someone behind the door. He says so, but as he has not yet the proper key to open that door, he begs to be excused from stating positively what is behind it. In other words, he separates the domain of philosophy from that of theology. But what else does the philosopher ever do? What does scholastic philosophy itself do if not exactly that? It certainly does not venture into the domain of grace; it does not even mention it in its treatment of ethics: indeed its ethics point precisely to the way man can perfect himself " thanks to the energies of the human." Not only does scholasticism never mention grace, but it even maintains that " regarded in the abstract and indeterminately, the end of human nature consists in happiness"; and if it adds that "regarded in the concrete and definitely, this end is not in any created good but in God", it is not because the scholastic philosopher has appealed to revealed religion, but because he puts his trust both in logic and in observation. Scholasticism reasons that the objective end of man must be God, that no created goods can fulfill the conditions of man's objective beatitude because it is a datum of experience that "these goods are so incomplete that they never satisfied anyone, of so short duration and so unstable that no one can possess them without anxiety and fear of losing them, so limited that they can be possessed only by a small number of people." This is enough to give the key to many human problems, but it certainly does not appeal to anything but "the energies of the human." In fact, it does not even put us on guard, as Irving Babbitt does, against the merely human, against the "natural man"; it does not speak of "concupiscence"; it does not even consider the canker at the heart of human nature, the ever present tendency to excess, to evil functioning of the powers of intellect and will as well as feelings. Scholasticism even goes so far as to say: "Man can be obliged to admit God only if he proves His existence." As Cardinal Mercier reminds us: "When in the first half of the last century De Bonald and Lamennais sought to oblige the human reason to receive its first principles and its primary motives of certitude from revealed teaching, Gregory XVI, far from accepting this dutiful subjection offered to the Church, publicly reproved and condemned the mistaken loyalty of its authors." In short — and this is perhaps too little understood in non-Catholic circles, but of course no one knows it better than Dr. Sheen — the Church considers philosophy and the sciences autonomous in their own domains. As Cardinal Mercier puts it: "Philosophy and the sciences are autonomous in the sense that in their case the supreme motive of certitude is the intrinsic evidence of the object they study, whereas in matters of faith the ultimate motive of belief is the authority of God, the author of supernatural revelation. Revelation is not a motive of assent, a direct source of knowledge for the scientist and the philosopher, but rather a safeguard and negative standard." "The Church does not positively teach either science or philosophy."

Why then should Irving Babbitt, as a philosopher, be chided for refusing to venture into the domain of grace, and for contenting himself, exactly as scholasticism does, with studying how man may perfect himself by purely human effort? Why, on the contrary should not Catholic critics note with the greatest interest that Irving Babbitt, apparently alone among philosophers, brings out the tremendous fact that, on strictly critical grounds, without venturing into the domain of revealed religion, it is evident that the intellect and will, as well as the senses, naturally tend to disorder through excess, but that it is no less critically evident that there is at work in man a power which can check them and which consequently must be of a superior order. Here we come to the second point of Dr. Sheen's summing up of the doctrine of Irving Babbitt on which there seems to be a misunderstanding. When Dr. Sheen writes: "Mr. Babbitt concedes that modern thought has failed to find an adequate substitute for that supernatural principle of grace" but "believes, however, that it can be found by appealing to a principle of Eastern thought, namely the supremacy of the will", he evidently has missed the point that the "will" Babbitt here speaks of is not the "natural will" but, on the contrary, an evidently supernatural principle since it can check the natural will and intellect. Moreover Babbitt's method is not to appeal to or borrow principles but to examine the immediate data of consciousness. If he seizes eagerly upon the Eastern recognition of the same immediate data that he himself discovers in man, it is only because he finds there corroboration of his own findings, a means of wider experiential inquiry. In fact — and here is the special significance of Babbitt's testimony — he merely records his own observations, and recalls the observation of Eastern men, that a principle of control, the equivalent of Christian grace, is critically demonstrated to be at work within man. Why should not this be a most precious admission for the Christian? As a matter of fact, is it not true that, on the basis of the Catholic doctrine of grace, the positivist, the critical observer, should be expected to find grace thus working within man, at least within all men of good (natural) will?

It is, I know, rash for a layman to venture into the discussion of Christian grace. I shall therefore merely recall the well known and very minute discussion of the subject by the Rev. Joseph Pohle in the Catholic Encyclopaedia. This will bring us to consider whether Babbitt is a Pelagian as Dr. Sheen would have it. The Pelagian, as Dr. Sheen recalls, " held that human nature by its own power is able to save itself without the help of God's grace." At once, in the light of the above discussion, we may say: Irving Babbitt, as a philosopher, is not necessarily concerned whether man can save himself, that is, deserve eternal happiness through the beatific vision of God. He is talking, like all philosophers, about the question of man's happiness in this life, even though philosophy may show, as it does in scholasticism, that this happiness cannot be complete because God is evidently the ultimate end of man. Philosophy by itself certainly can know nothing about God's grace; and, as we saw, scholasticism itself does not pretend to. The accusation of Pelagianism would thus seem to be beside the point. But what is more, Irving Babbitt actually goes further than philosophy does. His special contribution is to have brought out the fact that there is evidently working within man a higher will which can be critically observed. Babbitt does not invent this higher will; he does not borrow it from Eastern thought; he discovers its action in man, and Eastern thought merely helps him to be surer of his own observation. It is because this higher will is a power of control over the excess of the natural intellect, will, and sense of man, that he is forced to admit that it must be supernatural, and that therefore it coincides with Christian grace. Now we may ask, according to Catholic doctrine, should not Christian grace thus be found at work at least in all men of good (natural) will? The answer according to Dr. Pohle is evidently in the affirmative: " The universality of grace," he writes, " is a necessary consequence of God's will to save all men. . . . If it can be established that God grants to the three classes of the just, sinners, and infidels truly sufficient grace for their eternal salvation, the proof of the universality of grace will have been furnished." He goes on to explain that, as to the just, we have the anathema of the Council of Trent (Sess. vi, can. xviii); as to sinners, the assertion of the Catholic Catechism that it is a grievous sin to despair of God's mercy; and, on both classes, a great quantity of Biblical texts. For instance, on the just: " God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able." (1 Cor. 13), and on sinners: " I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." (Ezech. xxxiii. 11). But in this discussion we are more concerned with the third class, " infidels." Is the grace of God also conceded to the " heathen " ? asks Dr. Pohle. " The Divine readiness to grant assistance also to the heathen," he answers, " is a certain truth confirmed by the Church against the Jansenists Arnauld and Quesnel. To question it, is to deny the above demonstrated intention of God to save all men; for the overwhelming majority of mankind would fall outside its range. The Apostle of the Gentiles, Paul (Rom. ii, 6 sqq.) lays stress on God's impartiality toward the Jews and Greeks, without ' respect of persons,' on the Day of Judgment, when He will reward also the Greek ' that worketh good ' with eternal life. The Fathers of the Church, as Clement of Rome (I Ep. ad Cor., vii), Clement of Alexandria (Cohort. ad Gent., 9), and Chrysostom (Hom. viii in John, n. i), do not doubt the dispensation of sufficient graces to the nations ' that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death.' Orosius (De Arbitr. libert., n. 19), a disciple of St. Augustine, proceeds so far in his optimism as to believe in the distribution of grace "*quotidie per tempora, per dies, per momenta, per ἄτομα et cunctis et singulis* (daily through the seasons, through the days, through the moments, through the smallest possible division of time, and to all men and every man)."

According to the orthodox Catholic doctrine, then, the grace of God may be acting as a check upon the intellect, will, and sense of natural man. It must be often present within men, even sinners; and it may be constantly present within "heathens" and all men of good will. Why then should it not be of the greatest interest to theologians that Irving Babbitt, even if he is merely a critical observer — or, rather, in proportion as he is merely such — should testify that his observation leads him to state that what he recognizes as the equivalent of Christian grace is actually thus present within men, even though, as a positivist, he should content himself with saying that it is there, and not conclude, as he actually does, that we have here evidently an ultimately divine principle. Patently, to discover thus within man a principle which Catholic theologians say must be there is not Pelagianism, first of all because Pelagianism is concerned with the value of this principle primarily with respect to the next life, but still more so, because Pelagianism actually denied the very need of a principle superior to the intellect and will of natural man. "Pelagianism," the same Dr. Pohle tells us in his article on the subject in the Catholic Encyclopaedia, "received its name from Pelagius and designates a heresy of the fifth century, which denied original sin as well as Christian grace . . . As all his ideas were chiefly rooted in the old pagan philosophy, especially in the popular system of the Stoics, rather than in Christianity, he regarded the moral strength of man's will (*liberum arbitrium*) when steeled by asceticism, as sufficient in itself to desire and to attain the loftiest ideal of virtue." Now, the cardinal consequence of Irving Babbitt's discovery of the higher will in man is precisely his complete opposition to all forms of Stoicism, down to that of Mr. Walter Lippmann. What Babbitt perpetually denounces is the Stoic pride, which is for him not only insufficient to insure virtue and happiness in terms of the afterlife (though it is not his province to deal with this), but is insufficient to insure as much virtue, measure, order, and happiness as man can gain in this life. " Nature, according to Pelagius," Dr. Pohle continues, " retains the ability to conquer sin and to gain eternal life even without the aid of grace." Nature, according to Irving Babbitt, has not even the ability to conquer the excess to which the natural intellect and will of man is prone, nor to attain order and happiness in this life, without the functioning of the higher will, a supernatural principle. If there is a doctrine that is diametrically opposed to that of Pelagius, it is certainly the humanism of Irving Babbitt.

As for semi-Pelagianism, a name coined at the end of the sixteenth century in the course of the discussion about Molina's doctrine of grace, but in reference to the heresy which followed Pelagianism, it is a much longer story. After sketching it from its rise, about 428, Dr. Pohle gives an account of its condemnation in 529 at the Second Synod of Orange. So far as we are concerned, this heresy revolves about the question of the " gratuity " of grace. As we saw, Dr. Sheen summed it up as holding " that by natural good works man could merit grace." The relation of " merit " to grace is evidently a most delicate one. The question at issue is that of the absolute gratuity of grace. " Some of the earlier scholastic Theologians," Dr. Pohle recalls, " cited in answer the celebrated and much debated axiom: *'Facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam'*: ' to the one who does what in him lies God does not deny grace.' " The point at issue is the affirmation that, no matter how widely granted grace may be or how worthy through good will and good works the recipient, grace remains a free gift of God — in short, that it is not called for by the dignity of human nature. Dr.

Pohle guarantees the orthodoxy of the following interpretation: "To the one who prepares himself negatively and places no obstacle to the ever-ready influence of grace, God in general is more inclined to offer his grace than to another who wallows in the mire of sin and thus neglects to accomplish what lies in his power. In this manner the cause of the distribution of grace is located not in the dignity of nature, but, conformably to orthodoxy, in the universal will of God to save mankind." Thus again we see that, according to Catholic theology, grace, as a free gift of God, may be found in all men, and that therefore Babbitt but corroborates this conception when he finds actually present in man a principle superior to man's natural powers. The fact that he comes to this conclusion critically should make it only the more valuable.

As for More's possible semi-Pelagianism, his discussion of grace apropos of St. Paul seems, as we shall see more fully later, to free him from this accusation. However, as More has deliberately invaded at this point the sphere of theology and Church history, his statements in that domain are beyond the question of humanism with which we are dealing. After we have established that the "higher will", which, for Babbitt, is an essential of humanism, may be but another name for God's grace and that the most orthodox theology recognizes that this grace can be present within every man of good (natural) will, "not excepting even the heathen," the fundamental relation of Babbitt's humanism to revealed religion would seem to be established.

Whereas naturalism leads men away from revealed religion, humanism so understood orients them in its direction, for, as opposed to naturalism, it points to a supernatural order. If there is such an order it is reasonable to believe that it should have been revealed to man. If, as Babbitt desires, the humanist humbly works to submit his "lower self," his natural intellect, will and feelings, to his higher self, the "higher will," to whatever of God's grace there may be within him, he will tend to live in such a way that he will increasingly fit himself for the free gift of Divine grace, for a greater enlightening of the intellect and imagination. No one may more logically than the humanist come to repeat with Cardinal Newman: " Lead, kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom."

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For, after all, the question remains: How far can man, even when mindful of the higher will in him, establish the standards necessary to lead a well-ordered human life? Irving Babbitt, as we saw, assigns the establishing of such values to the intuitions of the higher imagination. Though the scholastics assign it to the intellect, they note that in the case of the essential values, the intellect grasps basic truths so readily on the basis of experience that the process appears as intuitive as the action of what Babbitt calls the higher imagination. To recall this doctrine, this time in the words of Cardinal Mercier, for the moral values: " We have a special natural facility disposing us to know the means which lead us to our end, a facility or ' habit ' which the scholastics called ' *habitus principiorum rationis practicae,'* or more briefly synteresis." Because of this, Cardinal Mercier goes even so far as to conclude that " we can therefore say that human nature is a law unto itself." One has only to read a scholastic treatise on ethics to see how, without revelation, by the light of natural reason alone, it is possible to establish the standards of a well-ordered human life; and scholasticism, as we have seen, agrees with Babbitt that " the end of human nature is the happiness of man, at least indeterminately and in the abstract." That it should be possible to find corroboration for these values in the literary records of the race where the humanist seeks them is also most reasonable. In short, there is such a thing as the " natural law " (*lex naturalis*), the human perception of the eternal law (*lex aeterna*), " the application of the dictates of good conscience." There is what, in the United States, we call " equity," namely, a law superior to the " common law " or law of the legislator. There are standards which follow necessarily from human nature. Actions conformable with human nature are right and morally good; actions at variance with it are wrong and immoral. Reason in its analytical function, or in its more intuitive aspect of synteresis, can distinguish them — at least to some extent.

But here, precisely, the question obtrudes: to what extent and how securely? If scholasticism establishes with such assurance a system of ethics, it is because it considers that reason can prove the existence of God and that it can deduce from it man's duties and rights. But though Catholic writers admit that " theoretically speaking, man is capable of acquiring a full knowledge of the moral law, which is nothing but the dictates of reason properly exercised," they are not unmindful that even the ethical systems of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics approved what we now readily consider immoral actions and practices. A common conclusion is that "actually, taking into consideration the power of passion, prejudice, and other influences which cloud the understanding or pervert the will, one can safely say that man, unaided by supernatural Revelation, would not acquire a full and correct knowledge of the contents of the natural law."

As a positivist, Irving Babbitt could not but realize how difficult the establishing of true and abiding standards must be. He likewise concludes that it cannot be done without much abstracting and imaginative concentration upon the facts, not only of the present but of the past, in short a careful study of the various traditions of the race, oriental as well as occidental. In fact this thought explains the width and depth of his own studies. This evident need of appealing to experience may be hard to distinguish from mere pragmatism, and yet the difference is essential. Humanism and Christianity are as ready as pragmatism to say: " By their fruits ye shall know them." The difference is that pragmatism is " the attitude of looking away from the first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities, and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts "; whereas humanism and Christianity look up to the antecedently real, to the abidingly true. The pragmatist says: It is true and good if it works. The humanist and the Christian say: It works because it is good and true. Moreover it may work and yet not be good because it works only for a limited end which in view of an ultimate end may actually be bad. Now the question remains: For whom or what does it work? Is it to be considered good and true merely because it works for my selfish interests, for the interests of my time and place? The answer of the humanist as well as of the Christian is that values worthy of the name must be universal values, abidingly good and true for all times and places. But this inevitably brings up the question of ultimate ends. There can be no assigning of values except in terms of ends, and no discovery of universal ultimate values except in terms of universal ultimate ends. No action of an agent can be adjudged good or bad until his highest ultimate end is known. Here we come to the necessary limitations of humanism as well as of every purely human doctrine, since, as we saw, reason or even whatever intuitions of which man may be capable, can get a clear conception of his ultimate end or of the ways to reach it, only with difficulty.

How then can the ultimate question be satisfactorily settled: what is the end of man? Irving Babbitt answers, with Aristotle, that the end of man is happiness; but evidently again happiness is merely a fruit, a by-product of reaching the end. The haunting question remains: what is the ultimate end? It was inevitable that the cultural humanism of Irving Babbitt, even though it searched for its values through meditation on the whole recorded thought and experience of the race, should run into this impasse, just as surely as the pragmatic naturalism of John Dewey based on emerging human experience. It was inevitable, too, that critics should seize upon this point.

The critic who has done so most exasperatingly is no doubt Mr. Allen Tate. And in spite of Mr. Robert Shafer's tit-for-tat retort to Mr. Tate, it remains evident that the latter has touched upon points which the humanists must study further. Mr. Tate was not wholly wrong, for instance, in stating that, often in his *Shelburne Essays,* Paul Elmer More tends " to extract from any given book the doctrine that coincides with his own "; and, he might have added, to condemn the book in so far as he does not find in it his own doctrine of dualism. " Mr. More," writes Mr. Tate, " entertains false hopes of literature; he expects it to be a philosophy and a religion because, in his state of independent faith, he has neither a final religion nor a final philosophy prior to the book which he happens to be reading." As a matter of fact, the humanist does have a final philosophy which he may even tend to make into a final religion, at least to the extent of believing in a dualism which includes a supernatural higher will or *frein vital.* Mr. Tate forgets that the humanist gets his philosophy, primarily, on the basis of the immediate data of consciousness and immediate experience. If the humanist searches at least for corroboration of the resultant ethical code, he does not do so merely in the records of literature but also in those of history, philosophy, and comparative religion, in so far as they may enshrine the highest intuitions of the abiding reached by the race. If there is a weakness here, it is but the inevitable consequence of a secular approach to ethics. In proportion as the individual or the state takes on the task of proclaiming authoritatively or sanctioning ethics it must become judicial. The Church proclaims the moral law, but leaves the believer free to follow it or not, and its sanction comes only in the after life. On the contrary, whenever the state proclaims a law it must sanction it in this life. To insure morality it must multiply laws and provide more means of law enforcement, unless as one columnist has put it: " If the world is to be perfected by law, why not just one law that we shall all be perfect? " The more secular the point of view, the greater the necessary censorship. So that the secular literary critic may easily tend to take over, as the humanist is accused of doing, the duty of the moralist, and become ever more prone to condemn a literary work on other than literary grounds. It may then well be granted that to use literature even as a help to establish ethical standards is to run into this danger. Moral standards transcendent in origin to the thing to be judged would seem to be essential to safeguard legitimate liberty in art as well as in life. At any rate, in so far as ethics may be involved, the question of an ultimate end will not down. Values and ends go together because values depend on ends; and scholastics and humanists must agree that it is by no means easy to make sure of the ultimate natural end of man and even of the natural law which he should follow in order to reach it.

It was therefore most interesting to note that such was Paul Elmer More's own conclusion after reading Mr. Tate's article and the comments on humanism which Mr. George N. Shuster made on the publication of *Le Mouvement Humaniste aux Etats-Unis*. In spite of the bitterness of Mr. Tate's attack especially directed against him, Mr. More takes it to heart that such diverse critics "agree in complaining that humanism fails to offer any clear positive basis on which the mind and heart of man can rest"; and he tells us that the answer to the possible incompleteness of humanism came to him in two words: "purpose and values." So that the question reduces to this: Can humanism, of itself, unaided, provide the purpose and values it needs for its fulfilment and without which it cannot pass from the purely critical to the productive state? Must it not for its driving force depend on religion? In other words, must not man go beyond meditation on the immediate data of his consciousness and beyond the study of the historical and literary record of the race; must he not try to determine whether there has not been a Revelation to tell him about his ultimate end and serve as a criterion of the value of any and every action? If man seeks, and if there is any realty in what he seeks, why should he not be answered?

Mr. More recognizes that with its doctrine of free will — and we have already noted that he does not clearly differentiate natural free will from Babbitt's " higher will " — humanism takes its stand unhesitatingly on the affirmation of purpose versus the chance or fate of naturalism and its consequent futile literature; but Mr. More asks: " the high value of being a man — is that *telos* attainable, is it even approachable without religion? " The question drove Aristotle into the metaphysics of the Absolute. Face to face with it, Mr. Babbitt ranges himself " unhesitatingly on the side of the supernaturalists "; but asks Mr. More, why then " that sweeping reluctance veiled but deeply felt " to associate the supernatural with " dogmatic or revealed religion " ? Instead Mr. Babbitt states that humanism needs to be supported by " religious insight," but Mr. More further asks: " insight into what? " Mr. Babbitt uses the term " into the higher immediacy "; but Plato would not have recognized it as equivalent to " insight into things divine," nor is it enough to meet the clear conviction even of Sophocles or other great humanists of ancient Greece. And without genuine insight into things divine, continues Mr. More's argument, " why should I not follow the sway of temperament and satisfy all the desires of nature as they arise " . . . " why should I propose to myself a line of life which requires a constant exercise of choice and restraint, in themselves painful to the natural man, unless something of value is to be attained thereby? Mr. Babbitt answers: to attain happiness; and even Mr. G. R. Elliott, though he, like Mr. T. S. Eliot, believes in dogmatc and revealed religion, answers even more emphatically: 'Humanism is the study and practice of the principle of human happiness, uncomplicated by naturalistic dogmas on the one side and religious dogmas on the other.' " " But," Mr. More continues, " that blessed word happiness! If one were only sure of attaining it on the human level, how the problem of purpose and value would be simplified. . . . Happiness. I cannot forget the terrible ending of *Vanity Fair:* . . . 'Which of us is happy in this world?' That," concludes Mr. More, "is the dilemma that faces the humanist. The intuition of free will; free will exercised for a purpose; purpose directed to clothe human life with value; value measured by happiness — the chain is perfect, link by link, only at the end it seems to be attached to nothing." Is not humanism then, asks Mr. More, doomed to disappointment? "Will not the humanist, unless he adds to his creed the faith and the hope of religion, find himself, at the last, despite his protests, dragged back into the camp of the naturalist? If we perish like beasts, shall we not live like beasts?" To those who have followed the common labours of the two great humanistic critics of naturalism, these anguished queries of Paul Elmer More to his life-long friend have all the pathos of the last words of Socrates.

It is not difficult to see what Irving Babbitt would answer. Thackeray uses the word happiness in the hedonistic sense of physical and mental well-being, a passive enjoyment, whereas, for Babbitt, human happiness is to be found in the type of activity peculiar to man as such, the achieving of that human order which is the end of human nature. This type of happiness is of course the εὐδαιμονία of Aristotle, following, as we saw, upon the normal activity of man's faculties, proportionately developed and harmonized, and to be carefully distinguished from mere pleasure (ἡδονή), the physical accompaniment of the exercise of any activity. Animals, and man in so far as he partakes of animal nature, may experience pleasurable sensations; but man alone, as he alone transcends animal nature, may know εὐδαιμονία. Thus happiness, rightly understood, is necessarily the ultimate end of the humanist; and such happiness, far from being "attached to nothing," links up with the fulfillment of a human law which may in turn humbly seek support in a higher will ultimately divine.[1]

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[1] It should be noted that More has himself brought out the peculiar nature of eudaemonia. Cf. p. 216. As late as 1928 in *The Demon of the Absolute,* he sets off the domain of humanism as distinctly as Babbitt.

It was to be expected that we should reach here the possible point of parting between Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. More, who in his early work tended to disparage Christianity in favour of a self-sufficient individualism, now tends to look upon humanism as ineffective save in subordination to his type of Christian Theism. Babbitt, for his part, never disparaged Christianity, but, on the other hand, has always insisted on keeping separate the discussion of humanism, not only from the question of revealed religion, but even from all theistic controversies. He wished from the start, and continues to wish, to meet the naturalists on their own ground. He will not go beyond asserting the higher will as an experiential fact. He admits the logic of those who would add that the presence of this higher will in man points to the existence of God as the author of " the law for man " as well as of " the law for thing." He is even ready to admit that he sides with the spiritualist. He refuses to be called an atheist or even an agnostic. But, through intellectual modesty, he stops short of affirming the existence of God and contents himself with affirming the existence of the Law. To deny Theism is for him an inverted dogmatism. To affirm it is to leave the domain of experience for that of logic or for dogmatic assumption. Let us then, he would say, set up humanism clearly opposed, on the one hand, to naturalism, and clearly distinct, on the other, from theological pronouncements.

But surely it is not in vain that the founders of the American humanistic movement have laboured together to point out the hopelessness of naturalism. It is, moreover, particularly significant that even More has done so, in large measure, on purely critical lines, and that Babbitt has remained so loath to pass from observation to the discussion of revealed religion, because to continue thus to meet the naturalist on his own ground gave his testimony its full value. Since in this essay, however, we aim to confront as many approaches as possible to our problems, it may be interesting to note what neo-scholasticism would add on this all-important issue. Scholasticism, we saw, would agree with Babbitt in asserting that the end of human nature is the happiness of men. But we must hearken also to the objection of Mr. More: humanism's chain is perfect, link by link, only at the end it seems to be attached to nothing. Here scholasticism would add: Mr. More too is right: the chain must be the bridge to an ultimate, universal end; it must be attached to God. Scholasticism, unlike Mr. Babbitt, does not remain short of avowed Theism.

Observation, experimentation can study only the particular, the many. Now, it is an inveterate tendency of the human mind to generalize on the particular, to abstract from the particular and to get to the general and universal, the one. To abstract is the essential act of that mind which distinguishes man from the rest of nature. As Cardinal Mercier puts it: " To abstract is that distinctive function of intelligence, by which man differs from beast, which is common to all men and is present in every kind of intellectual act, while it is wholly wanting in animal perception." You simply cannot stop the intellect from seeking the universal any more than you can stop a healthy open eye from seeing. In vain would the positivist or the experimentalist pretend that he does not generalize. Evolutionism, mechanism, subjectivism, relativism, are as much general theories as creationism or spiritualism. To deny the general is as much a generalization as to affirm it, and Cardinal Mercier reminds us that even Comte, in the introduction and first discourse of his *Cours de Philosophie Positive,* is obliged " to recognize that beyond the sciences strictly so called there is scope for the study of the 'generalities of the different sciences.'" But if the intellect inevitably must go on ever seeking higher unity because, as experience demonstrates, it is in its nature to do so and the perception of universality is its end, you cannot stop it from seeking the reason, that is the causes, of things, nor can you stop it from seeking their ultimate cause. And so man cannot stop thinking of God. He does so no less when he denies Him than when he affirms Him. This too is an immediate datum of consciousness. Why is not this the solution of the problem of happiness and of the problem of values? Yes, happiness is the end of human nature, but only when this end is considered indeterminately. Happiness is the product *both* of the effort and of the attainment of the objective end of human nature. The intellect is the highest part of human nature, and the ultimate objective end of the intellect is the ultimate cause or God. Man can only be happy in proportion as he reaches God. He is happy in proportion as he reaches balance, proportion, measure, only in so far as these are part of that order whose ultimate principle is God. Man can never be fully or long happy through the particular. That too is an immediate datum of consciousness and experience. "There are three kinds of created goods," writes Cardinal Mercier, "those of the body, those of the soul, and external goods. But all these goods have a threefold deficiency which renders them powerless to constitute man's beatitude; they are so incomplete that they have never satisfied any one; they are of so short duration and so unstable that no one can possess them without anxiety and fear of losing them; they are so limited that they can be possessed only by a small number of people. No created good, then, can supply the conditions of man's objective beatitude. Furthermore, a union of all these different goods would be equally powerless to make man perfectly happy, for the insufficiency of each class is not due to the quantity but to the intrinsic quality of these goods." "Only the complete development of the mind's activity as the knowledge of the First Cause," he concludes, "the principle of the order of the universe, is capable of making man happy." Only by reaching God, the ultimate end of the highest activity of man, can man find peace. Here is the explanation of an ever-recurring and universal experience which every positivist worthy of the name must admit. Thus, philosophy gives the explanation;

but in doing so, it points to the necessity of revealed religion.

For, as we saw, it is another datum of consciousness and of experience that the intellect, all capable though it be to reason its way to a First Cause, can apprehend it but imperfectly; that the mind of man, depending upon sense as it does in this life, can conceive God only imaginatively, anthropomorphically, and so imperfectly that man makes Him too often according to his own image, so much so that as he develops and his perception widens, he may even recoil before the image which he has made. Thus, again to quote scholasticism: " During his earthly life man does not experience that complete development of his being which allays all desire and want and endows the soul with the imperturbable repose of happiness." Since man's intellect reaches out so necessarily to God and yet can apprehend Him so imperfectly, is it not rational to believe that God must reach down to man; that as man's natural will, the appetite of the intellect, seeks God as its end, God's own Will seeks man in the form of what the Christian calls grace? There precisely would be the source of Irving Babbitt's higher will and the legitimacy of his hope that the action of this higher will in man will yield man happiness and even peace. But what does this mean if not that Babbitt's humanism necessarily has a religious background? This then, scholasticism would hold, might well be Irving Babbitt's answer to his friend Paul Elmer More: that through the higher will, which More does not seem to differentiate sufficiently from mere natural free will, the chain of humanism really links with the divine. Nor is it surprising that humanism should find it difficult to keep separate these two aspects of man, the natural and the supernatural. For scholasticism experiences the same difficulty. " Doubtless," writes Cardinal Mercier, " the supernatural end alone is, in the absolute sense of the word, the supreme end of an intelligent nature, in the real order of things in which we find ourselves placed. Yet, the natural end, which in a possible order of things might have constituted the complete and exclusive end of man, is also, in a legitimate yet relative sense, a supreme end, that is to say one not subordinated to a higher end. Thus there is nothing to prevent the attainment of the natural end being called happiness, though in a sense less complete than that of the supernatural end." Scholasticism, therefore, would support Irving Babbitt in his contention that we may seek happiness in a well-ordered life, that we may think of the duty of being truly civilized aside from the ideal of sainthood, that we may legitimately stop short, at least as philosophers, of the consideration that God assigned to man a supernatural destiny, above the exigencies of all created nature and beyond its power of attainment, since this further destiny is a matter of revelation. What characterizes the humanism of Irving Babbitt, what indeed might be called his super-humanism, is that he goes beyond scholasticism. His higher will equates with Christian grace and therefore notes in man an activity which scholasticism does not mention. We have indeed seen that this would make Irving Babbitt liable to the accusation that he offers humanism as a substitute for religion. It should at least allay the fear of Paul Elmer More that the chain of humanism is left suspended to nothing. The dilemma was inevitable. If, as Catholic theology asserts, grace is vouchsafed to all men of good will, then the positivist should be able to note its activity in man. The unique contribution of Irving Babbitt is that precisely as a positivist he has noted the fact. Mr. Bernard Bandler, who has also had the privilege of frequent talks with Mr. Babbitt, writes of him: " In his ultimate evolution and sympathies, he favours religion [over humanism]. He believes that ' the final reply to all the doubts that torment the human heart is not some theory of conduct, however perfect, but the man of character,' and the man of greatest character to him is the saint." It is clear, however, that by " saint " Irving Babbitt may mean not a man who depends on revealed religion, but one who meditates so deeply on the fact of the higher will in him and concentrates so intensely, intellectually and imaginatively, on his own and the race's experience that he attains to religious insight. But this religious insight is not sufficient, retorts Mr. More. At least, apparently even Catholic theology would say, it is what " the heathen " can achieve; and it is sufficient to make them men of good will to whom peace has been promised, to whom the further grace of God may be freely given. But, Mr. More would urge, why not press on? Is it not our duty to do so? Why not study anew the origin and record of Christianity since humanists, even as humanists, would scan the whole experience of the race? Why not study it with particular eagerness since we are told it makes available a " revelation " which may come to the assistance of the, admittedly at best precarious, religious insight of the humanist? If " the final reply to all the doubts that torment the human heart is the man of character," why not study particularly the life of the historical figure whose character was claimed to be divine? Evidently, Mr. Babbitt would be the first to encourage such a study, though he would insist on keeping it clearly distinct from humanism. Has he not written, referring to Christianity: " I am not so arrogant as to deny the validity of other ways of affirming the higher will, or to dismiss as obsolete the traditional forms through which this will has been interpreted to the imagination "? Has he not himself expressed doubts whether humanism would be sufficient to safeguard individual character and civilization without the help of religion? If he has paused on the threshold of that domain, may not the believer in revealed religion credit him with having discovered within man that principle of the higher will which points to the Divine and must be an enticement to seek the possible fact of the penetration of the natural order by the supernatural, since its presence within man, which constitutes humanism as Babbitt understands it, makes " humanism and religion both lie on the same ascending path from the naturalistic flux "?

Let Paul Elmer More therefore pursue the "modernist" into the domain of revealed religion. Since Irving Babbitt by his courageous critical study of natural man, by bringing the wealth of his scholarship and of his own keen insight to bear on the problem of his nature, has revealed in him an element clearly supernatural, after all, the two life-long friends will not have parted, as one remains to guard the ground he has staked out critically, even if the other leaves him to study that historical "message of great joy" that God had actually revealed Himself to man. For the presence of that supernatural element within man, the higher will, which Irving Babbitt stresses throughout all his works, even more than the unquenchable craving of man's natural intellect and will for the ultimate One, would make a Divine Revelation to confirm religious insight a logical necessity. Irving Babbitt may not be ready to pursue the matter; but if man thus tends inevitably to God, if, especially, God has never abandoned man, since He is within man as a higher will, it is legitimate to surmise that God must have revealed Himself more fully to man as soon as man had fitted himself for this Revelation. Thus Paul Elmer More's own contribution would be after all a truly logical complement to the work of Irving Babbitt.

VII

HUMANISTIC DUALISM AND CHRISTIANITY:

THE WORK OF PAUL ELMER MORE

PAUL ELMER MORE is undoubtedly primarily a moralist. He has been accused, as well as Irving Babbitt, of representing a survival of the Puritan spirit in the American thought of today. It is true that, throughout his intellectual life, More has sought to save from "the great confusion" which followed the development of deism, pantheism, and modernism, the elements of the Puritan faith which he considered indispensable to safeguard the integrity of human character and the future of civilization: above all the consciousness of a distinction between good and evil. There is no doubt either that, like the Puritan, he has sought to do it as an individualist. Professor S. E. Morison of Harvard has recently reminded us that "the right approach to the Puritans is by way of the Middle Ages." For, as he goes on to explain: "What was the central core of Catholic thought in the Middle Ages? That man was created for the glory of God, and that the unique duty and purpose of man was to serve God and do His will. This was just what the Puritan thought about life." Moreover, as M. Georges Goyau, the French historian, remarks, while "Luther conceived Christian society as a collectivity subservient to the State, composed of consciences individually subservient to God, and thus favoured the absorption of the Church by the State; Calvin, passionately devoted to the social reign of the word of God, looked to the State to translate it into laws and thus tended to make the State subservient to the Church." It is therefore not strange that Puritanism, stemming as it does from Calvinism, tended to set up, as Babbitt has pointed out, religious Caesars of its own. But, at least, it retained the idea of " the City of God " above the kingdoms of men and thus helped to keep alive in America the Christian conception which Babbitt considers the very foundation of occidental liberty as opposed to oriental despotism. It is also true that if the Puritans dropped the liturgy of Catholicism, along with many of its doctrines, they exaggerated others, notably its belief as to the amount of evil in human nature. But this again means that ultimately they took their stand on a responsible moral individualism which kept clear the dualism in man's nature, its evident tendency to evil but its no less evident perception of righteousness. The very fact that they minimized the possible co-operation of man with the grace of God is proof enough that they remained untouched by the great current of romantic sentimentalism which was presently to speak of the natural goodness of man, and finally come to merge God, man, and nature. Professor Morison is in agreement with Baron Seillière in concluding that it will be a sad day for the republic when the spirit of Puritanism dies. Paul Elmer More may rightly be credited with the same thought. It is because he saw that the moral autonomy of the individual, which Puritanism had fought for, was compromised even in America by the development of an idealism which denied the dualism of man's nature, that he set out to find other bases for the assertion of this dualism. His studies led him to India. In his *Century of Indian Epigrams*, rendered in part from Bhartrihari, which he dedicated to Irving Babbitt, already the confidant of his meditations, he found reflected its religious ideas. The principle is renunciation based on the distinction between the fugitive character of the pleasure of the flesh and that abiding happiness which can be reached only by the realization that the soul alone exists and that the outer world is but an illusion. In spite of the exaggeration in this doctrine, More saw in it the testimony of a long experience in the perception of a dualism in man's nature, corresponding to the dualism at the basis of the Christian tradition. As he explains in his preface: This intellectual attitude of the Hindus is the result of an acute perception of the double nature of man and of the outer world, and it is not too much to say that every philosophical and religious system should be based on the perception of this contrast. After Bhartrihari, he examined the Upanishads, the secret doctrine of the Hindu anchorites, and there again discovered the same conception that indulgence in all the urges and appetites of human nature does not give abiding happiness. He had sought a basis of morality outside of revealed religion and had at least found a critical basis for a distinction between a higher and a lower nature in man.

Very bravely, he soon gave up college teaching in order to devote himself wholly to reading and meditation in the peace of Shelburne, N. H. Later he became editor of *The Nation;* and until 1914 he made it a reflection of his preoccupations, while, in his *Shelburne Essays,* he collected the best of his thought and sought to give to the country that literary criticism without which, James Russell Lowell had said, there could be no American literature. What Paul Elmer More now proposed to do was evidently to establish a broad philosophical basis for that criticism. He knew that no literature of the past had ever developed wholly out of a given country, that no purely provincial literature was ever great, that all great literary work is essentially the reflection of a long human and not merely local experience, and that only the writers who have gained this wider outlook and have thus glimpsed the more general aspects of humanity have continued to have meaning for later ages. He therefore refrained from what some of his contemporaries were to do: concentrate on the American scene. Rather he would help call to the attention of all that America, no less than Germany, England, or France, needed to include in its cultural background the whole Occident and even the Orient — in short the culture of the race as a whole. Already W. C. Brownell had had the same vision, Irving Babbitt had begun his quest for standards; Stuart Sherman was beginning his career as their disciple. A humanistic criticism was being developed.

That More was not blind to the beauties of form is evident throughout his work, since he became himself one of the masters of English prose. But that he was particularly preoccupied by other values, by the fundamental moral problem, we may readily grant. Thus he praises Charles Eliot Norton because he made the lessons of the past a personal experience and so left us the example of a truly cultivated mind. On the other hand, he does not hesitate to criticize Emerson because he loses contact with the long tradition of the existence of evil and consequently with the complexity of human nature. Thoreau gives him the occasion to distinguish between those who seek solitude to lose themselves in pantheistic revery and those who would find therein the setting for deeper thought, as well as between those who look to nature for a consolation which it cannot give and those who manfully struggle against its blind and pitiless forces. The cult of Browning is for More the proof of a superficiality which, vaguely dissatisfied with materialism, seeks consolation in a facile idealism blind to the cross currents in human nature. More fully recognizes the poetical genius of Shelley, but he denies that he has reached the higher human reality, and holds that Wordsworth's sentimental worship of nature and pantheistic reveries likewise diminish the value of his work, since this is to encourage a fallacious conception of man. On the contrary, he recognizes human truth in the *Don Juan* of Byron because his sardonic laughter but hides the acute sense which every great poet has of the abysses of sadness in the human heart. He speaks respectfully of Carlyle because he finds in him that vision which only the more profound minds have had of both the ever-changing flux of life and the abiding element of the moral law whose transgression is followed by an inexorable retribution. In Tennyson, he distinguishes between that part of his work in which his efforts to make a synthesis of the ideas of his time are but the futile compromise so common to the Victorian era, and certain passages in the *Idylls of the King* and elsewhere which reveal an intuition of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit almost without parallel in English poetry.

Behind this criticism is evidently More's primary contention that not only are there in man two opposite tendencies but that it is only through the recognition of their presence that a given work may be significant. There must be the solution of a conflict between the two contrary principles, and the greater the conflict the greater the interest. This applies to the form of art as well as to the content. That form is the most beautiful which most adequately orders the most complex material. As to the content, a work of literature will move us in proportion as it enables us to see struggling within man the vital urge, made up of his inner desires and outer impressions, and the power of ordering in man, which is categorically distinct from the flux of appetites and sensations to be ordered, and which is felt to be superior to the natural intellect, will, and feelings. Blake, Shelley, Wordsworth, and so many others are inferior aesthetically, as well as ethically, because, on the whole, they have failed to rise sufficiently above the flux of impressions, thus losing the occasion to reach the very essence of poetical emotion which depends upon the simultaneous perception of what is changing and of what is immutable in man, upon the contrast beween his passion of the moment and the eternal law above and within him. Take away the consciousness of this immutable element and the very sources of emotion are dried; great literature becomes impossible. Recognize it — you will have *Antigone, Œdipus, Hamlet, King Lear, Le Cid, Le Misanthrope, Phèdre;* overlook it — you will get the puppets of romantic literature.

And after the decadence of the arts will come the decadence of civilization. One whole side of More's critical work is sociological. Critics of Babbitt and More have chided them for ignoring actuality. It is true that they treat the particular chiefly through considerations of the general, but it is because it is through the general that the particular can be best understood. Take for instance More's definition of social justice: " It is such a distinction of power and privilege, and of property as the symbol and instrument of these, as at once will satisfy the distinctions of reason among the superior, and will not outrage the feelings of the inferior." This merely means: to each one his due, but it is the key to the solution of social and economic problems in the most diverse conditions. In the social domain as elsewhere, monism is but a chimera. There will always be the better and the less good, the more and the less capable. To entrust to the inferior a responsibility beyond his powers is as unjust to him as to all others concerned. The happiness of the individual and the health of the social group are to be found neither in the exercise of force to enthrone injustice nor in an envious striving for a mythical equality. They are attained only when the members of each social group exercise the function they can perform adequately and are rewarded in proportion. Democracy can function efficiently only in so far as it succeeds in assuring the emergence of the more capable to the positions where their capacities are needed and can be utilized. Hence the need of development of the natural aristocracy latent in democracy, as a *via media* between an equalitarian democracy and a hereditary oligarchy or a plutocracy. Nor can the state afford to ignore the dualism in man or in society. In every organism, there must be a co-ordination of energy, a sifting of the better; and the success of any social group depends upon the capacity of its leadership, which in turn depends upon the power of the leaders to distinguish the superior from the inferior, to exercise a check upon the uncritical appetites of the group, a capacity which can only be gained by practicing it on oneself with the consequent development of knowledge, experience, and character. In the absence of such leaders there will be but the chaos of contradictory impulses or the brutal domination of the stronger. Thus Paul Elmer More is with Irving Babbitt in his opposition to all philosophies which would leave man immersed in the flux of impulses. In spite of his personal regard for William James, he can see in pragmatism only the most dangerous of sophisms, because it takes the stream of impressions coursing through us as the totality of consciousness, without distinguishing between the *élan vital* of the flux and the *frein vital*[1] distinct from it and felt as a counter current superior in its nature. More condemns in the doctrine of materialistic evolution a pseudo-scientific point of view since it passes beyond the field of experience, the only legitimate field of science, and becomes metaphysical by pretending to find the explanation of change in the current of change itself, instead of recognizing the possibility and the need of a principle of selection which acts within nature but which, like the *frein vital* which we feel within us and to which it corresponds, is superior to the flux of change. In short, he holds that the principle of order in the universe is superior to the universe, as the principle of order within us is superior to our natural self. To pragmatism and to materialistic evolution More opposes the philosophy of Platonic dualism.

To mention Platonism is to recall the need of distinguishing it from the misinterpretations of neo-Platonism. Plotinus fundamentally corrupted the doctrine of his master because he reduced his dualism of matter and spirit to a monism by considering creation as a series of emanations from God which degenerate as they recede from him. Thus evil becomes the final term of a monistic series instead of being the absence of the good which may be found in created beings wholly distinct from God. Hence, with the neo-Platonists the pursuit of the good becomes a vague aspiration to retrace all the steps back to the ideal within a monistic order, whereas, really, the good is achieved by maintaining or restoring in the created order the perfection of the ideal order. Through this monistic confusion of two distinct orders, the natural comes to be conceived as essentially good. Feeling and the current of sensual desire are called divine. Rousseau gives Julie no other law but that of her heart. Goethe in his *Faust* goes so far as to consider the *frein vital,* the principle of the restoration of the ideal order, as the spirit of evil. Shelley in his *Prometheus Unbound* expresses the rebellion against the divine conceived as a checking principle of order and deifies instead the emancipated emotions.

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[1] It should be noted that the expression "*frein vital*" was devised by Mr. Babbitt. Mr. More usually uses the phrase "inner check."

Against all these monistic errors, More reasserts clearly Plato's own doctrine. He first strips it of its mythological and metaphysical elements. He finds the substance of Plato's philosophy of dualism in the *Apology,* the *Crito,* and the *Phaedo.* In these we have first a genuine passing from sensations to ideas. Then the artistic imagination, submissive to the idea, helps the soul to shed the grosser emotions, thus liberating the nobler. " Right love," defines Plato, " is to love temperately and musically what is well-ordered and fair." "Μουσικῶς ἐρᾶν" — What a spell these words have cast down the centuries, now inspiring the noblest idealism, now insufficiently distinguished from mere carnal passions! But with Plato the appeal is wholly ideal. The imagination strengthened by emotion lifts the soul through the contemplation of beauty and through the love of finite individuals to the idea of the beautiful and the good. Character is thus moulded, thanks to the exercise of the ordering principle of the *frein vital,* from multiplicity to unity, from outer experience to inner development. " Show me," says Plato, " a man able to see both the one and the many in nature, and I will follow in his footsteps as though he were a god." More has found this man in Plato and takes him as his master. He will henceforth painstakingly elucidate his thought because he finds in him confirmed and much further developed the testimony to the dualistic solution of the mystery of life which he has already found adumbrated by the Hindu sages. Thus he will the more confidently oppose to the monistic philosophy of change, the dualistic philosophy of a true humanism as the key to the solution of human problems in all domains.

We may already see that, as opposed to the monistic philosophies of change, dualistic humanism instead of disparaging revealed religion points to its possibility. Referring to the sceptical element in humanism which denies to human reason the power to explain reality adequately, More writes: "With scepticism goes the true humility of religion, which is ready to join devoutly in any genuinely traditional worship, trusting that in this way faith may be enriched and the indolence of doubt expelled." He defines faith as "the flower of a knowledge of the self, the intuition which grows ever more clear through the exercise of the *frein vital*"; and elsewhere he adds: "At the center of the life of the soul, unifying its varied interests, raising them above the grosser forms of utility and inundating them with joy, there must be the idea of God." Thus while Rousseau accuses the Church of having invented the opposition within man between the law of the spirit and the law of the members, More admits that it has but recorded a fact, the primordial fact of the dualism of man's nature to the defence of which believers and unbelievers in revealed religion must rally if civilization is to be saved. For man will be smothered in the flux of circumstance unless he distinguishes between the law for man, distinct from the law for thing, unless he rises above this flux, in obedience to the law of the spirit. And social groups are fated to decadence unless, recognizing the dualism of good and evil, of the superior and the inferior, they abandon their trust in that levelling equalitarianism which is but a confusion of all values and the rejection of the possibility of human progress through justice. Wherefore, Paul Elmer More entrusted to literary criticism the added function of helping to transmit and to interpret the experience of individuals and of generations, by carefully discerning in a writer's work the abiding truth which his genius has enabled him to distinguish and to fix in forms the more imperishable that they themselves are adequately ordered; and, on the other hand, by pointing out the futile fancies of those who have misconceived the true nature of man distinct from the rest of nature.

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Thus, starting from the critical observation that, judged by its fruits, the thought of the eighteenth century, continued in the nineteenth and twentieth, had evidently gone astray, and retrograded back of the philosophies of the Middle Ages and of antiquity, because it had led to types of monistic pantheism and materialism, or to a pluralism which remained monistic since it did not distinguish man from the rest of nature, Babbitt and More worked together to restore the element which had become obscured since the Renaissance. The experience of the Orient as well as of the Occident had pointed out to them that human reason must recognize its limitations and that it must abandon definitely all monistic explanations of the universe or of human life. As true positivists, they came to recognize, as the basis for whatever explanation we can reach of the mystery of life, the actuality of the distinction between matter and form, flesh and spirit, body and soul, good and evil. Could dualistic humanism reach beyond these distinctions?

Irving Babbitt, we have seen, was led to recognize the existence in man of a higher will which points to the existence of a spiritual realm above material nature, but he had resolutely refused to explore this higher plane because so much had been done to make us look upon man as a mere animal and to merge completely man, nature, and God, that he thought it essential to concentrate all available energy on re-establishing man in his own particular estate distinct from both. Though in his early work Paul Elmer More showed that he failed to appreciate Christianity, he had always tended to rise from humanistic mediation to religious meditation. It is then not so surprising as it might seem at first, that some fifteen years ago he decided to make a re-examination of the history of Christian belief. The fact is that he had begun to doubt whether humanism could appeal readily enough to men in general, while the conviction had grown upon him that, if the supernatural exists, it is reasonable to expect its manifestation on the natural plane, a manifestation which would necessarily have to be anthropomorphic, precisely as Christianity claimed had actually been the case. Thus, after attacking all monistic philosophies, More came to challenge the monistic interpretation of religion known as "modernism," which strives to retain the ethical content of Christianity after having repudiated its dualistic basis. He closed his series of *Shelburne Essays* and turned to his monumental work on the Greek Tradition.

Since the religious problem hinges on the nature of man, he was able to begin where he had left off in his examination of the philosophy of Plato. In *Platonism* (1917) and *The Religion of Plato* (1921) he analysed further Plato's dualism. Socrates had established three main theses: the legitimacy of a partial scepticism, the existence of a spiritual world, the identity of knowledge and virtue. The third of these propositions led to two interpretations, one of which easily led in turn to rationalism or a complete trust in reason. Plato had fused these theses into a harmonious system. But, after Plato, Greek philosophy divided into three currents. The first led to Epicureanism and Stoicism, which developed the rationalistic tendency of the third thesis; the second, as neo-Platonism, tried to rationalize the affirmation of a spiritual world; and the last, Pyrrhonism, elaborated the partial scepticism of Socrates and rejected his two other theses. So that the history of Socratic thought after Plato is really the account of Platonic heresies. Paul Elmer More therefore began by analyzing the nature of these heresies. Essentially they consist in this: For the dualism of Plato, they already substitute monistic systems (of which the monism of our day is but a revival) — the Stoics and Pyrrhonists, a materialistic monism, the neo-Platonists, a spiritualistic monism. This More shows in detail in his third volume: *Hellenistic Philosophies* (1923). Monistic "modernism" is the antithesis of historical Christianity, and not merely its modernization, because Christianity is essentially based on a dualistic conception of man and of the universe. For Christianity to be critically acceptable, all monistic systems must therefore be shown to be essentially false. Hence the need of rehabilitating Platonic dualism by showing that its heresies cannot stand a critical examination. This done, we are in possession of a critical method based on Socratic scepticism which we retain, but we are also definitely convinced of the fact of the dual nature of man, spirit, and matter, and of the existence of a supernatural world as well as of a material world. This double affirmation of the limitations of human reason and of an after-life was the supreme message of Socrates face to face with death: "Strange it would be if now, when the God, as I firmly believe and am convinced, bids me stand forth as one devoted to wisdom, a questioner of myself and all the world, I were to desert my post through fear of death or any other thing. . . . For the fear of death, my friends, is only another form of appearing wise when we are foolish and of seeming to know what we know not. No mortal knoweth of death whether it be not the greatest of all good things to man, yet do men fear it as knowing it to be the greatest of evils. And is not this that most culpable form of ignorance which pretends to know what it knows not?"

If Socrates is a true sceptic and if Platonism retains this scepticism, why then call Pyrrhonism one of its heresies? Because the very essence of scepticism is the admission that our knowledge is limited to the immediate impressions which no one can deny. The question is: what do these immediate impressions include? The Pyrrhonist and the Platonist are agreed in considering as such the physical impressions of pleasure and pain, and all the sensations and perceptions that have to do with the body, and in general with material phenomena. They differ in that the Platonist would add that, in addition to these physical perceptions, he is no less immediately and certainly conscious of other perceptions which are not material, and therefore testify to the existence of a subjective and objective world of an entirely different order. These indubitable spiritual perceptions More groups in what he calls the philosophy of Plato, in opposition to two other elements to be found in his work, one theological, the other mythological, which are at most probable. These two elements may be left aside as metaphysical and therefore beyond scepticism. On the other hand, one cannot thus dismiss the immediate data of consciousness. Among these data are the perception of the existence in man of something distinct from the body which may be called the soul, and also the perception of acts which can only be the acts of a spiritual principle. The Pyrrhonist may look upon the perception of these spiritual facts as insufficiently established, and try to frame rules of conduct exclusively on his perceptions of the material world, but not without being reduced to determinism, relativism, and agnosticism — in any case, to a monism which is likely to evolve into some type of materialism. It must be admitted that, at first sight, the Pyrrhonist is right; for, while all men admit the existence of physical perceptions, they are not all agreed on the fact of the spiritual, while the sceptic would affirm nothing so long as there are contradictory opinions. This is precisely the objection which Polus makes to Socrates in "Gorgias." And Socrates, making a solemn appeal to individual consciousness, answers: "Here we are, you alone and I alone, debating together on this great concern of the soul; and I think only this will satisfy you, to convince me, as I am sure that all I desire is the honest confession of what you, and no other, have felt and do know. For the rest of the world, what is it to you and to me how they believe?" Socrates then goes on to point out that all men, by the meanings which they give to some words, and by the immediate sense of right and wrong which they call conscience, are indubitably conscious of spiritual experiences, though, in their lighter mood, they may pretend to deny them. But, as a matter of fact, the question remains personal as Socrates first put it: " You and I, in this solemn moment in which we seek to know truth, are we not conscious of spiritual experiences; and all incapable though we may be of explaining their nature or to follow all their consequences, can we seriously deny them? "

Thus, we find in Socrates the fundamental principle of dualistic humanism, the way of escape from the moral anarchy or amorality of naturalism. Have we or have we not, asked Irving Babbitt, as an immediate datum of consciousness, in spite of all questions as to the how or why, the perception of a selective principle superior to our natural self, of a vital check thanks to which we may co-ordinate all the natural tendencies of our being? Here, Paul Elmer More repeats essentially the same question. Who will dare to answer, No? Let us now see how, starting from this principle, established even more solidly, thanks to a minute study of Platonism and of its heresies, More will rise to the religious plane, and there, discovering Christianity, will submit it to the analysis of a scepticism which recognizes the objectivity of the spiritual.

Starting then with Socrates and genuine Platonism, stripped of all its monistic developments, here is what we have objectively ascertained: the impressions which we have of the spiritual domain are immediate and universal data of consciousness as much as are the impressions which we receive from the material world. All men live in these two distinct orders of experience. Still, we must recognize that, compared with the more brutal sensations of the physical world and the emotions they arouse, the sense of spiritual things is fugitive and uncertain. Cardinal Newman, in particular, More recalls, has described vividly this character of the experience of the spiritual with the conviction of a priest and the eloquence of a poet. It is readily transmuted into poetry; and, in expressing it, Pascal reaches the sublime. On the other hand, because of its inordinate craving to reduce all to unity, reason is always ready to rebel against the indubitable but tantalizing fact of the dualism of man's nature. It tends therefore to affirm that these more elusive perceptions of the spiritual are not only uncertain but fallacious, and that, far from representing an order beyond the physical, they have, like all other impressions, a materialistic origin. Moreover, reason is encouraged in its inveterate tendency to monism by the lower appetites of our nature, always rebellious to discipline of an order higher than their own. It is to this perpetual tendency of rationalism that the Platonist opposes the domain of spiritual perceptions, the existence of which cannot critically be denied since it is an ever recurring part of everyone's experience. For him, the Pyrrhonist is a pseudo-sceptic since he permits reason to tyrannize dogmatically over one half of the immediate data of consciousness and twist them to its own at bottom indolent tendency to deny what it cannot reduce easily to unity. Why deny the objective existence of a spiritual order in the presence of spiritual impressions, when you accept the objective existence of physical reality on the same basis of experience? These immaterial forces with which man is undoubtedly in touch, although he cannot explain how, constitutes what the Platonist calls the Ideas. As the Pyrrhonist recognizes in the physical world relations of simultaneity and succession which give him the two categories of uniformity of coexistence and uniformity of cause and effect, the Platonist perceives corresponding relations in the spiritual world. In the spiritual as in the physical order, certain consequences follow certain actions, so that the doctrine of Ideas may be called the science of the spiritual. And what is more, this experience of the spiritual is even more exact and striking than the experience of the action of physical laws because it is more fundamental. So that from the point of view of the Platonist, to allow physical phenomena to hide the reality of the spirit or of the world of Ideas is a supreme and wilful illusion, a species of somnambulism. To deny this spiritual world is, in short, a perversion of reason itself, as for the Pyrrhonist to deny the existence of the physical world in favour of a complete idealism would be to surrender totally, wilfully, and dogmatically to metaphysics. True scepticism must avoid both these extremes.

If now we compare as to their fruits Pyrrhonism and Platonism, we shall see that here again the Platonist is the true sceptic. He recognizes, with the Pyrrhonist, pleasure and pain which are the result of a given act in the physical world, and he is willing to recognize with him as a good, his *ataraxia* or freedom from physical pain; but he further notes, beyond this absence of physical pain, and equally as a datum of experience, *eudæmonia* or the acquisition of a happiness superior to that of the senses, the immediate experience of a satisfaction which accompanies a conduct in conformity with the philosophy of Ideas, and which is both the effect and the confirmation of the knowledge of the spiritual world.[2] Here again, the Platonist is shown to be the better sceptic, that is the more objective, the more completely critical, since *eudæmonia,* which is not necessarily in opposition to *ataraxia,* but which, on the contrary, supplements it, is superior to it because it follows from a way of life more completely human, since it achieves the harmony of all the powers of material and spiritual man. Thus the Platonist, because of his genuine scepticism, leads man to attain a peace of the soul, a harmony of his whole being, incomparably more precious because more completely meeting the needs of human nature, through the achievement of all the ends of his being, than the mere imperturbability which the Pyrrhonist, in his imperfect scepticism, accepts as a supreme instead of a partial end, and without any certitude of its realization. Thus the fruits of Platonic dualistic philosophy, because it conforms to the true nature of man, spirit as well as matter, surpass those of every other system. But this very fact is only a proof that we have reached as far as any philosophical system can ever take us. And yet since the Renaissance, as in antiquity, man has ever experienced the temptation of rationalism to attain to monism by denying his experience either of the material or of the spiritual world, because even the true sceptic who accepts both orders of experiences cannot explain them adequately. He cannot define in rational terms the nature of the objective reality which is behind material phenomena and which he accepts as a fact. The same difficulty holds for the world of Ideas. As to their nature, their mode or place of existence, or their mode of operation, the Platonist must confess that he knows nothing, in spite of his surmises. Even Plato allowed himself to be tempted to explain how these Ideas, though separated from material phenomena, are none the less capable of affecting these phenomena by " participation " or " imitation "; and it may even be that he attempted to solve the paradox of this separation and participation, though naturally in vain. On the whole, however, he left to the spiritual imagination this field into which reason cannot penetrate. Pascal perceived the facts clearly. The time comes when we must say with him: " Be humble, powerless reason; keep still, imbecile nature."

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[2] It may be noted that More agrees here with Babbitt in the definition of *eudaemonia,* or the distinctly human happiness which Babbitt recognizes as the end to be aimed at by the humanist. Cf. p. 194.

To set limits to reason is to assign the proper limits to a sound rationalism which will not venture beyond the powers of reason, but which, on the other hand, makes the most of them. What Paul Elmer More has done by his minute analysis of the scepticism of Plato, as exhibited in the *Theatetes*, the *Republic*, the *Timaeus*, the *Sophist*, the *Parmenides*, and the *Phaedrus*, is to set off the plane of humanism in opposition to the naturalistic plane where reason is used unreasonably to deny the existence of a spiritual world in favour of a materialistic monism, or, as it were, of a materialistic metaphysics. Humanism, on the contrary, guards rigidly against metaphysical digressions, but utilizes all the resources of reason. Natural reason becomes " imbecile " only when it pretends to go beyond its field. But rationalism is truly and essentially " imbecile " because it tries to draw out of reason a monistic system and, on the other hand, does not permit it to seize all the truths that it can reach, since, arbitrarily, it denies it the possibility of testifying to the existence of a spiritual world. What Plato establishes as a fact of psychological observation is that the world of Ideas is a rational truth, and in doing so he establishes a sound basis for a genuine humanism, a doctrine of man as such, matter and spirit, each distinct from the other, even though their interpenetration must remain a mystery. But how could man, once he has thus recognized the fact of the existence of a spiritual world, stop short of attempting its exploration? Humanism points to this need. It would, however, note that, in this exploration, reason must yield to imaginative concentration on the facts it has pointed out. Plato himself has tried to formulate a " mythology " and a " theology," as More has shown in his *The Religion of Plato,* but we must thoroughly understand that, just as reason has its limits, so has even the most intuitive use of the imagination; and since we have now left the domain of human experience, there is no possibility of certitude but only of probability. Here we may — nay, we must — return to the thought of Pascal. Powerless reason must be still, and even imagination can but surmise. To reach certitude in the domain of theology, we must be able to listen to God; in other words, God must have spoken to man.

Thus does Paul Elmer More reach the threshold of historical Christianity, led thither by the philosophy of dualism to which the thought of India awakened him and which he found fully developed in his master Plato. " If there is any escape from the restrictions of probability in the religious sphere of theology and mythology," he concludes, " it cannot be achieved by the guidance of unassisted reason, but must wait on a revelation which comes with its own authority of immediate conviction." Here we leave behind the plane of humanism to enter into the domain of faith.

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We venture into it with precaution, because, even here, we do not wish to change our method. We wish to go forward only by establishing further facts. Platonism leads us to hope for a projection of the supernatural on the natural plane, since it shows that it is indispensable to the acquisition of certitude as to the world of Ideas. In the Occident, as soon as the possibility of the fact of a revelation of God to man is raised, we encounter Christianity. Christianity proclaims that there has effectively been the revelation of a personal God through the reputedly historical fact of the Incarnation. This fact has been finally defined as follows: Jesus Christ " was a person who embraced within Himself the full nature of divinity and the full nature of humanity." Such is the substance of the definition pronounced at the fourth ecumenical council of Chalcedon in 451, reaffirming in more categorical terms the principal thesis of the faith formulated at the first ecumenical council held at Nicaea in 325. What can the sceptic do with this statement? Paul Elmer More answers resolutely: he should accept it; because, as he explains in *The Christ of the New Testament* (1924), the essential dogma of Christianity, the Incarnation thus understood, is in conformity with our spiritual experience, and the philosophical truth which corresponds to this definition is in no way contrary to reason.

This meant of course a direct attack on the whole " modernist " movement. More so understood it. " It is well to be forwarned," he wrote, " that the whole bent of higher criticism during the last hundred years has been directed against the Definition of Chalcedon "; and he quotes Schweitzer, who gives a masterful summary of this whole movement in his *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu Forschung*. " First of all it was necessary to shatter this dogma [of the double nature of Christ] before the historic

Jesus could be resought. . . . It seems to us now a self-evident commonplace." If so, More answers, it is the more regrettable, because it could not be done without a purely gratuitous assumption that no genuine sceptic, or positivist, could accept. The whole movement of biblical criticism known as "modernism" is based on the *a priori* assumption that the projection of the supernatural upon the natural plane is impossible. In other words, rationalistic criticism denies dogmatically the possibility of a miracle. Thus it is led to reconstruct the life of Jesus by rejecting *a priori* every biblical passage which contains a fact or an allusion unexplainable in terms of mechanics or mathematics. The modernist will admit that even the physical world is full of mystery. He knows that his elementary terms such as mass, energy, movement, number, denote facts whose nature he cannot fathom; but he has a dogmatic faith in the regularity of physical laws, and this faith implies that no mysterious force from another order can come to project itself into the midst of observable phenomena and interfere with what he calls the conservation of energy. Everything that is thus opposed to his preconception of an unalterable uniformity in the functioning of the mechanism of nature, he rejects, without perceiving that he thus ceases to be a positivist, since his preconception, far from being based upon experience, makes him, on the contrary, refuse to consider experiences the historical authenticity of which is at least probable. The rationalistic biblical criticism at the source of modernism is thus seen to be nothing but the arbitrary application of a philosophical system. To show that this philosophical system cannot be countenanced by a genuine sceptic would be to blast out the whole foundation of modernism. That is precisely what Paul Elmer More proceeds to do.

Since the question of the possibility of miracles is the very heart of the subject, let us take it up first. Let us note, first of all, that the miraculous is not the mysterious or the inexplicable, since even the rationalist is forced to recognize that they stand at the end of every rational effort to understand any fact, beginning with the fact of existence itself. The word " miraculous " then applies not to the mysterious in itself, but to that type of mysterious facts which do not fit in with our conception of nature or which evidence does not force us to accept. Thus the miraculous is wholly different for the monist who has a purely physical conception of nature and for the sceptic who recognizes, with Plato, the action of two different orders in nature, the physical order and the order of Ideas. Any event which does not conform to his idea of the physical world, the monist will call a miracle, which for him means an imposture. On the contrary, the sceptic, who has perceived the existence of another order than that of matter, will accept the idea that the same event can be due to a projection of the spiritual order into the material. He will, however, term this event miraculous only if the evidence is doubtful and if, consequently, the event truly implies an extraordinary projection of the spiritual on the material plane. Such a simple act as lifting the arm is really as mysterious or inexplicable as the sudden healing of decayed tissues or even as a resurrection, for it implies the simultaneous operation of two radically distinct orders of existence: the extended, mechanical, material order, and the simple, immaterial, spiritual order. The Platonic sceptic does not pretend to be able to explain how the body affects the mind or the mind the body, even in so simple an act as the raising of the arm, but the explanation of a sudden cure or of a resurrection does not seem to him more difficult. He will not call miraculous the mysterious act of lifting the arm simultaneously with the formation of an idea, because the fact is wholly evident, but he will call miraculous a resurrection, or even a sudden cure, because such facts are so rare that their evidence must be carefully examined before they can be recognized as having really happened.

So we are back to the question of philosophical systems. The monist refuses to admit the possibility of a sudden cure or of a resurrection, but he also refuses to admit that, when the arm is raised, two orders of existence come into play. For the latter concordance would also be for him a miracle, and an imposture, as much as a resurrection, since his monistic system makes this concordance impossible. Thus he is led to invent theories which endeavour to account for ideas or energy in terms of matter, or matter in terms of ideas or energy, with an overlooking of facts, an abuse of induction, and a technical jargon which reveal both a lack of common sense and of humour. More does not hesitate thus to denounce all the psychologists who would assimilate mind and matter, and the idealistic philosophers who would do away with matter in favour of mind. The Occident is abdicating all possibility of efficient leadership in proportion as it accepts monistic philosophies. Not only have these philosophies led to a disintegration of individual character and to social catastrophes, as Babbitt and the More of the *Shelburne Essays* have pointed out, not only have they dechristianized Europe and are dechristianizing America, but they make impossible any religion whatsoever at all worthy of the name. The biblical criticism which stems from Strauss would indignantly deny this. Of Germanic origin, it pretends, not without some nationalistic pride, to lift religion from the lower Greek levels to the purer altitudes of Teutonic thought. What it actually does is to shut off all access to a genuine spiritual life. Vainly does the modernist protest that he substitutes for the " Ideas " of Plato the " ideals " of Hegel: a desire that certain things be true for the belief in things recognized as true. Schweitzer, summing up the famous philosophy of modernism, writes: " In the end, it makes no difference to what degree the Incarnation was realized in the person of Jesus, since the idea [rather the ideal] is a living thing in the community; . . . religion in its essence is independent of any historical fact." This is to assume that man can live on a lie, that man will continue to struggle against the animal impulses of his nature, against the lust of power and sensation, in the name of the doctrine of dreamers whom he has proved to be impostors. What could be more credulous or devoid of all true critical spirit? At the supposedly purer altitudes of German thought, the Christian faith, luminously expressed in the highly discriminating Greek terms, has, instead of acquiring a spirituality it already possessed, dissolved in the mist of meaningless words. The need of the hour is therefore to bring it back under the scrutiny of an adequate analysis; and the first step should be to return to Plato. There can be no religion unless the distinction between a spiritual world distinct from the material world, of the Idea distinct from matter, is clearly established. It is this distinction which the monistic philosophy at the root of Germanic biblical criticism has obliterated. It is Plato who has established it in the most critical way.

Let us then examine anew his doctrine of otherworldliness, this time more precisely in its bearing upon the problem of religion. The perpetual conflicts of doctrine among those who are haunted by the desire to explain everything by a reduction to unity — Epicureans, Stoics, neo-Platonists, in antiquity; materialists and idealists since Descartes — would be enough to lead us to suspect that they are all wrong. The experiment has lasted long enough to be conclusive. It is simply impossible for human intelligence, however humiliating it may be to admit it, to solve the problem of the two separate entities of matter and mind by explaining how they act on each other. Are we then obliged to remain passive before this distinction which man so evidently has made down the ages, since he has always tried to explain it away by reducing it to unity? Or can we distinguish the true from the false in the impressions which assail us? Have the very words true and false any meaning? This is precisely the problem of philosophy. The sophists had declared it insoluble: The true and the false are in terms of the ego. This sophism has a long story from the days of Protagoras to those of Anatole France. There is no accounting for tastes or opinions. What seems to me true is true for me, and that is all there is to it. But Plato found the answer to this betrayal of human intelligence. After having recognized the limitations of the intellect, he vindicated its rights, notably in the *Theatetes* and the *Sophist*. I am free to believe that a chair may have only two legs, but that does not prove it. A chair is, by definition, an object on which I can remain comfortably seated, and I cannot do it on a two-legged chair. My idea of a two-legged chair is therefore false because it is an incoherent, inconsistent idea, an idea which is really no idea at all but on the contrary merely a vain fancy. There is then a true idea and a false idea, or rather a possible error, as to what a chair may be. The point is that the truth or the falsity of this idea does not at all depend upon me. It depends, on the contrary, upon something outside of me, upon certain facts of the physical order absolutely independent of me which I can utilize but which I cannot change. This physical order will prove that I am right in conceiving a four-legged chair; it will prove also that I am wrong in conceiving one with only two legs. I shall moreover be rewarded if my idea is true, and punished if it is false. This one fact that I can have ideas which do not coincide with the physical order, and that the physical order can act against the ideal order, would suffice to prove the existence of the two orders and their independence of each other. It also shows that if man selects the false instead of reaching the true, if he imagines what has no connection with the real, if, in short, he pursues a fancy instead of seizing upon a genuine idea, he will have to stand the consequences. This is enough to make us glimpse the dualism of good and evil which follows from the dualism of the true and the false on the basis of the antecedently real which naturalism would deny.

If now we pass from the objective world of concrete things to the world of abstract ideas, we shall witness the same thing, though not quite so easily. Instead of the idea of a chair, let us take, for example, the idea of justice. Is this or that law of the state just? The Rousseauist will say: Of course, since it is a law of the state. But the state, whether autocratically or democratically administered, can, like the individual, follow a fancy instead of conceiving a genuine idea. How can they be distinguished? One way is to study the consequences of this law. If they are good, then the law corresponds to a just idea; if they are bad, then the law was based on a fancy. Injustice can thus be defined: a fanciful conception of justice. But let us note that, here again, this correspondence of the law is with something outside of itself, outside of the individual or the group of individuals who have elaborated it. There are, then, moral truths as there are physical truths, outside of the true or false conception man may have of them — which means that there are moral forces as there are physical forces, which act irresistibly outside of us, entirely above our control, our thought, or our will. Again, the existence of the antecedently real is critically established, for, though the law may be shown to be good by its consequences, it is not good because of these consequences, but good consequences follow it because it is good, because it corresponds to an antecedent truth. These forces, according to which, in spite of ourselves, is determined the truth or the falsity, the morality or the immorality of our conceptions, are precisely what Plato called the Ideas; and experience, as we have just seen, teaches that these Ideas are objective in the sense that they are not in any way the product of our intelligence, that they are, on the contrary, the standards to which our ideas must correspond under pain of error and punishment, and that, consequently, these Ideas have, in reality, although in a way we cannot understand, an existence distinct from our minds. These Ideas, independent and antecedent to us, constitute the other world — their recognition, otherworldliness.

We have already seen how, in this world of Ideas, good and evil correspond to the true and the false, since they follow it and are its sanction. But if, now, we examine ourselves impartially, in a truly critical way, we must note that there are in us contrary tendencies, some of which draw us toward what we have recognized to be the good, while others urge us toward what we have recognized as evil. Here again we come upon the paradox of a dualism which offends our reason, with the consequent constant tendency, as evidenced by the Stoics, the neo-Platonists, and their numerous modern descendants, to deny evil as a distinct entity; whereas, on the contrary, it is quite evident that we are once more in the presence of a dualism, to which corresponds, however incomprehensible it may be, an opposition of good and evil powers existing in the universe, outside of ourselves, in other words, independently of our perception or of our will. Now, as noting and analysing instead of denying the dualism of matter and spirit is the very function of philosophy, noting and analysing this opposition of good and evil powers in another realm is the particular function of religion. If this dualism is not recognized, no religion is possible; as soon as it is recognized, religion is necessary. Such is the answer of the Platonist to the contemporary modernist or materialist.

Plato went so far as to conceive the world of Ideas as a world of resplendent entities, existing out of space, invisible to the eyes of the body but reachable by intuition. This opened to man the domain of the inner life to be developed in conformity with the archetypes of this superior world. Instinctively, moreover, man, in every age and clime, has had this sense of the Beyond. It could be said that he is a religious animal, if it were not already a proof that he is more than an animal. He has always had a tendency also to people this beyond with figures less abstract than the Ideas of Plato. Thus religion becomes formulated in a mythology or a theology. Plato himself ventured into this domain. From the volume on *The Religion of Plato* in which Mr. More has studied the tendency of this religion toward a theology, he would have us retain at least the following idea: If, as is sufficiently demonstrated, the world of Ideas exists outside of space, what philosophical objection is there to the belief in the existence of incorporeal beings in the beyond? Let us grant that the nature of life outside of space cannot be described, and even that it is essentially incomprehensible for us; is this not what should be expected? The very existence of the Ideas is incomprehensible, and, for that matter, the existence of the material world of which our physical perceptions and feelings make us aware, is no less so. An impenetrable wall of mystery surrounds us on all sides, and, if we are afraid of this mystery, we can only try to stop thinking; but, so long as we do, we shall have to continue to act on faith, for faith is inseparable from scepticism. The absence of philosophical objections is not of course a proof of the objective existence of a spiritual world. At least, it is sufficient to establish the reasonableness of a mythology or a theology which proclaims the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

Plato thus gives us a philosophy which, instead of making religion impossible, implies its necessity. The philosophy of Ideas opens the world of the beyond and there finds a foundation for morality. Now, the union of the supernatural and morality is the very essence of religion. Belief in the supernatural without a corresponding system of ethics is a mere superstition or a more or less conscious hypocrisy. An ethics without a belief in the supernatural —admitting that it is possible for disbelievers in the supernatural to have such a system otherwise than as an atavistic survival—loses its imaginative and emotional basis, and, deprived of this natural support, is soon, as history reveals, struggling desperately against pessimism or relaxation. Platonism thus brings to the sceptic an indubitable proof of the validity of religious convictions and of the inner life. It tallies with the conclusions of the sages of the Orient. But, with Plato, and even more so with these sages, philosophy runs the risk of reaching but vaguely the idea of the personality of God and of the existence of free spirits in the world of Ideas, because the theology and the mythology to which philosophy leads remain necessarily rudimentary. Why then not go farther?

Since the existence of a Kingdom of God, of a spiritual world, the antecedently real behind any possible sound system of ethics, is sufficiently established to satisfy a genuine sceptic, why not examine anew critically the claims of that historical Jesus who announced his mission by the words: "Repent, for the Kingdom of God is at hand," and of Whom it has been said that He united in Himself "the full nature of the Divinity and the full nature of humanity"? A philosophy worthy of the name leads us logically to do so, since the union of two natures, a divine nature and a human nature, in one person, is, as it were, but the cosmic expression of the mystery of the fundamental dualism of matter and spirit, authenticated by experience and so profoundly analysed by Plato.

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Thus Paul Elmer More's methodical, cautious, and critical progress on the plane of the spiritual brings him face to face with Jesus. He draws near to Him, not as a believer, not as the dutiful member of a Church, but as a sceptic. He will accept nothing but evidence. But, on the other hand, he approaches Him without prejudgments, as a sceptic who has reasoned his way to the possibility of the supernatural. He does not come to Him, as did Renan, to give Him the kiss of Judas before helping to bury Him in "the purple shroud" of a sentimental rhetoric. He has not condemned Him before listening to His words.

More's *Christ of the New Testament* is thus one of the most challenging works of our epoch. If Irving Babbitt, more persistently than his friend, has continued to stress the supernatural nature of the higher will with a view to establishing a humanism which includes a principle superior to the mere rationalistic control of natural impulses and thus stands in sharp opposition to every type of naturalism, More, on the other hand, has brought out, against every form of modernism, that the dualism of good and evil in man's nature, and in the world about us, points to the existence of a realm of eternal values, of a Divine Mind whose anthropomorphic revelation on the natural plane was to be expected, so that the Incarnation and all the episodes of the " Christian epic ", stupendously mysterious though they may remain, are none the less acceptable to a genuine sceptic.

What a change of atmosphere we feel as we pass from our abstract conception of God as the ultimate end of man which scholasticism may reach, or of the action of a higher will in man which humanism may isolate, and follow Paul Elmer More in the footsteps of the historical Jesus considered by a sceptic as the very incarnation of the Divine! No longer are we straining our feeble intellects or higher imagination to catch glimpses of the one in the many, of the laws behind fleeting phenomena. We are in the presence of the Master. We see Him moving about in that serene majesty and perfection to which the most confident deniers of His Divinity have paid tribute; and we listen, in awed contentment, as he unfolds, with sublime simplicity, the aspects of the Law whose outlines we could but so dimly discern. Jesus rises again from the grave in which modernism would leave Him buried as merely the noblest of men. He is shown to us walking in Judaea, conscious of being the Messiah, calling to men as no prophet had ever called, daring to say: " Come unto Me." One by one, More examines the modernist's contentions and dismisses them in turn in the light of his philosophy of dualism which prepares him to accept the possibility of a manifestation of the divine. Why doubt that Jesus proclaimed Himself the Messiah, since, a few months after his death, Paul persecuted His disciples because they dared to believe that Jesus had revealed Himself to them as the Christ of the Prophecies? Why should there be no obscurities as to the meaning Jesus attached to " the second advent " since it is so difficult to fathom the psychology of the hypostatic union? Why is there greater clarity as to the divinity of Christ in St. John than in the synoptics? The answer is that while St. Matthew and St. Mark sought to record the Messiah's solemn call to repentance, the beloved disciple took for his supreme aim to stress the divine nature of His Master through the miracles that proved it and through the record of the sublime words by which He revealed God to man. Why should the Logos of the Prologue surprise us? Is it not in keeping with the content of the gospel heralding gloriously as it does the re-expression of the Hebraic nationalistic hope of the Kingdom in the universal terms developed by Greek thought? With what justified pride as a Hellenist, More notes how, from generation to generation, the idea of the imminence of the Kingdom of God conceived anthropomorphically issues from the chrysalid of its first symbols to be transformed into the conception of an eternal life in the world of Ideas. What a triumphant witness to the completeness of this transformation are the words of St. Basil, among others, as early as the fourth century: " Blessed, it is said, are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. Now the kingdom of heaven, my brothers, you must know is nothing but the true understanding of things that are (*tôn ontôn*), which understanding also, the Scriptures call blessedness. For the kingdom of heaven is within you. And for the inner man we can say that there exists only contemplation (*theôria*). The kingdom of heaven then would be contemplation. For the things of which we now behold as it were the shadows in a mirror, of these, when we have been freed from this earthly body and have put on an incorruptible and immortal body, we shall see the archetypes. We shall see them, if we govern our life in the straight course, and make the right faith our care, without which government and care no one shall see the Lord. For, it is said, into an evil-doing soul wisdom shall not enter, nor will it dwell in a body subject to sin. And let no one object, and say: Ignoring the things that lie at our feet, you summon us to a philosophy concerning the incorporeal and altogether immaterial being. For I judge it absurd to permit our senses to fill themselves with their own matters, while the reason (*noûs*) alone is prevented from its proper energy. For, as sense is capable of attaining what is sensible, so reason is capable of attaining the things of reason (*tôn noêtôn,* the Platonic Ideas)." But if, as a student of Greek thought, More is struck by this wondrous conjunction of the sublime content of the Christian revelation and of the matchless resources of Platonic prose, he realizes that it was not the Greek fathers who gave Christianity its peculiarly persuasive power. Even the poetical philosophy of Plato, as its history proves, could not reach the heart of humanity to its very depths as did the words of Christ. Jesus it is, and no other, More concludes, who founded Christianity. The sceptic must admit that it is the energy of his vision, the power of his spiritual imagination, his complete absorption in otherworldliness, which have acted upon the wills of men as reasoning alone could never have done. And if the Kingdom of God which he preached was, according to one interpretation, merely symbolic, even that symbolism has kept and will always retain its appeal because, in its total aspect, it is indubitably the dynamic symbol of eternal Truth. If the *Parousia* of which Christ spoke, at times, did not become a reality and presumably never will, that is in the nature of symbols. But the awe-inspiring presence of the Other World is none the less about us and within us, always ready to break through the thick crust of matter. Death is ever at hand inexorably awaiting us. And beyond, what is there, if not the imminence of that Kingdom Christ came to announce; and, on the threshold of that Kingdom, why not the judgment, the confronting of what we should have done with our life with what we actually have done, of what we should have become with what we actually did? May not then even the sceptic accept in all sincerity the symbol of this eternal Kingdom ever present above the kingdoms of the earth, of the supreme unity behind the multiplicity of phenomena, of the antecedently real, true, and good, and beautiful, ever abiding, the archetype and norm of the value of the actions of men, in all times and in all places, and to the question which Jesus asked of the Twelve, answer with Simon Peter: "Lord to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life."

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After having thus examined critically the doctrine of the Incarnation and been led to admit that, once the dualism of spirit and matter is granted, there is nothing, even in its mystery, which reason cannot accept, we still have to study the doctrine of the Resurrection, which is its necessary complement. Here the sceptic must admit, More concedes, that the testimonies of the Gospels on this capital fact are so full of inconsistencies, if not of contradictions, that the attempts of the modernists to explain it by alleging a long trance of Jesus, or an hallucination on the part of His disciples, have at least an excuse. But he adds at once that they cannot satisfy him because they explain nothing. A man exhausted by a crucifixion, with open wounds in his hands and feet, even if he could have been reanimated and had lingered on for forty days, could not have left an impression of power sufficient to bring disciples, who had lost their faith in him, to imagine and to believe the incredible fact that he had risen from the dead. Nor is the theory of an hallucination on the part of the disciples any more convincing. How could so many persons in different places and at different times have been the victims of this same hallucination; why should people suddenly stop having it at the end of forty days; how could it have come again to only one person and that the dour and hitherto sceptical Paul?

Let us grant to the modernists, if need be, that the Resurrection cannot be proved from the Gospels, but in turn let them give up trying to make us accept such theories. There remains however the testimony of St. Paul, recognized as authentic, which, fortunately, recapitulates all the apparitions of Christ after the Resurrection. Here, at least, we have the undoubted proof of a profound belief that the Resurrection of Christ was a fact, and that this belief became the basis for the Faith, at last unshakable, of the disciples of Christ that He was truly God incarnate. The critics wish us to believe that even in the case of St. Paul nothing happened, at least nothing objective. The sceptic, free from preconceptions, cannot escape the conclusion that on the contrary something objective must have happened. Men who remained so long pusillanimous, so long incapable of understanding the words of their Master, men so evidently unimaginative, the same men who had fallen asleep in the garden of Gethsemane; a man who like Peter had denied three times Him to Whom he had said: Thou art the Christ; and later, a man like St. Paul so violently convinced that the Resurrection was an imposture, could not have been so completely transformed if nothing objective had happened.

What effectively did happen brings us back to the possibility of miracles. But again, where does the miraculous begin, or rather where is it absent when the spiritual and the material meet? The monist denies it at its source, refusing to recognize two distinct orders of existence. But he thus loses the right to enter into the discussion because he thus ceases to be a true positivist, a genuine sceptic, since he dogmatizes against experience. Strauss and all his disciples beg the whole question, since, when it is a case of determining what phenomena of the supernatural order appear in the history of Jesus, they begin by assuming that the supernatural does not exist, and that, consequently, every statement in the records of the life of Jesus which cannot be explained in terms of physics must be rejected as non-authentic. The true sceptic, on the contrary, noting in himself two orders of experience, is ready to accept the evidence, not only as to facts in which only material forces are concerned but also as to those facts in which spiritual forces seem to penetrate into the domain of the material.

Thus, freed from the dogmatism of the monist who wastes time and effort in trying to explain against evidence that the miraculous facts did not take place, the sceptic will study more attentively the force which seems to be at work in the case of these facts, namely, faith: "Thy faith hath made thee whole." "Why are ye so fearful? How is it that ye have no faith?" (Mk. IV–40) "Have faith in God, for verily I say unto you that whosoever shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; and shall not doubt in his heart, but shall believe that those things which he saith shall come to pass; he shall have whatsoever he saith." An Oriental hyperbole? Perhaps. Still it is but a paraphrase of the abstract promise: "All things are possible to him that believeth." (Mark IX–23). If the spirit can affect the material order, as is proved by the least of our actions, why wonder that a more powerful spirit, or a faith which appeals to this spirit, may attain greater and even prodigious results by comparison with the action of spirit on matter in our daily experience? Between the miraculous and everyday life, there is but a difference of degree, and faith is but the measure of our confidence in the power of the spirit. The miraculous is but the irruption into the domain of mechanical causes of this other side of reality which is the invisible world and which has its own laws. If, as is shown in the case of a hypnotized subject, the mind cannot move the body unless the subject has faith in its power of doing so, why cannot the mind of man, by an extension of faith, exercise a greater control over the matter about him? If it is reasonable to believe that man can do it, why not the Master of the world of the spirit, why not God?

Since the belief of the disciples and of St. Paul in the resurrection of Christ is an indubitable fact, since, on the other hand, we do not know the limits of the possible action of mind on matter, since, on the contrary, it is reasonable to believe that this action is almost unlimited, the sceptic must conclude that there is no reason to deny the resurrection of Christ, but that, on the contrary, there are reasons to affirm it. He will not pretend to explain the nature of the vision of St. Paul, or the texture of the body of Christ which appeared to Cephas, to the apostles, to the five hundred most of whom still lived in the time of St. Paul, to St. James, again to the apostles, to St. Paul himself, to all those, in short, who, on the testimony of St. Paul (I Cor. XV. 3) saw Jesus alive after his death on the cross. But he will conclude that the evidence leaves us free to believe that all these people were not the victims of an hallucination, that they were confronted with something objective, the manifestation, according to the laws of the spirit, of a spirit to spirits still prisoners of matter. They might then well believe that He whom they had seen dead on the cross had come back to life, and that, since His words were true, he was verily their Saviour, the victorious King of the Kingdom of God, the dispenser of the Holy Ghost. Thus, concludes Paul Elmer More, "The Resurrection would be the supreme act of grace, the divine confirmation of our faith in the otherworld as an ever-present reality behind the veiling clouds of phenomena; without it the Incarnation would be left a tale of sound and madness, signifying nothing. I cannot see why the critic imbued with the profounder Platonic scepticism may not reasonably substitute for Strauss' hallucination the comforting phrase of St. Paul, 'visions and revelations of the Lord.'"

As the truth of these "revelations" depends upon the reality behind these "visions," it is important for us moderns with all our problems to know if it is reasonable to believe in the Resurrection, the indispensable corollary of the Incarnation, to believe in the final and permanent penetration of our phenomenal world by the whole spiritual force of the Other World in the person of Jesus; if, in other words, the religious plane is in truth the plane of a spiritual life above reason to the threshold of which reason can bring us, and not a lower plane of hallucinations. It is important for us to know whether the humanist, after having become or while becoming truly human, cannot glimpse a discipline which may reach even more assuredly deeper depths of his being, and whether mankind, which, as a whole, can only with the greatest difficulty reach through culture and meditation the plane of humanism, may not rise even above this plane by attaching through faith in Jesus Christ their weak and vacillating wills more securely to the Will of God. On both these questions Paul Elmer More has given us an affirmative answer.

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The significance of this answer evidently cannot be exaggerated. One way to estimate it is to note how many of the names and movements we have so long trusted More asks us to repudiate. Not only is the more recent development of "modernism" to be rejected but even the Protestantism of Luther and of Calvin. The reason is that, as More points out in his chapter on St. Paul, it is from its very inception that Protestantism has drawn away from the dualistic outlook necessary for the maintenance of any real religion and has committed us to evolve toward naturalism or to a purely humanitarian Christianity. For St. Paul, with his truly characteristic Hebraic mentality, could only with the greatest difficulty rise above the conception of the imminence of the Kingdom of God conceived as a new terrestrial paradise, a more glorious Jerusalem. When, under the influence of his sudden conversion, he accepted at last the idea of a Messiah humbled on the cross, he had to explain how men could be saved in the sense of being admitted to a more spiritual Kingdom of God, through the merits of Christ crucified Who by his sufferings had satisfied the Law. This idea of an immolated lamb was to be found in the Scriptures. Its mystic imagery appears in the prophet Isaiah. St. Paul was thus able to link his new Christian faith with the Hebraic tradition; but, ever dominated by the thought of the Law, which had filled his youth, of a Law to be satisfied, it was to be expected that, once converted to the idea of a satisfaction in the person of Christ, he should continue to stress this element of satisfaction and thus keep prominent the difficult question of the antithesis between the operation of grace and the operation of faith. He affirms that we are justified because God wills it: " by His grace through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus." But does this justification take place without the co-operation of man? Has man nothing to do to deserve grace? Can he do anything to deserve it? Does he remain purely passive under its operation? Luther and Calvin abandon the fine distinctions of Catholicism on these all important questions.[3] They conclude that man was justified arbitrarily by the Will of God. But in that case, one still has to explain how man's soul could be freed from sin, how it could be changed when it had done nothing for itself. St. Paul explained it by conceiving the whole human race as a unit of which Christ became a part in becoming the son of man. " As in Adam all died, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." The disobedience of Adam entailed for all men the loss of the supernatural life; the obedience of Christ regained for all justification. This did not, however, make each individual man less passive. In fact, it implied that all men would be automatically saved, or that a few would be automatically predestined. And yet it is this aspect of St. Paul that Protestantism isolated. It thus adopted a one-sided doctrine of grace, losing sight of the fact that in St. Paul the doctrine of " justification through grace" is balanced by the doctrine of "justification through faith." This compensating approach was also in the tradition of the Scriptures. St. Paul here started with the idea of the Law. Without knowledge of the Law, there can be no consciousness of sin, or rather the consciousness of sin is in proportion to the knowledge of the Law. A law had been given to Adam. He could therefore have the consciousness of sin because he had violated it. With Moses, the Law was again given to men more precisely; and the possibility of remorse was augmented proportionately. Their state would have been worse than before, if, on the other hand, the knowledge of the Law and the sense of sin, and remorse which follows upon the transgressions of its commands, were not an occasion for man to draw nearer to God, since, in his anguish and sense of weakness, he is led to turn toward Him and to ask for His help. It is true that grace is a free gift of God; but, on the other hand, the justice of God requires that He grant grace to the individual man as he stands in need of it and recognizes that need. Here we may see the reconciliation of the two aspects of the doctrine of St. Paul. Man is shown to be active, instead of being wholly passive, in the process of justification. The arbitrariness of God's will disappears. The Christian, recognizing the feebleness of his intellect to understand the Law and the ease with which, in consequence, his will turns from it, and unhappy, moreover, in his remorse after its transgression, turns toward God in prayer and asks for a more efficacious faith in the Law — in other words, for His grace; and God grants it to him, wholly gratuitously, freely, because it is beyond man's merits, but not arbitrarily, because man has fitted himself to receive it by his contribution and his firm purpose of amendment. Thus man collaborates with God by calling for the application to his individual self of the merits of Christ; and God, in his justice, grants Him the grace which his faith has yearned for, a faith which Christ constantly asked men to have. Faith thus becomes not simply the exterior fruit of an arbitrary grace, but a law of our being, since, as a consequence of an act of the will, we make our own the victory of Christ over sin and death. Through faith we become other than we were: we have attached ourselves to the spirit of Christ in us, so that, on the day of judgment, we shall have wherewith to satisfy the justice of God. But if St. Paul presents the two elements of this doctrine — if, it might be added, Catholicism has continued to maintain the balance between them — Protestantism separated them and fell into a one-sided exaggeration. It isolated the formula "justification through faith" and opposed it to "justification through works." The result was a rationalistic monism. Faith ceasing to be, at least in part, the voluntary answer of a human soul to the call of the exigencies of the Divine

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[3] Cf. pp. 183 ff.

Law, became a mere passive state of receptivity. It may be that both St. Paul and St. Augustine furnished some excuse for this confusion, but the Greek fathers had fully brought out the principles which suffice to condemn Protestantism and Jansenism. These fathers maintained — no doubt more easily because they were in touch with Platonism — the dualism of the action of man's will and of God's will so evident throughout the Gospels, since Christ makes a constant appeal to the will of man, though ever expounding to him the Law of God, and tirelessly proclaiming that " The tree shall be judged by its fruits."

Along with the exaggerations of Protestantism must also be rejected the whole German spiritual metaphysics which followed upon them. Brückner but expresses the conviction of German exegesis when he boasts that German thought has purified St. Paul by removing "the sphere of religious life out of the region of objective facts into the region of inner experience, out of the categories of reality into the categories of manner and values," while, " for St. Paul, religion is a relation between God and man, based on facts and realized through facts." The practical result of this transfer, More explains, was that the things of the spirit lost all reality. For our intelligence is so constituted that we have no way of understanding or expressing the facts of the spiritual life except in symbols. Abstractions for man must be re-expressed imaginatively. Any symbols — the eschatology of St. Paul, for example — may become less satisfactory and thus of lesser help to our intelligence. But these symbols may still keep much of their value, whereas German religious metaphysics, stemming from Luther through Kant, empties religious thought of all concrete content and leads inevitably to an agnostic materialism. Here, again, our only hope is to appeal to the dualism of Plato, to recognize the virtue of every symbol which is based on a clear perception of the dualism of spirit and matter, of the Ideas and of phenomena. This does not mean that the symbol equates fully with the Idea, or is more than a means to express the Idea.

It can nevertheless be profoundly true. Thus Plato himself tried to express Ideas in terms of symbols; thus the master thinkers of the Church, starting from the eschatology of St. Paul, rendered Christianity capable of striking the imagination and thus of acting on the will. It is true that the balance between metaphysical inanity and materialism is difficult to maintain, but Christianity does not have to do so, since its Idea of Divinity, forever living in the dualistic conception of a God-made man, of the Spirit-made flesh, needs no symbol for its expression. Here we may note how Christianity need fear no comparison with other religions. Its supremacy is so great that it is one of the most convincing arguments in favour of its supernatural origin. Above the tumult of Greek superstitions, of Orphic, Phrygian, Egyptian, Chaldean mythologies, the monstrosities of Mithra, all vain efforts to fill the chasm between the human and the divine, the voice of Jesus suddenly resounded, pronouncing convincing words of a sublime simplicity. The Incarnation brushed away all mythologies. All the extravagances of the imagination were swept away by the single fact that God in the person of Jesus had appeared among men. If the Divine has ever revealed itself to man, if a voice has ever broken the silence of the infinite spaces, it can be but the voice which reaches us through the record of the Gospels, inadequate though this record may be. If we reject the dogma of the Incarnation, we must reject at the same time not only Christianity but all possibility of a genuine religion.[4] The thought of the great divisions and of the immense emptiness which the theology of Luther and the philosophy of Kant have brought again into the world by compromising this highest form of the religious idea which it is possible to attain, leads More to speak for once in his book in accents of indignation: "I say with all the conviction of which I am capable," he writes, "with whatever of authority long years of reading and reflection may warrant, — I say, looking forward to other matters we shall have to discuss, that the German conceit of what Kant accomplished in philosophy and of what Luther accomplished in religion, this conceit that fairly leaps at you out of the pages of German theology and that has hypnotized modern scholars, is one of the great barriers in the way of philosophical and spiritual truth. I am not minimizing the results of German research, on which indeed I am making heavy draughts in the writing of this book, but I am asserting that the Kantian metaphysic spells death to philosophy, and that the Lutheran theology spells death to religion. The Categorical Imperative, which severs the moral sense from the desire of happiness and declares that we must do our duty with no thought of the consequences to ourselves, is the emptiest of metaphysics, meaningless at the best, fraught with a base cargo of hypocrisies at the worst. . . . So too the Kantian dictum that in all our conduct we must think of each act as if we were to formulate a law for the universe, is a caricature of the Golden Rule, — again, a meaningless presumption at the best, and at the worst an excuse for intolerant fanaticism. I understand what Christ meant when he bade me treat my neighbour as I would have him treat me; I tremble at the inferences that might be drawn from Kant's identification of my acts with a universal law."

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[4] Babbitt would say here that humanism offers an approach to religion through the experientially ascertained presence of the higher will in man. If this approach ends in mystery, as even science does, at least it stops short of theological difficulties.

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Paul Elmer More, then, is at one with Irving Babbitt in his challenge to the naturalistic age. He shows that the issue is equally clear in the field of religion as in that of humanism. That issue ultimately rests on the adoption or the rejection of a philosophy of dualism. Babbitt continued to establish such a philosophy on Aristotelian lines and thus was found to parallel the tradition in scholasticism and neo-scholasticism. More utilizes more exclusively

Platonism. But the outcome is the same: the realization that we have gone astray since we have lost sight of the truth, established by the Greeks, of the two realms of phenomena and of ideas, of the particular and of the universal, of the many and of the one. Naturalism was but the result of abandoning this distinction. Since this abandonment, the Occident has "gone wrong on first principles." It has turned its back upon humanism, a word without meaning unless it stands for the assertion of man's special estate as a being distinct from the rest of nature, the only being to represent an intimate union of changing physical and abiding spiritual principles. And at the same time the Occident turned necessarily away from all possibility of religion in its historical meaning, of a contact with the spiritual realm of Ideas, with the abiding Truth and Law. Particular phenomena are good in so far as they represent aspects of the universal order, evil in so far as they fail to represent them. Naturalism, by denying the existence of this antecedent universal order, the source of ultimate standards, strips us of all possibilities of establishing values, human or religious; for both types are to be found on the same ascending path.

Dualistic humanism, on the contrary, not only establishes experientially a basis for such values but points to the possibility and even likelihood of a divine Revelation. If there is a spiritual principle in man, if the spiritual has so penetrated matter that man is a being able to reach the universal principles of abiding order in changing phenomena, able to conceive that order, to aspire to fit into it; if, on the other hand, man's natural powers of conceiving the universal are so imperfect that his will for the good and the true remain vacillating, then man's rational nature itself points to the need of a higher will in him, of a supernatural enlightenment of his natural capacities, and it is logical to expect an even more complete penetration of the phenomenal order by the spiritual.

Thus, too, we may understand that, spiritually, even our infinitesimal earth may well be the centre of the universe. The habitation of a being, part of nature, through a physical body, and yet capable of apprehending the limitless universal, through a spiritual soul, is necessarily such a centre, for in him meet representatively the immensity of the phenomenal universe and of the infinite world of ideas. It is true that it is hard to see why an Infinite Being should want to create an extended universe except that all power tends to action and that an Infinite Being may well manifest Himself in infinite ways. But once this extended universe is created as a phenomenal manifestation of the infinite number of archetypes in His infinite mind, it must stand apart divided from Him, unless there is placed in it a being both matter and spirit, in whom both orders meet. Physical man may be but a speck in the cosmos, but even his feeble intellect, since it is capable of conceiving the universal, transcends all possible phenomenal worlds, and alone may return the homage of nature to its Creator. Even humanism implies this sublime conception of man. But Christianity! For the Prime Mover of Aristotle, for the distant abstract God of all philosophies, for the futile and so often puerile effort of the imagination to vision otherworldliness, it substituted the manifestation of God coming to dwell in the fullness of His infinity within the realm of matter, no longer merely father but brother to man. A truly stupendous idea, and yet why not? Once grasp, with Greek thought, the dualism of spirit and matter and of their actual co-operative action in man, what limit is there to the possible manifestation of spirit in the material world? But with God thus revealed dwelling among men, walking in their midst and uttering the words of eternal life, the intellect is no longer left to its abstractions, the imagination needs no longer surmise. God may be worshiped in the person of Christ. He has been made manifest in the only way He could become fully understood by beings immersed in the world of matter. Hence the dynamism of the Christian ages, the rapture of being delivered from time and place and of being in union for eternity with the whole spiritual world, the consequent ease with which these ages rose to the conception of human brotherhood while antiquity had remained, in spite of the Stoics and others, chained to racial and class exclusions. Hence, too, the joyous outer expression of this realization, the soaring of the mediaeval cathedrals bounteously peopled with the images of those who had most keenly realized the Christ, the consecration of all the arts to the worship of God, the daring trust in the possibility of spiritual ecstasy, the assurance of progress since God was with man, the unquenchable courage and hope, born of the conviction that suffering might be but a better road to the spiritual life, and that death itself had been robbed of its victory. The implications and possibilities of the Christian outlook are so far-reaching that the natural intellect and imagination are powerless to explore them. Faith alone, born of grace and to be sought by prayer, can be the key to this " Kingdom of God."

And yet, infinite though the reaches of Christianity be, they are but the expansion of the vistas opened by a philosophy of dualism: " Our Father Who art in Heaven, hallowed be Thy name " — let the homage of nature be paid to its Author by man in touch with both; " Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in Heaven " — let men live according to the abiding law in the mind of God, may the fullness of the archetypes of the world of ideas be in all their deeds. In short, let the higher nature of man reach its end. Then come the hints of the immersion of this immortal essence of man in changing circumstance, with the call for the help needed to achieve the harmony of man's dual nature: " Give us this day our daily bread " — grant to us what we need for soul and body; " Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us " — for, being as we are, matter and spirit, it is too much to hope that we shall not fall short of our highest possibilities, we shall ever need forgiveness, but how could we hope for the forgiveness of the Father if we forgot our spiritual brotherhood with all men; "Lead us not into temptation" — the "lead" may seem disconcerting, but in our present estate the partial blinding of intellect by sense is only too evident; "but deliver us from evil, Amen" — for, no less evidently, evil is in us and about us, the Law of the spirit does not easily prevail over the law of the members. Hence the need of the prayerful concentration on the higher will, the need of grace to be sought through prayer. Thus the Christian message is so simple and rational in its essence that the dualistic philosopher may paraphrase the perfect prayer, and yet Christianity opens such limitless vistas of relationships between the world of matter and the world of spirit that our psycho-animal instruments of perception and comprehension are utterly inadequate for their exploration.

Whereupon the question obtrudes: If there has actually been that revelation which we found ourselves obliged to yearn for, as a psychological necessity, in view of man's limited power to glimpse the abiding law in and above phenomena, if God has actually come to dwell among men, if the Resurrection confirmed the fact of the Incarnation, as Paul Elmer More would establish anew, if there is any reality in the whole astounding Christian message of great joy, what likelihood is there that this presence of God in the midst of men was but momentary, and that this all precious revelation was left at the mercy of casual notes preserved in perishable manuscripts to be interpreted privately by any man? Such has been the dilemma of Protestantism since its rise. The alternative is one Church, as the abiding guardian of the revelation; and this alternative Mr. More has been facing, especially since he completed *The Christ of the New Testament.*

We have seen how he expressed the suspicion that after all the chain of the humanist's reasoning was left suspended in the void: "That is the dilemma that faces the humanist. The intuition of free will; free will exercised for a purpose; purpose directed to clothe human life with value; value measured by happiness — the chain is perfect, link by link, only at the end it seems to be attached to nothing." We have seen that the answer might be that value is really measured by happiness, only in so far as happiness flows from the conformity with the series of universal archetypes to which the particular situations of life may be referred, and finally to the ultimate end of man, which means that the happiness of which man is capable can be gained only through conformity with a higher will ultimately divine. Paul Elmer More has left the humanist meditating on this higher will and bravely taken upon himself to inquire into the possibility and actuality of that Revelation which the very assertion of the higher will would lead us to hope for and to surmise to have taken place. We might well say that he too has forged link by link a perfect chain: The dualism of matter and spirit in and above man, the world of phenomena and the world of ideas; the mystery of their penetration no greater in kind if in degree in a miracle than in, say, the lifting of the arm; the Incarnation as the supreme form of the manifestation of the other world in this; the Resurrection as its corroboration; the Revelation of the Law, of the ultimate values and of the final end of man; the sublimely simple words of Christ, proclaiming once for all to man the secret of complete happiness in the full conformity of the human will with the Will of God ever ready to strengthen the human will through grace — Peace on earth to men of good will; we have at last the complete chain, except that, unless we go beyond all this, we shall perforce allow it to fall back into the dust of circumstance. Logic bids us go further. If there has been such a stupendous historical fact as the revelation of God to man, the majesty of God demands that this revelation should have been made abiding, that it should have been placed permanently above the vagaries of individual men, that it should not have been left at the mercy of individual interpretation. Let then the logical chain be further forged: If Christ came, he must have remained. The Real Presence in the Eucharist, the permanent dwelling of God among men under natural species is but a logical extension of the Incarnation. If Christ made the needed Revelation that all men, in all times and places, might know easily and surely the fullness of the law for man, He must have found a way, not only to entrust His message to men but to entrust it in such a way as to insure its permanency. He must have instituted a priesthood wholly consecrated to carry on His work, to forgive as He forgave, to bestow grace as He did and in His name, to transmit the joyful message of the Law unadulterated and complete. In short, if there has been a Revelation, then one infallible Church, within which the Spirit of God is to be " until the consummation of the world," is a logical necessity; and it is no less logical that the infallibility of that one Church should ultimately be vested in its head, the Vicar of Christ, the proximate source of its powers. But Mr. More has refused to accept this logic. He repudiates Luther, Calvin, and Kant and answers pertinently the modernists' contentions. But if, as is only too evident, Luther and Calvin separated from the Roman Catholic Church only to distort and exaggerate some of its doctrines, and to drop others, and if modernism is based on a *petitio principii,* what assurance have we in turn that Mr. More correctly interprets Revelation? What likelihood is there that we had to await his coming to know what to believe? He disowns Protestantism, but he does not accept authority, where infallible authority alone can have value. His religion remains individualistic. Rightly, Mr. Tate and Mr. Bandler have both challenged him on that issue. If he has convinced us that even Irving Babbitt's humanism does not go far enough, and that the sceptic may well accept Christ as God incarnate, and His words as the assured Revelation of the Law and the end of man which humanism can grasp only uncertainly; and if, on the other hand, we accept Mr. More's contention that the older Protestantism and modernism as well as Roman Catholicism have led us astray, we end by being only the more bewildered. If so many have been wrong, how can we hope that Mr. More is right, and that he is right because, as he himself no doubt would admit, he is illogical? Mr. Tate brings out that it is vain to propose to us membership in the Anglican Church as Mr. More does, on the ground that it offers " the kind of revelation which neither in book nor in Church is absolute but in both book and Church possesses a sufficient authority." Logically, two imperfect authorities cannot give certitude, especially when each must get its authority from the other.

Thus the whole effort of Paul Elmer More reveals again the helplessness of individualism in relation to revealed religion. Montaigne perceived it clearly in the first days of the "private interpretation" of Revelation: "The study of the Scriptures is not the study of everyone. It is not reasonable to see handled by everybody, in every room and kitchen, the learned book of the sacred mysteries of our faith. Pleasant people, who believe that they have made it palpable to the people, by putting it in popular language. Is their understanding of all they find written merely a question of language? Ignorance was much more salutary and learned than this verbal and vain knowledge, breeder of presumption and temerity." Bossuet foresaw the inevitable break-up of Protestantism into numberless sects. Baron Seillière but re-expresses the reason for it when he speaks of the self-destructive mystical imperialism of the Reformation. The weakness of the Christian position, as soon as the belief in one infallibly authoritative Church is abandoned, is that the Christian message is so stupendous that it must be final or be unconvincing. That God should have given a Revelation to man and then left that Revelation unprotected and uncertain is so contradictory that to accept this uncertainty is to start inevitably a gradual repudiation of the whole point of view. Mr. More closes his book *The Christ of the New Testament* by rejecting indignantly the modernist's contention that, in the end, it makes no difference to what degree the Incarnation was realized in the person of

Jesus, since the idea (rather, the ideal) is a living thing in the community . . . religion in its essence is independent of any historic fact." "Such is the famous philosophy of 'modernism,'" he writes scornfully, "the doctrine that we need not believe but must act as if we believed — very ingenious, very pretty, but impracticable, and at heart a lie which the world will not tolerate: men will not long act as if they believed. The alternative is the Faith of the Greek tradition or no religion of Christ." Quite true, we might answer, but neither will men long act as if they believed in a Revelation made centuries before them, unless that Revelation can still be presented to them in all the majestic assurance of absolute Truth. Posit or accept the fact of a Revelation, and the obvious logical alternatives are one infallibly authoritative religion or endless theological disputes which cannot fail to weaken belief in that Revelation.

Indeed, even while Mr. More was writing *The Greek Tradition*, the "modernism" he was refuting was already beginning to be looked upon as not sufficiently "modern." That the further repudiations of the Christian tradition should develop from Unitarianism was to be expected. For, if an authoritative Church is the logical corollary of an abiding Revelation from God, on the other hand, the abiding freedom from all dogma follows no less logically from the Protestant principle of the private interpretation of whatever records there may be of such a communication between God and man. The attempt to rationalize anew through creeds the Protestant mystic movement into churches was bound to appear contrary to its essence. Hence the inevitable trend toward an abandonment of all formulations of which Unitarianism was to represent the advance guard. Anti-Trinitarian doctrines, which go back to Arianism, broke out again at the Reformation. By the end of the seventeenth century, the word Unitarian is used in England. Through Harvard College, Unitarianism establishes itself in New England by the middle of the eighteenth century. King's Chapel in Boston accepts it officially in 1785. As might be expected, three periods in its development are distinguished by its historians: the first, influenced by English philosophy, with William Ellery Channing as its most distinguished exponent; the second, dominated by Emerson and characterized by the influence of German idealism; the third one, the freest from controversy, from about 1885 to our own day. A fourth period seems to be beginning with the rise of the " New Humanism " under the leadership of Dr. Curtis W. Reese, author of *Humanism* and editor of *Humanist Sermons;* Dr. A. Eustace Hayden, professor of Comparative Religion in the University of Chicago and author of *The Quest of the Ages;* and Dr. C. Francis Potter, who founded the First Humanist Society of New York and recently summed up his purpose in *Humanism, a new religion.* That we have in this evolution of Unitarianism a gradual but ever logical variation on the same fundamental repudiation of dogmatic religion is clear. " To diffuse the knowledge and promote the interests of pure Christianity " is the aim of the American Unitarian Society of Boston founded in 1825. When, in 1865, the National Unitarian conference sought to apply to its members the term " disciples of the Lord Jesus Christ," a more rationalistic minority founded the Free Religious Association " to encourage the scientific study of theology and to increase fellowship in the spirit." " Fellowship on no dogmatic tests, the establishing of truth, righteousness, and love in the world " was the position taken by the Western Unitarian Association about the same time. In 1894, the National Conference agreed that the Unitarian churches accept " the religion of Jesus, holding, in accordance with his teaching that practical religion is summed up in love to God and love to man." There is to be no authoritative test for membership: " We cordially invite to our working fellowship [the conference statement continues] any who, while differing from us in belief are in general sympathy with our spirit and our practical aims."

"Pure" religion in the sense of non-dogmatic religion, considered merely in its practical aspects of love to God and love to man, — such seems to have been the constant tendency of Unitarianism. But, inevitably, this gradual divesting of Christianity of all its characteristic doctrines, save the statement of its ethics in a purely sentimental form, could but lead on to a complete repudiation of Christianity and a further so-called "purifying" of religion by abandoning the idea of the love of God and by discussing religion merely in terms of man. This has been achieved by the present "New Humanism" movement among Unitarians. After quoting Channing's statement as to his faith in man's capacity to reach the idea of God, and as to divine everlasting law, duty, truth, and love, Dr. John K. Dietrich writes: "It is only a step from this thought to another which forms the basis of Humanism; namely, that man not only is of worth but of supreme worth, that he is an end and not a means." In fact, though, as Dr. Dietrich states, the majority of Unitarians had not grasped this consequence, Channing had already seen it, for after the above description of man, Channing continued: "Such a being was plainly made for an end in himself. He is a person, not a being. He is an end, not a mere instrument or means. He was made for his own virtue and happiness and not for the virtue and happiness of another. It is to degrade him from his rank in the universe to make him a means and not an end."

Man is the end of man. Such is the theme to which the "New Humanists" would confine their attention. Hence they denounce the modernist as scarcely intellectually honest with his attempt to re-express the Bible in terms of modern categories. "When he has finished," writes Dr. A. Wakefield Slaten of the West Side Unitarian Church of New York, "the Modernist has a thought-system but it is not the Christian thought-system. It is not what Catholic and Protestant Christians have believed these many centuries." . . . "The Fundamentalist is consistent, the Catholic is consistent, the religious liberal is consistent, but the Modernist appears to be unaware of the implications of his position." Religious liberalism for Dr. Slaten is the "New Humanism." "It calls upon you to give up [he further writes] the comforting thought of the Fatherhood of God and offers you instead the inflexible impartiality of immutable natural law. . . . You realize that you are in the grip of cosmic forces. You sense your isolation, that you are physically alone in a terrifying and uncaring universe, and that when your little span of life is done you sink down into extinction, the blackness of darkness forever."

There is no doubt that when you pass from modernist writings to those of the "New Humanists," you feel a distinct change of tone. The boring from within by means of weasel words, the sentimental attempt to retain the emotional and ethical values born of faith while destroying faith, is replaced by the logical facing of logical alternatives: Roman Catholicism, on the one hand, or at least whatever the Protestant dogmatic churches still treasure of the original Christian content which they took with them when they separated from Rome and which they can preserve only by violating their fundamental principle of private interpretation; and, on the other hand, the total abandonment of the belief in Revelation, of all knowledge of the supernatural, of otherworldliness, and, in its absence, concentration upon the problems of ameliorating this life. "Humanism," writes Dr. Potter, "seeks to free the human spirit from dependence upon the supernatural because that dependence hinders man's belief in himself upon which Humanism is founded." And further: "The inspirations of Humanism are the twin visions of an ideal developed human personality and an ideal commonwealth made up of such persons. Dr. John Dewey, the great humanist educator, calls it 'dynamic social idealism.'" In short, with the religious "New Humanists," Protestantism, through Unitarianism, has finally merged with naturalism.

No such unstable compromise as modernism, or even the return to the Greek tradition of Paul Elmer More and his attempt to substitute for Roman Catholicism a church that would be authoritative without considering itself the only guardian of an abiding Revelation, can avail. The " New Humanists " merely answer the old question of Diderot in Diderot's way: " Moslems, which cult would you embrace if you abjured Mahomet? Naturalism." But what is there new about this? " That human life is the true end of human life, the repudiation of Christianity, such is the idea," concluded Brunetière, " which philosophical England [that is Deistic England] taught Voltaire." The whole of Dr. Potter's " Humanism, a new religion " is but a series of variations on this theme, the denouncing of the supernatural as an unprovable and even pernicious notion, the centering of man's effort on the creation of a satisfactory human society. Exported to France, such books would be recognized at once as ancient acquaintances, at their best exhibiting the long recognized shallowness of " Voltairianism," at their worst, the naïve *esprit fort* of Flaubert's *Homais*. The new religion of Humanism is but a belated reformulation of that humanitarianism, or religion of man, which, Seillière and Babbitt have shown, has been one of the main currents of thought since the eighteenth century.

No wonder that France, after experimenting for some hundred and fifty years with this naturalism, and plumbing the depths of its insufficiencies, saw some of its best thinkers and most talented artists turn to the opposite position, and that while we, in America, were thus evolving through Unitarianism to the so-called new religion of humanism and in general to naturalism, France was experiencing a Catholic revival.

However, it is evident that there is no immediate prospect that, in Protestant countries, there will be wholesale formal conversions to Roman Catholicism, although there may well develop at least partially parallel philosophical and ethical doctrines. Paul Elmer More may have re-established conclusively, against " modernism," the philosophical foundations of Christianity; but, without a convincingly authoritative church to safeguard the Revelation, the farther he has gone back toward orthodoxy the more he leaves us perplexed. Must we then accept the naturalistic simplification of the problem at the very time the superficiality of this solution is so thoroughly realized elsewhere? It is at this point that the special value of the whole work of Irving Babbitt fully appears. With Paul Elmer More we are thrown back into the very thick of religious controversies. The new " religion of humanism " of Dr. Potter and others merely resurrects the utopian hopes of mystic naturism which have been shown to be fallacious in all domains. Irving Babbitt, on the other hand, would remind us that it is possible to recognize the action of the supernatural in man without pressing beyond to the problem of the actuality or the transmission of a Revelation. And he would add: There is no " New Humanism "; there is only the old abiding humanism, the doctrine of man as such, man distinct from the rest of nature, capable of dominating nature and of improving human life, individual and social. But human life cannot be improved on a purely naturalistic basis. It has never been. Naturalism can give us only the humanitarian idealist, or the Machiavellian realist. We have long had both and they have been found wanting. Neither is truly modern in the sense of being sufficiently critical. To be critical is to recognize the need and the actual presence in man of a higher will ready to check the excesses of man's natural powers. Because it proclaimed the fact of this higher will in man, because it called for a discipline of the natural will in conformity with it, for spiritual strenuousness, for a development of the inner life, Christianity has worked. It civilized the barbarians. It gave us a better world than the ancient. Because, unlike the new religious humanists or other naturalists, Babbitt is not so arrogant, as he tells us himself, " to dismiss as obsolete the traditional religious forms through which the higher will has been interpreted to the imagination " in the modern world, he does not take a stand against Christianity or any genuine form of supernaturalism. Because, unlike More, he contents himself with reasserting the higher will, the equivalent of Christian grace, as a fact of experience, he keeps free from the entanglements of religious controversy. Humanism, as Babbitt understands it, would merely reassert, in its full historical meaning, the conception of man as a being in whom material and spiritual elements meet. It thus offers, to both Christians and non-Christians, a common ground on which all may contribute, according to the light that is in them, to the solution of the problems of personal character and of civilization, which, experience has repeatedly shown, mere naturalism, with its dehumanizing of man, cannot solve. We may well feel grateful to Paul Elmer More for his masterly study of the Christian faith in the light of a dualistic philosophy; but, whatever may be our own religious belief or lack of it, we may feel no less thankful to Irving Babbitt for the possibility of concerted action he offers to all men of good will who are not ready to retrogress, back of nineteen centuries of Christendom, to the lowest levels of pagan thought.

VIII

NATURALISM OR HUMANISM?

THE challenge of humanism to naturalism is so far-reaching that it was bound to bring out more clearly the alternatives of thought open to us as soon as the naturalists could be heard from in concerted rebuttal. This was achieved by the publication of *Humanism and America,* a collection of essays by various humanists under the editorship of Professor Norman Foerster. The counter-attack came at once in the numerous reviews of the book and in *The Critique of Humanism,* published under the leadership of Mr. C. Hartley Grattan. No doubt a few years hence there will be doctoral dissertations on "Literary Manners in the first third of the Twentieth Century" based upon this mighty *levée de boucliers* — and daggers. One reviewer even proved so ruthless as to try to bury his opponents alive, coming forth, upon the appearance of *The Critique of Humanism* with an article entitled *Post Mortem,* which filled with evident dismay, if not the humanists, at least his fellow-combatants, who were forced to preface further books against their enemies with the words: in case they do not stay dead.

All this will no doubt be as amusing in retrospect as it proved disappointing in actual performance because of the evident failure of the writers of *The Critique of Humanism,* and of most of the reviewers, to grasp the central thought of the humanistic movement, or the implications of their own position, a failure which led them repeatedly to beg the question and left them floundering in mutual contradictions. On the other hand, many of them brought comfort to the humanists the while they berated them. They revealed parallel trends away from mechanistic determinism, impressionism, the mood of disillusion and of escape, scepticism as a substitute for thought and effort, pseudo-realism, diffusiveness, formlessness, meaningless imagery, boob-baiting, and " cackling-hen " criticism. They, too, wish literature to be humanly, which most of them recognize to mean ethically, significant. They are against drift and for mastery. Most of them seem to be convinced that they wish to disown romanticism and all its works in the sense of " mystical naturism."

But *le mal romantique,* as M. Seillière has pointed out, is not easy to get rid of. When Mr. Bandler tells us that the only difference between the disciples of Irving Babbitt and their critics is that they differ in their *interpretation* of humanism, since both believe in thought, in order, and in discipline, he is reassuring. But when he adds that the difference between Babbittian humanists and others is that the former believe that order and discipline " can be introduced into modern life from the outside," whereas the latter " seem to agree that these must issue out of modern life itself, taking what form the materials of the contemporary scene permit," though he admirably sums up the issue, he fails to see that on this difference there can be no compromise. For this is the crux of the whole debate: Is there or not a realm of law outside of man which he must discover if he would bring order into his personal and social life?

This is why there is an irreducible opposition between John Dewey and Irving Babbitt. John Dewey repudiates " the antecedently real." As an integral evolutionist, Will Durant reminds us, he believes only in the emergent. As a pragmatist, he would, at most, bend the many to the advantage of the time and place. As an experimentalist, he puts his trust in what Morris R. Cohen denounces as " the absurdity of identifying the whole realm of nature with our little human experience." He would, Mr. Mumford tells us, " give priority to external events and to physical science as an instrument for interpreting and controlling these events." In short, Dewey's philosophy has all the implications which Mr. Grattan so sympathetically brings out in his essay in *The Critique of Humanism.* Irving Babbitt, on the contrary, believes, with H. F. Osborn and so many others, that mind could not be evolved from matter under the strain of the struggle for existence, and, with Paul Elmer More, that thought and will have preceded order in the universe, just as thought and will have preceded the world of man-made things, so that there is a world of man-made things because the mind of man is capable of discovering and has discovered some of the antecedently real laws of the realm of ideas which moulds the realm of matter.

But this means precisely that order cannot " issue out of modern life itself " any more than it could issue out of mediaeval life, out of antiquity, or out of any age when men worked out a cosmos from the chaos of changing circumstance: it means that order must be *imposed upon life,* in all ages, and that it can be so imposed only by the discovery of the laws of the antecedently real, of the abiding reality, the laws ultimately divine.

Here we reach the fundamental antithesis between humanism and naturalism which hinges on the recognition of the distinction between God, man, and nature. To the naturalist, whatever order there may be comes from within nature. It is an emergent evolution. For the humanist, whatever order there may be within comes from without nature. It is the imposition of an idea upon formless energy. For the naturalist, order is whatever is evolved in a given time and place that works for the advantage of that particular situation. For the humanist, order is whatever is discovered of the abiding law. The naturalist may erect as law whatever suits him. He has no principle for condemning the findings of any man. Every man has a right to boast that that is the way he looks at it. The humanist would erect as law only whatever is in conformity with the eternal law which, though felt within himself, corresponds to an objective order. He must search for the way he ought to look at it. The naturalist would be satisfied with the changing wisdom of the age. The humanist would ever seek the wisdom of the ages. Hence the inveterate tendency of the naturalist to be, one might say, democratically proud, and of the humanist to be aristocratically humble. The first is confident that he represents nature; the second understands too well how difficult it is to get in touch with the abiding and to live up to it, not to remain diffident as to the capacities of his natural powers of cognition and volition. He knows that it takes too much concentration to discover the law to doubt that it must be worked out by the few before it can work to the benefit of the many. The naturalist is perpetually prone to reject the past findings of the race as outmoded moments of an onward evolution. The humanist treasures all traditions as data which can help to discover the constants of human nature. The naturalist remains lost in the welter of the changing many. The humanist seeks to rise to the understanding of the abiding one.

Hence the extraordinary significance of the work of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. Begun as a preliminary to literary criticism, it has evolved in concentric circles to touch upon every aspect of civilization. Finding the literary critic unable to deal adequately with values because he was without abiding standards with which to measure the manifoldness of change, Babbitt had the perspicacity, as we saw at the outset of this study, to recognize that " whether the critic can judge, and if so by what standards, is only a form of the more general inquiry whether the philosopher can discover any unifying principle to oppose to mere flux and relativity." Whereas naturalism leaves man helpless in the flux of relativity, humanism would make him master of that flux by leading him to discover the abiding principles within and without that flux and to build on this basis an ordered life and civilization. Not that, as we also saw, Irving Babbitt is less conscious than the naturalist that man lives within a changing world. The critics, who are in general accord with his critique but who balk at his principles, have so generally missed this point that it may not be amiss to stress again what are perhaps the key-sentences to the understanding of the works of Babbitt: "Life does not give here an element of oneness and there an element of change but a oneness that is always changing." "Man does not observe what is always changing from the outside; he is part of the process, he is himself a oneness that is always changing." Babbitt's great originality is to be as keenly aware of the many as of the one, and of the one as of the many, whereas his opponents are merely aware of the many and tend to deny the one.

Hence, when Mr. Bandler tells us that Babbitt's critics differ from him, because they believe that order and discipline " must issue out of modern life itself, taking what form the materials of the contemporary scene permit," we have in a nutshell the source of the misunderstandings of Babbitt's doctrine. Babbitt would agree that order and discipline must take " what form the materials of the contemporary scene permit," — that is, in other words, that there must be an organization of the changing many, of the circumstances of time and place. He assigns to the analytical reason the study of the conditions of the particular time and place. At this point, he too would rationalize the urges of the moment. But he certainly would not agree " that order and discipline must issue out of modern life itself." He would hold that you cannot rationalize the particular, the many, before you have principles with which to rationalize them, standards by which to judge and select, before you have become aware of the universal, of the one, bearing upon a particular situation, the one which alone can introduce unity and order into the multiplicity of circumstance. This universal is both within the many and without. In so far as it is in it, it explains whatever order " the many " already has. But it is not within the many in so far as " the many " is susceptible of further order. This further order cannot " issue out of modern life itself," out of the particular time and place, any more than superior fruit can issue from a wild tree. You must discover the universal standard, the " antecedently real " standard, outside a given particular before you can introduce into this particular the order which it has not reached. The capacity to do so is precisely what distinguishes " man as such ", what makes him " human," *sui generis,* in the midst of nature. To assert that capacity is to become a humanist. To deny that capacity or its need is to remain a naturalist. Irving Babbitt assigns that capacity to the higher imagination, scholasticism to the intellect; but the difference, as we saw, is largely one of terms. The point is that the humanist holds that man has the capacity to reach the universal in and through particulars, but a universal which is true in every particular, in any time and place, which is antecedently real — hence precisely its universality. In other words, the humanist believes that he can reach the constants of human nature and of human situations that are part of the abiding law, ultimately divine, in conformity with the will of God, and hence a fit object for whatever there may be of this higher will in man. It is in the name of these constants that the changing circumstance is to be rationalized, and without these constants, without these standards, humanism holds, not only literary criticism, but statesmanship, education, and all the arts must remain chaotic; and individual, social, national, and international life essentially disordered.

On the basis of our analyses, it would seem therefore that, etymologically as well as historically, the term " humanist " belongs to those who recognize that man is thus distinct from other animals through the presence in him of an autonomous spiritual element which enables him to discover the universal through the particular, hence to get in touch with abiding law, and which further points to a possible co-operation of God's will with man's will in carrying it out; for, if man has a spiritual element in him, this element must have a spiritual Being as its origin, and ultimate human values must be in terms of that supreme Being. Thus humanism stands clearly opposed to naturalism, which would merge man with nature, either by considering him wholly material or a mere manifestation of the All-One.

Further distinctions will have to be made, however, on the basis of what we consider to be man's difficulty in living up to the abiding law which he may be able to discover by himself, and of the history of the relations of man with the supreme Being which may help him both to know and to follow the law.

Renaissance humanism, as it appears, for example, in Rabelais and Montaigne, recognizes the need of God's help if one would lead an ordered life; and even, with Montaigne, disparages the capacity of natural man to reach wisdom. But Rabelais, Montaigne, and other humanists, are often inconsistent in the matter, and tend to various forms of Stoicism and Epicureanism, with a corresponding trust in nature. Scholasticism would maintain that man as an animal, endowed with intellect, can reason his way to the ultimate universal, to a knowledge of God as his end, can discover to some extent the values of his acts in relation to that end, but that, because of the limitation of that extent, the ego remains free to act or not to act accordingly. Scholasticism has little more to say about man's special difficulties in acting righteously, because, developed in a Christian community, it could isolate the fundamental philosophical problem of man's nature from the aspects more particularly considered by Christianity, such as the special weaknesses of the natural intellect and will, their tendency to excess, the strength of the sensuous appetites, and the ease with which they can gain control of the imagination. Baron Seillière evidently has the same conception of man's nature as scholasticism. However, as he has lived in touch with the full development of the naturalistic age, his special study has been the long line of naturistic excesses into which man can fall once he has repudiated religious controls. He therefore has stressed the need for a careful rationalization of man's libidos in the light of the race's experience;

but he too counts on the help of revealed religion to restrain them. Paul Elmer More would add, in his special contribution, as incidentally many of the Renaissance humanists still did, that the genuine sceptic may well believe that the supreme Being has revealed Himself to man, as man became gradually capable of understanding Him, and has become incarnate in Jesus Christ, who made definitely known what the relations of man to God were and should be. He has lately, unlike certain modern humanists, inclined to doubt that man can discover these relations by himself or be able to order life accordingly. His philosophical outlook is therefore not essentially different from that of the scholastics or of Baron Seillière, though his view of the further history of God's Revelation may not coincide with theirs. For them all, however, what might be called human integralism would include both the order of grace and the order of nature.

The exact position of Irving Babbitt may be summed up briefly against this background. He finds that a large part of the human race is not in touch with Christianity and that, even in the Occident, many do not believe in it as a revealed religion. He also finds that most of the quarrels that have led to its rejection have had to do with the dispensation of grace or the type of co-operation of God's will with man's will. He further notes that, in the Occident, the reaction against eighteen centuries of beliefs in a revealed religion has thrown man into complete materialism, or at least into a naturalism or naturism in which God, man, and nature have been merged; that thus man has been dehumanized and left with the sense that he is a mere helpless determined bit or chance conglomeration of particles of physical energy; or else an impersonal manifestation of whatever divine there may be and hence may safely follow all the impulses of his nature; or, at most, that he is the farthest development of cosmic evolution with perhaps a possibility of his being able to select his values in terms of his changing and temporarily personal self.

Babbitt avers, on the contrary, that these various forms of the dehumanizing of man are evidently contrary to the immediate data of consciousness. Let us restore his humanity to man. He is truly *sui generis*. He is shown by his possible acts to be a rational animal. There are two laws distinct: a law for thing and a law for man, both antecedent to things and man. In proportion as man discovers these laws, he will be able to master the universe and he will reach the standards of a harmonious life. However, Babbitt would further add that, as human experience only too obviously proves, these two laws which meet in man meet there unreconciled. St. Paul was a sound psychologist and a true positivist when, on the basis of the immediate data of consciousness, he asserted: "I find then a law, that when I have a will to do good, evil is present in me." For not only do the animal appetites of man tend to excess but so do his intellect and will. St. Paul looked to revealed religion for the solution of this conflict between "the law of the spirit" and "the law of the members." There is no doubt, Babbitt would admit, that revealed religion had a sound concept of human nature. And, with Baron Seillière, he would welcome the use of revealed religion in the solution of the problem of human conduct. But, he adds — and here, it would seem, we have his very special contribution — since all men are not in touch with revealed religion, since their natural urges tend to excess, and yet, since they are capable of opposing to this excess of the *élan vital* a contrary principle of *frein vital,* there is evidently in man something superior to the natural self. Something of a supernatural nature which revealed religion calls grace is present within man. This is the positive fact we must reassert. Thus we may reintegrate into the consciousness of modern man what was lost sight of in the transition from the Middle Ages. The loss of the sense of this power is precisely what led the post-Renaissance age to go "wrong on first principles" and to fall into "the naturalistic trap." Let us restore the sense of this *frein vital;* and, instead of wallowing farther in the morass of naturalism, we shall have a new humanistic age. For humanism, so understood, is evidently neither merely ancient, mediaeval, Renaissance, seventeenth- or twentieth-century. It is a constant of human nature. It is available whenever man does not lose the conception of his special estate as man.

The comparison of these definitions should at least enable us to distinguish which, among those who today would call themselves humanists, may logically do so. If only for the sake of intelligent discussion, all who any way consider that God, man, and nature are merged should recognize that they are, according to standard definitions, naturalists or naturists. The word " humanist," on the other hand, should be reserved for those who believe that man is a being distinct from both God and the rest of nature.

Moreover, if the repudiation of the spirit of drift of the twenties may well be considered encouraging, the question of the means we are ready to take to secure order needs to be further clarified. Are we to have order primarily through social control or through self-control? The ever recurring misunderstanding between Babbitt and his critics reappears at this point. After accusing him of denying the right of social problems to be discussed on their own level, and of reducing all problems to the question of individual character, they should explain just what a purely social solution of social problems may mean. It is true that some of the critics of humanism actually have. They are avowed communists.

The frankest is undoubtedly Mr. V. F. Calverton. His logical forcefulness is refreshing after the often inconsistent denunciations of the writers of *The Critique of Humanism*. He does not heap epithets upon the humanists as most of these writers did. He does not accuse them, as they did, of being unconcerned with social questions. On the contrary, he recognizes that the very opposite is true, thus making it unnecessary for the humanists to refute their other opponents. " While humanism may dodge many verbal issues," he writes in *The New Masses,* " it does not evade the social one." There is no need of conference between Mr. Calverton and the humanists. He fully recognizes that humanism is at the opposite pole from communism. But there is need of considerable conference before we can know just how far the other critics of humanism stand with Mr. Calverton. One of the most valuable features of the work of Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, and Baron Seillière is that their challenge to naturalism, because of its centrality, and because of the abundance of data they have classified, has given us a means of clearing up such confusions. Repudiate the supernatural, the antecedently real, the Law above man which man must discover in order that his own laws may be true and just, and you are committed to a merely pragmatic and hence ever changing social morality through man-made laws, with no appeal against the sovereign state which is to enforce them to secure the social control of the individual. Soviet Russia's conception of the state, recognizing no law above itself and no guarantee for individual rights, ever ready to make war against every institution, philosophy, or religion which asserts such a law above man and the individual responsibility of man to God, is but the political ideal which follows inevitably from naturalism.

Mr. Calverton fully recognizes that humanism makes this issue clear, and he boldly challenges in turn its adversaries to come out as avowed communists if they would free themselves from their inconsistencies. " What is most interesting about the new humanism from a radical point of view," he writes, " is that it will eventually force the intellectuals into choosing between two crossroads in their logic. . . . It will not be long, with this new development, before the intellectuals will have to be either consistent individualists or consistent collectivists — which will ultimately mean consistent communists." In the same number of *The New Masses,* Mr. Michael Gold, its editor, also welcomes the humanists for the reason that "they will force every liberal to examine his own heart to see whether he still believes in Church, Class, Pride, Patriotism, Capitalism, and the other superstitions and tyrannies on which western society is founded." Mr. Gold suspects that many of "the liberals" still believe some of the things the humanists believe, and he expresses the hope that the humanists will prevent them from straddling any longer. Mr. Calverton calls the humanists reactionaries because they are "still defending individualism in a world that is totally out of accord with it." Mr. Calverton and Mr. Gold are right. The issue is between individualism and ultimate communism, between schools that would seek to insure progress primarily through self-control, and schools that would strive for it through social control, which means logically through state control or state tyranny in all domains. The issue is ultimately between the humanistic state and the naturalistic state.

Mr. Calverton does not fail to quote from *Democracy and Leadership* the fearless statement of Irving Babbitt that, as against bolshevism, "which strikes at the very root of civilization . . . under certain conditions that are already partly in sight, the Catholic Church may perhaps be the only institution left in the Occident that can be counted on to uphold civilized standards." We have seen what prompted Irving Babbitt to write thus. He recognizes that Catholicism represents genuine Christianity in that both stand for a dualistic conception of man, as a being in whom the physical and spiritual meet. He recognizes too that both are realistic in their further analysis of human nature as neither tending inevitably to good nor to evil, so that the problem of individual character remains to be worked out by each and every man. It is because Catholicism is thus genuinely individualistic[1] that it has made for the development of an individualistic civilization. Not only has it asserted the equal dignity of every man, woman, and child, strong or weak, rich or poor, serf or patrician, but it has freed all from the tyranny of the state by making the precepts of right conduct depend on the abiding Law and not on the changing impulses of the sovereign king or people. Moreover, it has met the only too evident fact that man's powers of self-control are weak by holding out to him the possibility and the means of receiving help from God, through grace, in answer to an aspiration toward and closer meditation upon, the Will of God: Peace on earth to men of good will.

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[1] "Individualistic" is used here in the sense that Catholicism attaches an infinite value to the individual soul. It does not, of course, leave to the individual the determining of the articles of faith or the code of morals.

If Babbitt, at this point, cannot credit Protestantism with the same uncompromising stand for this individualistic doctrine of self-control, it is merely because it is a matter of historical record that Protestantism has both denied man's capacity for self-control by exaggerating the evil tendencies in man's nature, and tended to hand over religion to the state, thus confusing again the spiritual and the temporal; while, on the other hand, its principle of private interpretation has gradually led to rejections of dogma which tend to make it merge with naturalism. Mr. Calverton neglects to mention, however, that after his statement, " the Catholic Church may perhaps be the only institution left in the Occident that can be counted on to uphold civilized standards," Babbitt adds: " It may also be possible to be a thoroughgoing modern and at the same time civilized." Significantly, this question is raised at the beginning of the chapter in which Babbitt seeks to distinguish between true and false liberals. Calverton and Michael Gold would also raise the same question. For them, as we have just seen, to be a true liberal means to be a bolshevist. " Circumstances may arise," wrote Babbitt, " when we may esteem ourselves fortunate if we get the American equivalent of a Mussolini; he may be needed to save us from the American equivalent of a Lenin." Mr. Calverton after quoting this passage asks: " What do the anti-humanists have to say about this? Why are they so silent about this aspect of humanist doctrine? " And he answers: " Because most of them at heart are but intellectual fascists of another stripe." He would thus brand as reactionaries not only the humanists but the self-styled liberals who are not yet ready to look to Moscow for their ideal.[2]

As opposed to this ideal of the absolute supremacy of the state, we have the recent opinion of Chief Justice Hughes and of three of his associates in the Macintosh case: " In the forum of conscience, duty to a higher moral power than the State has always been maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would undoubtedly be made by many of our conscientious citizens. The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." Calvin Coolidge expressed the same view when he wrote: " Men do not make laws. They do but discover them. Laws must be justified by something more than the will of the majority. They must rest on the eternal foundation of righteousness." Catholics would no doubt say that these statements parallel Catholic teaching. It is no less evident that they are in accord with the very essence of dualistic humanism. Here is the touchstone with which to distinguish between the false and the true liberal: the recognition of the abiding Law above the changing whims of men, and hence the recognition of a higher moral power than the state. As the American government is grounded on the recognition of the rights of the individual which stem from such a humanistic and religious philosophy, the critics of humanism should understand that humanism will remain very much alive no matter how many times it is declared dead. A *post mortem* over dualistic humanism would also be one over American and every truly liberal polity.

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[2] As for the humanists themselves, they are, of course, the very opposite of intellectual fascists. Since, according to fascism, society does not exist for the individual, but the individual for society, fascism, like bolshevism, is the antithesis of humanism. A Mussolini, as opposed to a Lenin, would merely be the lesser of two evils. Fascism, at least, does not annul the individual.

As Mr. Calverton recognizes, humanism, as restated by Irving Babbitt, is not a literary dispute. It is not merely the doctrine of the men who happen to have contributed essays to *Humanism and America,* or even, for that matter, merely the doctrine of Babbitt or More or of any of their disciples. There is no new humanism. There is merely the age-old opposition between naturalism (or the monistic merging of God, man, and nature, and the consequent denial of a law antecedent to all human experience) and humanism, the clear conception of man, distinct and unique in nature, and responsible to a law superior to himself, a law which he must discover, a higher will to which he must learn to attune his natural will. This higher will, religion interprets in terms of God. The humanist may interpret it only in terms of a veto power which he knows by experience to be within him. He none the less recognizes the higher will as something ultimately divine. If the work of Irving Babbitt and of Paul Elmer More is so valuable, it is because, by the boldness of its challenge to the naturalism which denies this dualism in man, it has made us sharply conscious of the alternatives open to us.

Which shall we choose: naturalism, with its repudiation of the supernatural, with its denial of an abiding law above men and nations, the source of ultimate standards and of individual rights, and with its inevitable trend toward a despotic state; or humanism, with its critically established assertion of this abiding law, its sympathetic outlook toward revealed religion as well as toward all genuinely cultural traditions of the race, and its clear distinction between the temporal and the spiritual? The fate of the Occident and, as it may already be discerned, of the Orient as well, inevitably depends upon that choice. For ideas shape civilizations. Change the idea and the order will change. Replace ideas by chimeras, and the order will dissolve. We may choose as we please, but we cannot escape the consequences of our choosing. We are free to re-enact what Babbitt calls all the pagan stupidities; but, if we do so, as he reminds us, we cannot escape the pagan doom. The shifting sands of " the many " are strewn with the ruins of the kingdoms of men. Humanism, in warning us to recover the sense of the abiding " one," but reasserts, on the basis of human experience, the Christian injunction to seek first the Kingdom of God.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

ON DUALISTIC HUMANISM

Foerster, N. (ed.), *Humanism and America* (Farrar and Rinehart, 1930) lists "the books published since 1900 that are humanistic in a strict sense, together with a few books humanistic in a sense more general and indefinite." Foerster, N., *Toward Standards* (F. and R., 1930) gives a shorter list which includes the principal magazine articles on the subject. Richards, P. S., *Belief in Man* (F. and R., 1932) should be added.

Mr. Arthur Berthold announces a bibliography of humanism. It offers a difficult problem. All those who do not merge God, man, and nature, who, in other words, are not monists, might be included. They are of course legion. Within this definition, the distinction made in this book could be applied.

Babbitt, Irving: *Literature and the American College* (1908); *The New Laokoon* (1910); *The Masters of Modern French Criticism* (1912); *Rousseau and Romanticism* (1919); *Democracy and Leadership* (1924); *On Being Creative* (1932). All these books are published by Houghton, Mifflin. The *Masters, Rousseau* and *Democracy* contain Professor Babbitt's own references. These books will hereafter be referred to respectively as: L. A. C.; N. L.; M. F. C.; R. R.; D. L.

More, Paul Elmer: *A Century of Indian Epigrams* (1898); *Shelburne Essays,* 11 vols. (1904–21). Vol. 11 contains an alphabetical list of all the essays; *The Demon of the Absolute* (*New Shelburne Essays,* Vol. 1, 1928). All these books are published by Houghton, Mifflin. *The Greek Tradition: Introduction, Platonism* (1917, rev. 1926); *The Religion of Plato* (1921); *Hellenistic Philosophies* (1923); *The Chirst of the New Testament* (1924); *Christ the Word* (1927); *The Catholic Faith* (1931) — all published by the Princeton University Press.

Seillière, Ernest: The principal works of Baron Seillière bearing on my analysis of his work and not mentioned in the text are: *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (1921); *Les Etapes du mysticisme passionel* (Rousseau, Chateaubriand, Mme de Staël, Byron) (1909); *Le Mal romantique* (Stendhal, Fourier) (1908); *George Sand, mystique de la passion, de la politique et de l'art* (1920); *Balzac et la morale romantique* (1922); *L'Avènement du mysticisme passionel au théâtre* (Alexandre Dumas *fils*) (1921), Barbey d'Aurevilly (1910); *Le*

Romantisme des réalistes (Flaubert) (1914); *Emile Zola: le romantisme des naturalistes* (1923); *Mysticisme et domination* (1913); *Schopenhauer* (1910); *Les Mystiques du néoromantisme* (Marx, E. Rohde, Tolstoy, The Pan-Germanists) (1910); *L'Impérialisme démocratique* (Hobbes, Rousseau, Proudhon) (1917); *Apollon ou Dionysos* (Nietzsche) (1905); *H. S. Chamberlain, le plus récent philosophe du pangermanisme mystique* (1918); *Les Pangermanistes d'aprèsguerre* (Thomas Mann, H. Keyserling, O. Spengler) (1924); *Le Péril mystique dans l'inspiration des démocraties contemporaines* (1918); *Edgar Quinet et le mysticisme démocratique* (1920); *Auguste Comte* (1925); *Du Quiétisme au socialisme romantique* (Victor Hugo) (1926).

A complete list of Seillière's works together with the title of the principal books on his doctrines is given in each of his books to date. The last one is *Le Romantisme et la religion* (*Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique,* Paris, 1932). The best study of his works to its own date is Gillouin, R., *Une Nouvelle Philosophie de l'histoire moderne* (Grasset, Paris, 1921). J. M. L. Boudeau's *Ernest Seillière* (Emile Paul, Paris, 1921) is specially valuable for its very complete bibliography of Baron Seillière's magazine articles (225) and of the articles (88) published about his works till that date.

ON NEO-SCHOLASTICISM

A " Select and Classified Bibliography in Philosophy " compiled under the direction of Rev. Leo W. Keeler, professor of philosophy at the Gregorian University, Rome, may be found in *The Modern Schoolman* (Jan. 1933), St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo. It includes the principal works readily available on scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophy. In my study of the psychology of scholasticism I have used especially Maher, M., *Psychology, Empirical and Rational, 9th edition* (Longmans, 1926), and Mercier, D., *Modern Scholastic Philosophy,* 2 vols. (Herder, 1926). For St. Thomas Aquinas I have used l'Abbé de Genoude, *La Somme Théologique de St. Thomas d'Aquin,* 2 vols. (Paris, 1855).

The *Catholic Encyclopaedia* (The Enc. Press, N. Y.) contains a presentation of neo-scholastic philosophy far more complete than any single work. Nearly 300 articles are devoted to its separate topics or to the critical analysis of other systems from the scholastic point of view. Besides, over 100 articles deal with the history of philosophy and over 200 articles on theology touch on some aspect of human integralism. They are most conveniently located for systematic study through the courses of reading in philosophy, the history of philosophy, and theology published in the index volume. I have checked up through this material every topic referring to scholasticism or Catholic doctrine. The " Stonyhurst Series " (Longmans), the first editions of which antedate the development of the Louvain movement, includes separate books on Logic; Principles of Logic; First Principles of Knowledge; Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism; Psychology (Maher's); General Metaphysics; Natural Theology; Principles of Natural Theology; Moral Philosophy; Political Economy.

Later books which may also serve as an introduction to the subject are:

Mercier, D.: *Critériologie* (Louvain, 1918); *Psychologie* (Louvain, 1912); *Origins of Modern Psychology* (Kenedy, 1918); *Métaphysique générale* (Louvain, 1910); *Les Origines de la psychologie contemporaine* (Louvain, 1908); *The Origins of Contemporary Psychology* (trans.), (Kenedy, 1918).

Wulf, M. de: *Scholasticism Old and New* (Gill, Dublin, 1907); *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1922); *History of Mediaeval Philosophy,* 2 vols. (Longmans, 1925); *Mediaeval Philosophy illustrated from St. Thomas Aquinas* (Harvard, 1924); *L'Oeuvre d'art et la beauté* (Louvain, 1920).

Maritain, J.: *Art and Scholasticism* (Scribners, 1930); *An Introduction to Philosophy* (Longmans, 1930); *Les Éléments de philosophie,* in course of publication (Téqui, Paris).

Gilson, E.: *L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (Vrin, Paris, 1932); *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Heffer, 1929).

Zybura, J. S., *Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism* (Herder, 1926), and Bandas, R. G., *Contemporary Philosophies and Thomistic Principles* (Bruce, 1932) initiate a determined comparison between neo-scholastic and present-day thinkers. Current discussions from the neo-scholastic standpoint may be followed in *The New Scholasticism* (Cath. Univ. Press, Washington, D. C., 1927–) and in *La Revue Néo-scholastique de philosophie* (Louvain, 1894–).

PAGE REFERENCES BY LINES

THE RENAISSANCE OF HUMANISM

P. 6, l. 3, D. L. p. 1; p. 6, l. 2, Rabelais, *Gargantua,* ch. 57; p. 6, l. 31, Montaigne, *Essais,* III, ch. 13, p. 252 (Flammarion ed.); p. 7, l. 5, Rabelais, *Gargantua,* ch. 57; Cicero, *De Finibus,* Bk. III, 6; p. 7, l. 15, Montaigne, *Essais,* II, ch. 12, p. 233, note; p. 7, l. 19, Montaigne, II, ch. 12, p. 249; p. 7, l. 27, Montaigne, II, ch. 12, p. 142; p. 7, l. 31, Rabelais, Book II (*Pantagruel*), ch. 8; p. 7, l. 22. The same may be said of Erasmus, as Foerster has brought out. Cf. *Toward Standards,* pp. 22 ff.; p. 9, l. 21. It may be said that Montaigne himself had thus answered his own "Que sais-je?" Cf. the end of *Essais,* II, ch. 12, and the whole trend of the chapter. The thesis could readily be established that the representative humanists looked to grace to make up for the weakness of man's natural powers. Babbitt's humanism includes this grace as " higher will " and " higher imagination ", noted experientially as possible activities of the individual. It is also interesting to note that when Montaigne appears to speak in favor of animal nature, he often merely wishes to recall that man is body as well as soul: " Ils veulent se mettre hors d'eux et échapper à l'homme, c'est folie: au lieu de se transformer en anges ils se transforment en bêtes; au lieu de se hausser ils s'abattent." III, ch. 13 (p. 255, Fl. ed.). Pascal merely echoes this thought: " L'homme n'est ni ange ni bête et le pire est que qui veut faire l'ange fait la bête." (Sect. VI, *les Philos.*) Scholasticism is also against any attempted " angelism ". For instance it denies to man intuition except as due to the familiarity of the intellect with a given situation (illative sense of Newman). Man is a rational animal and his animal nature has its rights though they must be subordinated to his spiritual nature: rationalized. This of course does not exclude asceticism as a counsel of spiritual perfection. At most, it can be said that Montaigne takes a stand against any such asceticism. On the last page of his *Essais,* Montaigne writes: " Les plus belles vies sont, à mon gré, celles qui se rangent au modèle commun (et humain, *var.*) sans merveille, sans extravagance." A more adequate description of the humanistic ideal would be hard to find. Nor does it follow, according to Montaigne, that this ideal can be reached without the help of grace. It might therefore be said that the humanists of the Renaissance considered grace as part of human integralism, just as Babbitt considers the " higher will " an integral part of the experience of men of good will.

P. 10, l. 7, Littré, E., *Dictionnaire de la langue française;* p. 10, l. 20 (quoted in Littré, art. *Naturalisme*). Cf. Diderot, *Suffisance de la religion naturelle,* Pensée 9; p. 11, l. 20. Moreover Voltaire was early in contact with like ideas through the French *libertins* circles. P. 11, l. 34, cf. Shaftesbury, *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue,* Part 3, Sect. 3, and Voltaire, *Lettre au Marquis de Villevieille,* Aug. 26, 1768 (p. 120, Vol. 15, Didot, 1833); p. 11, l. 30 to p. 13. The development of this whole movement may be followed in Stephen, L., *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (1876), and through Weber's *History of Philosophy.* Turner, W., *History of Philosophy* (Ginn, 1929) treats it from the Catholic standpoint. The articles on Deism, Naturalism, Pantheism, Materialism, with their bibliographies, in both the *Britannica* and the *Catholic Enc.,* are also valuable for comparative study. Cf. also *Rousseau and Romanticism,* p. 121; p. 14, l. 7. On recent trends in French philosophy, cf. Lévy-Bruhl, *History of Modern Philosophy in France* (Open Court, Chicago, 1899), Lasserre, P., *La Philosophie,* in Montfort, E., *Vingt-cinq ans de littérature française*, 1895–1920 (Lib. de France, Paris), and Parodi, D., *La Philosophie contemporaine en France* (1919). Also Calvet, J., *Le Renouveau catholique dans la littérature contemporaine* (Lanore, Paris, 1927).

THE CHALLENGE TO NATURALISM

P. 18, l. 22, R. R. p. 40; p. 18, l. 33, Diderot, *De la poésie dramatique,* Sect. XVIII; p. 18, l. 36, notably in R. R. p. 19 ff. and p. 123; p. 19, l. 7, R. R. p. 121. Cf. Shaftesbury, *An Inquiry Concerning Virtue.* Shaftesbury introduces the moral sense as a distinct faculty, but it was left to Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith to stress its emotional as opposed to its reflective character. For a criticism of this whole tendency which corroborates Babbitt's, cf. Maher's *Psychology,* pp. 336–7. Cf. also D. L. p. 51; p. 19, l. 19 to p. 22 sum up the trend as analyzed in R. R.; p. 23, l. 20. Rand, E. K., *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Harvard, 1928), Taylor, H. O., *The Mediaeval Mind,* 2 vols. (Macm., 1925), *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages* (Macm., 1911), Haskins, C. H., *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Harvard, 1927), Crane, T. F., *Italian Social Customs in the Sixteenth Century* (Yale, 1920) are important books for the restoration of the perspective of the relation of the Middle Ages to the development of modern civilization; p. 23, l. 30, D. L. p. 284; p. 23, l. 35, cf. the "grande ordonnance" of 1357; p. 24, l. 6, D. L. p. 37; p. 24, l. 16 to p. 25, l. 34, cf. D. L. pp. 41–52; pp. 25 to 27, l. 9 sum up the argument in R. R. pp. 49–69; p. 25, l. 28, "chaos d'idées claires", cf. Faguet, E., *Dix-huitième siècle,* p. 226; p. 25, l. 38, D. L. p. 54; p. 27, l. 21. This has been very thoroughly done in Schinz, A., *La Pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Alcan, Paris, 1929). Professor Schinz was among the first to write against Pragmatism. Cf. his *Anti-Pragmatism* (Small, Maynard, Boston, 1909). In his later work in literature, he opposes a rational to a romantic Rousseau and reacts rather violently against the consensus of opinion about Rousseau's romanticism as summed up by M. Lanson and analyzed by Babbitt, Seillière, and others. He is however obliged to grant that Rousseau "ne fit jamais assez nettement cette distinction [the distinction he himself makes] des deux phases romantiques en l'homme — pas même par devers lui — pour que ses lecteurs n'eussent l'occasion de s'y tromper" (op. cit. p. 512). Professor Schinz personally takes a stand against romanticism: "S'ils n'existaient pas ces sombres prophètes maudissant le romantisme — il faudrait les inventer" (op. cit. p. 513).

P. 27, l. 25, Lanson, *Annales de la Société J. J. Rousseau,* VIII, 30 (quoted in R. R. p. xvii); p. 28, l. 8, cf. Zanta, L., *La Renaissance du stoïcisme au seizième siècle* (Champion, 1914); pp. 28–31, Cf. D. L. pp. 70–96; p. 32, l. 26, R. R. p. 367; pp. 35–38. Cf. M. F. C.

pp. 1–33; pp. 38–9. Cf. M. F. C. pp. 97–188; p. 40, l. 14, Strowski, F., *Tableau de la litt. franç. au XIXème siècle,* p. 365; p. 40, l. 20, Francke, K., *Hist. of German litt.* (Holt, 1911), pp. 319–20; p. 40, l. 29, ibid. p. 320; p. 40, l. 32, ibid. p. 320; p. 40, l. 37, ibid. p. 325; p. 41, l. 27 to p. 43, l. 31, cf. ibid. pp. 330 to 334. Cf. the important article by Robert Adamson in *Enc. Brit.* stressing the indebtedness of Hegel and Schopenhauer to Fichte, and also his article in same on Schelling. Cf. also Weber, *Hist. of Phil.,* pp. 473–559, and de Wulf's *Outline of Hist. of Phil.* in Mercier, op. cit. Vol. II; p. 44, l. 30, Francke, op. cit. pp. 428–437; p. 45, l. 7. Strowski, op. cit. pp. 368 ff.; p. 45, l. 18, M. F. C. pp. 257 ff.; pp. 45–48, M. F. C. pp. 218 ff.; p. 46, l. 26, cf. Strowski, op. cit. p. 375. Cf. the judgment on Renan in E. C. Moore, *Hist. of Christian Thought since Kant* (London, 1912), p. 128: " Renan has scarcely the historian's quality. His work is a work of art. It has the halo of romance. Imagination and poetical feeling make it in a measure what it is." P. 48, l. 9, M. F. C. pp. 218 ff.; p. 50, l. 25, Francke, op. cit. p. 443; p. 50, l. 31, ibid. p. 543; p. 51, l. 19, ibid. p. 544; p. 52, l. 2, ibid. pp. 543–4; p. 52, l. 24, ibid. p. 542; p. 52, l. 20, Weber, op. cit. pp. 519–20; p. 54, l. 1, James, W., *Principles of Psychology* (Holt, 1896), Vol. I, p. 338; p. 54, l. 4, ibid. p. 401; p. 54, l. 7, ibid. pp. 338–9; p. 55, l. 20, Dewey, J., *The Man and his Philosophy* (Seventieth Birthday Addresses, Harvard Press, 1930), p. 100; pp. 56–8, cf. Dewey, " What I Believe " (*Forum,* March, 1930). The quotations from Dewey are all taken from this article which so authoritatively sums up the essentials of his philosophy; p. 59, l. 12, R. R. p. xiii; p. 59, l. 18, M. F. C. pp. 34 ff.; p. 59, l. 32, M. F. C. p. 309; p. 59, l. 36, M. F. C. p. 307; p. 60, l. 2, M. F. C. p. 311; p. 60, l. 9, M. F. C. p. 327; p. 60, l. 13, M. F. C. p. 328; p. 60, l. 19, M. F. C. p. 328; p. 60, l. 31, M. F. C. p. 329; p. 61, l. 20, D. L. p. 186; p. 61, l. 24, M. F. C. p. 330; p. 61, l. 30, D. L. p. 186.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IRVING BABBITT

P. 63, l. 1, D. L. p. 9; p. 64, ll. 16–18, 20, R. R. pp. xiii–xiv, cf. also D. L. pp. 13–14; p. 64, l. 33, R. R. p. xiv; p. 65, l. 16, D. L. 171; p. 66, l. 20, R. R. p. xiii; p. 66, l. 23, R. R. p. xiv; p. 67, l. 17, D. L. p. 168; p. 67, ll. 26–28, R. R. pp. xiii–xiv; p. 67, l. 34, D. L. p. 168; p. 67, l. 37, D. L. p. 169; p. 68, l. 4, D. L. p. 169; p. 68, l. 13, D. L. p. 13; p. 68, l. 17, D. L. p. 14; p. 70, l. 21, M. F. C. p. 46; p. 70, l. 28, cf. R. R. p. 370 to end for some of the most important statements bearing on Babbitt's psychology. These should be compared with the introduction of R. R. and of D. L. and the appendix in D. L. on " Theories of the Will "; p. 71, l. 29, R. R. p. 176; p. 72, l. 3, R. R. p. 28; p. 72, l. 9, R. R. p. 172; p. 72, l. 25, R. R. p. 177; quotations between p. 72, l. 26 and p. 74, l. 18

are all in R. R. between p. 172 and p. 177, except the following: p. 74, l. 30, R. R. pp. 171–2, important note on imaginative insight in reference to Greek terms; p. 74, l. 38, M. F. C. p. 55; p. 74, l. 7, M. F. C. p. 176; p. 74, l. 9, M. F. C. p. 176, cf. also R. R. p. xx; p. 77, l. 20, cf. *Humanism and America,* p. 39; p. 79, l. 3, ibid. pp. 39–40; p. 79, l. 11, ibid. p. 39; p. 79, l. 17, ibid. p. 40; p. 80, l. 9, cf. *Lit. and Amer. Col.,* p. 36; p. 80, l. 21, D. L. pp. 182–3.

ERNEST SEILLIÈRE AND HUMANISM

P. 87, l. 7, Braunschvig, M., *Notre littérature étudiée dans les textes* (Colin, Paris, 1925), p. 189. In general, however, an excellent book, very valuable also for its bibliography; p. 105, l. 17, D. L. p. 22; p. 105, l. 23, D. L. p. 22; p. 108, l. 36, Arbousse-Bastide, P., *Pour un humanisme nouveau* (*Cahiers: Foi et Vie,* Paris, 1930).

THE TRADITION OF DUALISM

P. 110, l. 8, R. R. pp. xvi and xviii; p. 110, l. 15, Cohen, M. R., *Reason and Nature,* p. 453; pp. 111 ff. An attempt is made here to sum up the data on Buddhism and Confucianism in Professor Babbitt's books. His interpretation of Buddhism coincides with that of T. W. Rhys Davids. Cf. art. on Buddhism in *Enc. Brit.:* " Emancipation (for Buddha) is to be found in a habit of mind, in the being free from a specified sort of craving that is said to be the origin of certain specified sorts of pain. In some European books this is completely spoiled by being represented as the doctrine that existence is misery, and that desire is to be suppressed. Nothing of the kind is said in the text "; p. 114, l. 27, R. R. p. xxii; p. 116, l. 2, cf. More's *Hellen. Phil.,* Appendix B; p. 117, l. 14, Zybura, J. S., *Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism* (Herder, 1926); p. 118, l. 17, Mercier, *Man. of Schol. Phil.,* Vol. I, p. 3; p 129, l. 10, Maher, *Psychology,* p. 414; p. 129, l. 16, Mercier, *Manual,* Vol. II, p. 239; p. 138, l. 18, cf. Newman, J. H., *Grammar of Assent,* ch. 9. Newman defines the illative sense (ch. 9, p. 3): " The capacity of entering with instinctive correctness into principles, doctrines, and facts, whether they be true or false, and of discerning promptly what conclusion from them is necessary, suitable, and expedient, if they are taken for granted; and this, either by means of a natural gift, or from long habituation to those various circumstances. . . . The ratiocinative, or illative sense, is parallel to taste in the Fine Arts." Cf. also Babbitt, R. R. p. 28; p. 139, l. 32, cf. *Summa Theologica,* Seventh Treatise, 79th question, art. 12; p. 140, l. 2, cf. Maher, op. cit. pp. 334 ff., and Mercier, op. cit. Vol. II, ch. 4; p. 140, l. 13, *Genesis,* Ch. I, v. 26; p. 151, l. 28; Mercier, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 569, 567; p. 155, l. 14, Mercier, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 571; p. 155, l. 14, Mercier, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 571; p. 155, l. 38, D. L. p. 171; p. 156,

l. 18, R. R. p. 367; p. 157, l. 21, quoted in Munro-Sellery, *Medieval Civil.* (The Century Co.), p. 372; p. 158, l. 25, Mercier, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 400; p. 158, l. 32, ibid. Vol. I, p. 33; p. 159, l. 6. Cf. Maritain, *Éléments de philosophie* (Paris, 1930), pp. 130–32; p. 160, l. 38, Maritain, op. cit. p. 112; p. 162, l. 34, D. L. p. 171; p. 164, l. 12, More, P. E., "A Revival of Humanism" (*The Bookman,* March, 1930); p. 167, l. 23, Mercier, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 222.

HUMANISM AND RELIGION

P. 171, l. 15, D. L. p. 6. Cf. also R. R. p. xi; p. 172, l. 4, Mercier, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 21–2; p. 172, l. 16, Foerster, N., *Toward Standards,* p. 200; p. 172, l. 23, ibid. p. 171; p. 173, l. 5, *Humanism and America* (Foerster ed.), p. 40; p. 173, l. 12, *Toward Stand.,* p. 202; p. 173, l. 20, ibid. p. 205, note; p. 173, l. 36, Ward, H., *Builders of Delusion* (Bobbs, Merrill, 1931), p. 166; p. 174, l. 25, *Toward Stand.,* p. 293; p. 178, l. 7, Sheen, F. J., "The New Paganism" in *The Catholic News,* Feb. 22, 1930. Dr. Sheen has reprinted this article in *Old Errors and New Labels* (The Century Co., 1931) with the names of Babbitt and More omitted but with the same evidently insufficient critical discrimination, e.g.: "Our modern Humanists who ask us to reject the superhuman Christ, either because eternal life is not necessary or because faith in Him is reducible to 'imagination', are asking us to fly in the face of forty centuries of experiment." It is most regrettable that Dr. Sheen thus lumps together Babbitt and More and the ex-Unitarian "New Humanists" when the latter recognize fully that Babbitt and More are diametrically opposed to them. Cf. Potter, C. F., *Humanism, a New Religion,* p. 114: "The Foerster, More, Babbitt group of academic Humanists opposes with vehemence both the extreme naturalism of Krutch and also the belief in man and the revolt against supernaturalism which characterizes the religious Humanists." By religious Humanists, Dr. Potter means his own group. Dr. Potter further recognizes (p. 114) that "academic Humanism (Babbitt's group) is alarmist in temper, orthodox in tendency, and likely to degenerate (sic) into a new scholasticism"; p. 180, l. 4, Mercier, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 216; p. 180, l. 13, ibid. p. 216; p. 180, l. 27, ibid. p. 28; p. 180, l. 29, ibid. Vol. I, p. 22; p. 181, l. 1, ibid. Vol. I, p. 23; p. 181, l. 9, ibid. Vol. I, p. 22; p. 181, l. 27, *The Cath. News,* art. cit.; p. 182, l. 17, *Cath. Enc.,* Vol. VI, art. *Grace;* p. 183, l. 10, ibid. Vol. VI, p. 700, col. 1; p. 183, l. 16, ibid. p. 700, col. 2; p. 183, l. 27, ibid. p. 701, col. 1; p. 184, l. 32, *Cath. Enc.,* Vol. XI, p. 604, cols. 1, 2; p. 185, l. 26, *Cath. Enc.,* Vol. XIII, p. 703, col. 1 and p. 706, col. 2; p. 185, l. 12, *Cath. Enc.,* Vol. XI, p. 604, col. 2. Cf. also Vol. VI, p. 695, col. 1; p. 185, l. 34, *Cath. Enc.,* p. 699, col. 1; p. 187, l. 22, Mercier, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 239; p. 187, l. 27, ibid. p. 240; p. 187, l. 34, ibid. p. 216; p. 188,

l. 7, ibid. pp. 263 ff.; p. 188, ll. 18, 24, *Cath. Enc.*, Vol. IX, art. *Law, natural,* p. 78, col. 2. Cf. also Mercier, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 237–40; p. 189, l. 4, James, W., *Pragmatism* (Longmans, 1922), p. 54; p. 190, l. 6, Tate, A., " The Fallacy of Humanism," *The Hound and Horn* (Winter, 1930); p. 190, l. 11, Shafer, R., " Humanism and Impudence " (*The Bookman,* Jan. 1930); p. 191, l. 24, *The Commonweal,* April 17, 1929; p. 191, l. 28, More, P. E., " A Revival of Humanism " (*The Bookman,* March, 1930), p. 7, col. 1; p. 191, l. 32, ibid. p. 7, col. 2; p. 192, l. 13, ibid. p. 7, col. 2; p. 192, l. 18, ibid. p. 8, col. 2; p. 192, l. 28, p. 8, col. 2; p. 192, l. 37, ibid. p. 8, col. 2; p. 193, l. 2, ibid. p. 9, col. 1; p. 193, l. 7, ibid. p. 9, col. 2; p. 194, l. 1, cf. R. R. p. 348; p. 195, l. 23, Mercier, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 4; p. 195, l. 36, ibid. p. 2; p. 196, l. 22, ibid. Vol. II, p. 216; p. 196, l. 37, ibid. Vol. II, p. 217; p. 198, l. 1, ibid. Vol. II, p. 223; p. 198, l. 36, Bandler, B., II, " The Individualism of Irving Babbitt," *The Hound and Horn,* (Fall, 1929), p. 65; p. 199, l. 28, D. L. p. 316; p. 200, l. 4, *Humanism and America,* p. 43.

THE WORK OF PAUL ELMER MORE

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